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We study the problem of argument systems, where a computationally weak ver-
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generated by the prover. In addition, the zero-knowledge property guarantees that
proof leaks no information about the potential secret input from the prover. Exist-
ing efficient zero-knowledge arguments with sublinear verification time require an
expensive preprocessing phase that depends on a particular computation, and incur
big overhead on the prover time and prover memory consumption.
This thesis proposes new constructions for zero-knowledge arguments that
overcome the above problems. The new constructions require only a one time pre-
processing and can be used to validate any computations later. They also reduce
the overhead on the prover time and memory by orders of magnitude. We apply
our new constructions to build a verifiable database system and verifiable RAM
programs, leading to significant improvements over prior work.
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With the advent of cloud computing, there has been significant interest in tech-
niques for ensuring correctness of computations performed by an untrusted server
on behalf of a client. Protocols for verifiable computation (VC) allow a computa-
tionally weak verifier to outsource the execution of a computation to a powerful
but untrusted prover (e.g., a cloud provider) while being assured that the result
was computed correctly. Somewhat more formally, a verifier V and prover P agree
on a function f and an input x. The prover then sends a result y to the verifier,
together with a proof that y = f(x), and the verifier can validate that the result is
indeed correctly computed. In addition, it is particularly interesting when the time
to validate the result on the verifier side is less than the time to compute f(x) on
its own.
VC protocols can be constructed from succinct argument systems, where the
prover P convinces the verifier V the validity of a statement, and the proof size and
verification time are smaller than the statement itself. See Section 2.4 for formal
definitions of argument systems. There is a long line of work constructing VC
protocols from argument systems for arbitrary computations, the most prominent
of which rely on succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) [20,46].
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This has resulted in several implemented systems; see Section 1.1 for an overview.
However, SNARKs rely on a preprocessing phase, where a trusted party (possibly
the verifier) generates a set of public parameters corresponding to a circuit for a
specific function f . This preprocessing phase is orders of magnitude slower than
evaluating f itself, and can only be used later to prove and verify the results of
the same function f on different inputs. In addition, these SNARK-based protocols
introduce a big overhead on the running time and the memory consumption of the
prover to generate the proof.
In this thesis, we propose a new construction of a argument system for arbi-
trary computations. At a high level, our construction builds on top of prior work in
interactive proofs (IP), and combines them with a verifiable polynomial delegation
(VPD) scheme to extend the supported class of computations from P to NP, allow-
ing computations to take auxiliary inputs from the prover without sending them
back to the verifier. Compared to existing SNARK-based protocols, the preprocess-
ing phase of our construction is independent of the function and can be used to
validate any computation later. Our construction also reduces the overhead on the
prover time and memory consumption by orders of magnitude. We apply our new
argument system to build VC protocols for verifiable databases and verifiable RAM
programs, and show that they lead to significant improvements upon prior work.
We also present a variant of our new argument that is zero-knowledge.
2
1.1 Related Work
Verifiable computation was formalized in [45, 72], but research on constructing
interactive protocols for verifying general-purpose computations began much ear-
lier with the works of Kilian [57] and Micali [66]. While those works have good
asymptotic performance, and follow-up works further optimized those approaches
(e.g., [10, 13, 54]), subsequent implementations revealed that the concrete costs of
those approaches are prohibitively high for the prover [75].
SNARKs. The next big breakthrough in general-purpose verifiable computation
and argument systems came with the work of Gennaro et al. [46] (building upon
earlier work by Groth [50] and Lipmaa [63]), which introduced quadratic arith-
metic programs (QAPs) and showed that they can be used to capture the correct
evaluation of an arithmetic program. QAPs have since been the de-facto tool for
constructing efficient succinct arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) [20, 23] that can
be used to verify arbitrary NP computations. This has led to a long line of re-
search providing both highly-optimized systems [16, 35, 37, 41, 61, 71, 74, 76, 81, 93]
and significant protocol refinements [17, 39, 52, 64]. We refer to [85] for a detailed
survey.
The major disadvantage of SNARK-based approaches is the extremely high
prover time they currently impose. The prover time is O(m log2m), with O(m)
cryptographic operations (modulo exponentiations in a bilinear group) where m is
the number of gates in a arithmetic circuit for a particular function. In our new
argument system, the prover time is O(m logm) (O(m) for highly regular circuits)
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with only O(n) cryptographic operations, where n is the number of inputs and
usually much less than m.
In addition, the fastest existing implementations of SNARKs assume a circuit-
specific preprocessing step, something that is not practical (and may be impossible)
in a scenario where multiple queries that cannot be predicted in advance will be made
on a given data. In contrast, our new construction requires only a one-time circuit-
independent preprocessing, and can later be used to validate arbitrary computations.
Finally, we remark that the systems mentioned above are all “natively” de-
signed to support verification only when the input is known to the verifier, which
is enough for argument systems as defined in Section 2.4. However, in verifiable
computation, the verifier also wants to outsource the storage of the input to the
prover. Support for outsourced data can be handled by having the verifier com-
pute a succinct hash of its data, and then verifying the hash computation along
with verification of the result. However, this adds additional overhead as the hash
computation needs to either be computed as part of the arithmetic circuit [29], or
checked by an external mechanism [12, 41]. Alternatively, one could hard-code the
data into the circuit being evaluated, but then the circuit-specific preprocessing
needs to be executed after each data update. Instead, our new argument system
naturally supports outsourcing data through a commitment and we can also support
dynamic data efficiently.
While some other works also aim at verifying arbitrary computations over
remotely stored data [27,31,33,55], these approaches are only of theoretical interest
at this point.
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Interactive Proofs. Interactive proofs were introduced by Goldwasser et al. [49],
and have been studied extensively in complexity theory. More recently, prover-
efficient interactive proofs for log-depth circuits were introduced in [48]. Subsequent
works have optimized and implemented this protocol, demonstrating the potential
of interactive proofs for practical verifiable computation [36,78,81].
Structure of the Thesis:
• Chapter 2 introduces background on bilinear groups, circuits, polynomials and the
details of the sum-check protocol and the interactive proof protocol of Cormode,
Mitzenmacher, and Thaler [36] (that we call the CMT protocol) . In addition, it
formally defines an argument system for verifiable computation and its correct-
ness, soundness and zero-knowledge.
• Chapter 3 presents the detailed construction of our new argument system for ver-
ifiable computation. We first show our verifiable polynomial delegation scheme,
and an improvement of the CMT protocol that supports a larger class of compu-
tation efficiently. Then we present our new argument system combining the VPD
and the CMT protocol, followed by the security proofs and complexity analysis.
• In Chapter 4, we present a verifiable database system, vSQL, using our new
argument protocol. We introduce background on SQL queries, definitions, and our
construction of a verifiable database system. We also show several optimizations of
our argument system for common SQL queries, followed by experimental results,
showing that vSQL improves the prover time by two orders of magnitude and can
be used to validate arbitrary SQL queries [88].
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• Chapter 5 describes our construction of verifiable RAM programs using our new
argument system as a backend. By utilizing the function-independent prepro-
cessing feature of our argument system, we propose a tighter RAM-to-circuit
reduction, and show that the prover time and the memory usage are improved by
up to two orders of magnitude upon prior work [90].
• In Chapter 6, we present a variant of our argument system that is zero-knowledge.
We show the construction of a zero-knowledge version of the VPD protocol, and
show how to run the interactive proof protocol on commitments without leaking
intermediate values. We give formal proofs for soundness and zero-knowledge of
the construction [89].
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, gives a more detailed survey on related work in the
literature of verifiable computation, zero-knowledge proofs, verifiable databases
and verifiable RAM programs, and describes future research directions.
6
Chapter 2: Preliminaries
In this chapter, we present background material on bilinear maps, circuits,
polynomials and interactive proofs.
We use λ to denote the security parameter. For a multivariate polynomial f ,
the degree of each monomial in f is the sum of the powers of its variables; the total
degree of f is the maximum degree of any of its monomials.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings and Assumptions
We denote by (p,G,GT , e, g)← BilGen(1λ) generation of bilinear-map param-
eters, where G, GT are groups of prime order p, with g a generator of G, and where
e : G×G→ GT is an efficient map, i.e., for all P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp it holds that
e(P a, Qb) = e(P,Q)ab. For simplicity we assume symmetric pairings in this thesis,
but our scheme can be adapted to use asymmetric pairings as well.
Let ppt stand for “probabilistic polynomial-time”. We rely on the following
cryptographic assumptions.
Assumption 1 ( [24] q-Strong Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (q-SBDH)). For any ppt
7
adversary Adv, the following probability is negligible:
Pr

(p,G,GT , e, g)← BilGen(1λ);
s
R← Z∗p;
σ = ((p,G,GT , e, g), gs, . . . , gs
q
);
(a, h)← Adv(1λ, σ);





We use W`,d to denote the collection of all multisets of {1, . . . , `} where the
cardinality of each element is at most d. The next assumption states the following.
Assume a polynomial time algorithm that receives as input two ordered sequences
of elements of G such that each element contains in the exponent a multivariate
monomial with at most ` variables and of total degree at most ` · d, for some d,
and for every ordered pair of elements (across the two sequences) it holds that the
elements differ in the exponent by a fixed multiplicative factor α. Then, if the
party outputs a new pair of elements that differ in the exponent by α, then it must
hold that the first of these two elements was computed as a linear combination of
the elements of the first sequence (and likewise for the second and the same linear
combination). This fact is captured by the existence of a polynomial-time extractor
ε that, upon the same input outputs this linear combination.
This knowledge-type assumption is a direct generalization of Groth’s q-PKE
assumption [51] for the case of multivariate polynomials. In fact, q-PKE is by












= poly(λ). The results of [22,28] show the impossibility of knowledge
1This is the number of multisets of cardinality `d, with elements taken from a set of ` elements.
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assumptions with respect to arbitrary auxiliary inputs. In the following definition
we use the notion of a benign auxiliary input (or, alternatively, a benign state
generator), similar to [37, 41, 53], to refer to auxiliary inputs that make extraction
possible, avoiding these negative results. Concretely, our proofs hold assuming the
auxiliary input of the extractor comes from a benign distribution.
Assumption 2 ((d, `)-Power Knowledge of Exponent (PKE)). For any ppt adver-
sary Adv there is a polynomial-time algorithm E (running on the same random tape)




(p,G,GT , e, g)← BilGen(1λ); τ1, . . . , τ`, α R← Z∗p;




i∈W τi}W∈W`,d , gα);
G×G 3 (h, h̃)← Adv(1λ, σ, z);
(a0, . . . , a|W`,d|)← E(1λ, σ, z);
:





i∈W τi 6= h

.
2.2 Circuit and Polynomial Notations
An arithmetic circuit C is a directed acyclic graph whose vertices are called
gates and whose edges are called wires. Every in-degree 0 gate in C is labeled by
a variable from a set of variables X = {x1, · · · , xn} and is referred to as an input
gate. All other gates in C have in-degree 2, are labeled by elements from {+,×},
and referred to as addition and multiplication gates, respectively. Every gate of
out-degree 0 is called an output gate. In the following, we focus only on layered
circuits and we assume that the output gates are ordered. We say that a circuit is
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layered if it can be divided into disjoint sets L1, · · · , Lk such that every gate of g
belongs to some set Li and all the wires of C connect gates in two consecutive layers
(i.e., between Lj+1 and Lj for some j). We write C : Fn → Fm to indicate that
C is an arithmetic circuit with n inputs and m outputs evaluated (as defined in a
natural way) over a field F. We denote by |C| the number of gates in the circuit
C, by widthi(C) the number of gates in the i-the layer of C and by width(C) the
maximum width of C, i.e., width(C) = maxi{widthi(C)}.
Polynomial decomposition. We use the following lemma for polynomial decom-
position.
Lemma 1 ([69]). Let f : F` → F be a polynomial. For all t ∈ F` there exist efficiently
computable polynomials q1, . . . , q` such that: f(x)− f(t) =
∑`
i=1(xi− ti)qi(x) where
ti is the ith element of t.
Multilinear extensions. For any function V : {0, 1}` → F we define the multilin-
ear extension, Ṽ : F` → F, of V as follows:






where bi is the i-th bit of b, X1(xi) = xi and X0(xi) = 1 − xi. Note that Ṽ is the
unique polynomial that has degree at most 1 in each of its variables that satisfies
Ṽ (x) = V (x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}`.
Multilinear extensions of arrays. An array A = (a0, · · · , an−1) where ai ∈ F can
be viewed as a function A : {0, 1}logn → F such that A(i) = ai for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
In the sequel, we abuse terminology by defining (in the natural way) the multilinear
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extension Ã of an array A.
2.3 Interactive Proofs
An interactive proof [49] is a protocol that allows a prover P to convince a
verifier V of the validity of some statement. We phrase this in terms of P trying to
convince V that f(x) = 1, where f is fixed and x is the common input. Of course, an
interactive proof in this sense is only interesting if the running time of V is less than
the time to compute f . Let 〈P ,V〉(x) denote the output of V after the interactions
with P on input x.
Definition 1. Let f be a boolean function. A pair of interactive algorithms (P ,V)
is an interactive proof for f with soundness ε if the following holds.
• Completeness: For every x such that f(x) = 1 it holds that
Pr[〈P ,V〉(x) = 1] = 1.
• ε-Soundness: For any x with f(x) 6= 1 and any P∗ it holds that
Pr[〈P∗,V〉(x) = 1] ≤ ε.
Note that the above can be easily extended to prove that g(x) = y (where x, y are
common input) by considering the function f defined as f(x, y) = 1 iff g(x) = y.
2.3.1 The Sum-Check Protocol
A fundamental interactive protocol that serves as an important building block
for our work is the sum-check protocol [65]. Here, the common input of the prover
11
and verifier is an `-variate polynomial g(x1, . . . , x`) over a field F; the prover’s goal









g(b1, b2, . . . , b`) .
Note that direct computation of H by V requires at least 2` work. Using the sum-
check protocol, the verifier’s computation is exponentially smaller. The protocol





b2,...,b`∈{0,1} g(x1, b2, . . . , b`); the verifier checks that the de-
gree of g1 is at most the degree of x1 in g, and that H = g1(0) + g1(1); it rejects
if these do not hold. Next, V sends a uniform challenge r1 ∈ F. In the ith round
P sends the polynomial gi(xi) def=
∑
bi+1,...,b`∈{0,1} g(r1, . . . , ri−1, xi, bi+1, . . . , b`). The
verifier checks the degree of gi and verifies that gi−1(ri−1) = gi(0) + gi(1); if so,
it sends a uniform ri ∈ F to the prover. After the final round, V accepts only if
g(r1, . . . , r`) = g`(r`). We have [65]:
Theorem 1. For any `-variate, total-degree-d polynomial g over F, the sum-check
protocol is an interactive proof for the function f(H) = 1 (where f(H) = 1 iff∑
b1∈{0,1} . . .
∑
b`∈{0,1} g(b1, . . . , b`) = H) with soundness d · `/|F|. Moreover, V per-
forms poly(`) arithmetic operations over F and one evaluation of g on a random
point r.
Remark 1. When g is a multilinear polynomial (the degree of each variable is at
most 1, and the total degree is `), the running time of P in round i of the sum-check
protocol is min{O(m), O(2`−i)}, where m is the total number of distinct monomials
in g [36, 78, 81].
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2.3.2 The CMT Protocol
Cormode et al. [36, 80], building on work of Goldwasser et al. [48], show an
efficient interactive proof for a certain class of functions.
High-level overview. Let C be a depth-d layered arithmetic circuit over a finite
field F. The CMT protocol processes the circuit one layer at a time, starting from
layer 0 (that contains the output wires) and ending at layer d (that contains the
input wires). The prover P starts by proposing a value y for the output of the circuit
on input x. Then, in the ith round, P reduces a claim (i.e., an algebraic statement)
about the values of the wires in layer i to a claim about the values of the wires in
layer i+ 1. The protocol terminates with a claim about the wire values at layer d
(i.e., the input wires) that can be checked directly by the verifier V who knows the
input x. If that check succeeds, then V accepts.
Notation. Before describing the protocol more formally we introduce some addi-
tional notation. Let Si be the number of gates in the ith layer and set si = dlogSie
so si bits suffice to identify each gate at the ith layer. The evaluation of C on an
input x assigns in a natural way a value in F to each gate in the circuit. Thus, for
each layer i we can define a function Vi : {0, 1}si → F that takes as input a gate g
and returns its value (and returns 0 if g does not correspond to a valid gate). Using
this notation, Vd corresponds to the input of the circuit, i.e., x. Finally, we define for
each layer i two boolean functions addi,multi, which we refer to as wiring predicates,
as follows: addi : {0, 1}si−1+2si → {0, 1} takes as input three gates g1, g2, g3, where
g1 is at layer i − 1 and g2, g3 are at layer i, and returns 1 if and only if g1 is an
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addition gate whose input wires are the output wires of gates g2 and g3. (We define
multi for multiplication gates analogously.) The value of a gate g at layer i < d can





addi+1(g, u, v) · (Vi+1(u) + Vi+1(v))
+ multi+1(g, u, v) · (Vi+1(u) · Vi+1(v))
)
.
Protocol details. One idea is for V to verify that y = C(x) by checking that
Vi(g) is computed correctly for each gate g in each layer i. Since Vi(g) can be
expressed as a summation, this could be done using the sum-check protocol from
Section 2.3.1. However, the sum-check protocol operates on polynomials defined














˜addi+1(g, u, v) · (Ṽi+1(u)
+ Ṽi+1(v)) + ˜multi+1(g, u, v) · (Ṽi+1(u) · Ṽi+1(v))
)
,
where ˜addi (resp., ˜multi) is the multilinear extension of addi (resp., multi) and β̃i is
the multilinear extension of the selector function that takes two si-bit inputs a, b
and outputs 1 if a = b and 0 otherwise.2 However, this approach would incur a cost
to the verifier larger than the cost of evaluating C, as it requires one execution of
the sum-check protocol per gate.
2Although using β̃ is not strictly necessary here [79], we use it in our construction to improve
efficiency when C is composed of many parallel copies of different smaller circuits in Section 3.2.
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Instead, by leveraging the recursive form of Ṽi, correctness of the circuit eval-
uation can be checked with a single execution of the sum-check protocol for each
layer i, as follows. Assume for simplicity that the output of the circuit is a single
value. The interaction begins at level 0, with the prover claiming that y = Ṽ0(0) (i.e.,
the circuit’s output) for some value y. The two parties then execute the sum-check
protocol for the polynomial f0,0 in order to check this claim. Recall that, at the end
of this execution, V is supposed to evaluate f0,0 at a random point ρ ∈ Fs0+2s1 (the
randomness generated by the sum-check verifier). Since f0,0 depends on Ṽ1(u) and
Ṽ1(v), in this case V has to evaluate Ṽ1 on the random points q1, q2 ∈ Fs1 where
q2 consists of the last s1 entries of ρ, and q1 the previous s1 entries. If the verifier
had access to all the correct gate values at layer 1, it could compute these evalua-
tions himself. Since he does not, however, it must rely on the prover to provide it
with these evaluations, say v1, v2. This effectively reduces the validity of the orig-
inal claim that y = Ṽ0(0) to the validity of the two claims that Ṽ1(q1) = v1 and
Ṽ1(q2) = v2. The two parties can now execute the sum-check protocol for these two
claims. By repeatedly applying this idea, the final claim by the prover will be stated
with respect to Ṽd (i.e., the multilinear extension of the circuit’s input), which can
be checked locally by the verifier who has the input x.
Unfortunately, this approach still potentially requires 2d executions of the sum-
check protocol, since the number of claims being verified doubles with each level.
Condensing to a single evaluation per layer. Efficiency can be improved by
reducing the proof that v1 = Ṽ1(q1) and v2 = Ṽ1(q2) to a single sum-check execution,
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as follows. Let γ : F → Fs1 be the unique line with γ(0) = q1 and γ(1) = q2. The
prover sends a degree-s1 polynomial h that is supposed to be Ṽ1(γ(x)), i.e., the
restriction of Ṽ1 to the line γ. The verifier checks that h(0) = v1 and h(1) = v2, and
then picks a new random point r′1 ∈ F and initiates a single invocation of the sum-




1). Proceeding in this way, it is possible
to obtain a protocol that uses only O(d) executions of the sum-check protocol.
We assumed so far that there is a single output value y. Larger outputs can be
handled efficiently [81] by adapting the above approach so that the initial claim by
the prover is stated directly about the multilinear extension of the claimed output.
The CMT protocol is formally described in Construction 1.
Construction 1 (CMT protocol). Let F be a prime-order field, and let C : Fn →
Fk be a depth-d layered arithmetic circuit. P and V hold x, y, and P wants to
convince V that y = C(x). To do so:
1. Let V0 : {0, 1}dlog ke → F be such that V0(j) equals the jth element of y. Verifier
V chooses uniform r0 ∈ Fdlog ke and sends it to P. Both parties set a0 = Ṽ0(r0).
2. For i = 1, . . . , d:
(a) P and V run the sum-check protocol for value ai−1 and polynomial fi−1,ri−1
as per Equation (2.2). In the last step of that protocol, P provides (v1, v2)
for which it claims v1 = Ṽi(q1) and v2 = Ṽi(q2).
(b) Let γ : F→ Fsi be the line with γ(0) = q1 and γ(1) = q2. Then P sends the
degree-si polynomial h(x) = Ṽi(γ(x)). Next, V verifies that h(0) = v1 and
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h(1) = v2, and rejects if not. Then V chooses uniformly at random r′i ∈ F,
sets ri = γ(r
′
i), ai = h(r
′
i) and sends them to P.
3. V accepts iff ad = Ṽd(rd), where Ṽd is the multilinear extension of the polynomial
representing the input x.
Throughout the paper, when reporting asymptotic complexities we omit a
factor that is polylogarithmic in the field/blinear group size, implicitly assuming all
operations take constant time.
Theorem 2 ([36, 48, 78, 81]). Let C : Fn → Fk be a depth-d layered arithmetic
circuit. Construction 1 is an interactive proof for the function computed by C with
soundness O(d · logS/|F|), where S is the maximal number of gates per circuit layer.
It uses O(d logS) rounds of interaction, and the running time of P is O(|C| logS).
If ˜addi and ˜multi are computable in time O(polylogS) for all layers i ≤ d, then the
running time of the verifier V is O(n+ k + d · polylogS).
Remark 2 ([78]). If C can be expressed as a composition of (i) parallel copies of
a layered circuit C ′ whose maximum number of gates at any layer is S ′, and (ii) a
subsequent layered “aggregation” circuit C ′′ of size O(|C|/ log |C|), the running time
of P is O(|C| log |S ′|).
2.4 Security Definitions
In this section, we give the formal definitions of (zero-knowledge) argument
systems. Let R be an NP relation. An argument system for R is a protocol be-
tween computationally bounded prover P and a verifier V at the end of which V
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is convinced in the validity of a statement made by P of the form “there exists w
such that (x;w) ∈ R” for some input x. In the sequel we focus on arguments of
knowledge which have the stronger property that if the prover manages to convince
the verifier of the statement’s validity, then the prover must know w. We use the
definition of [46] which includes a parameter-generation phase executed by a trusted
party, the preprocessor. Formally, consider Definition 2 below.
Definition 2. Let R be an NP relation and let λ be a security parameter. A tuple
of algorithms (G,P ,V) is a zero knowledge argument for R if the following holds.
• Completeness: For every (pk, vk) outout by G(1λ) and all (x;w) ∈ R we have
〈P(pk, w),V(vk)〉(x) = 1.
• Knowledge soundness: For any PPT prover P∗ there exists a PPT extractor
E which runs on the same randomness as P∗ such that for any x it holds that
Pr[〈P∗(pk, vk),V(vk)〉(x) = 1∧(x,w) /∈ R : (pk, vk)← G(1λ), w ← E(pk, x)] ≤ neg(λ).
• Zero knowledge: There exists a PPT simulator S such that for any PPT









(pk, vk, trap)← S(1λ); (x;w) ∈ R; 〈S(trap, pk),A(pk, vk)〉(x) = 1 : (x,w)← A(z, pk, vk)
]
the definition can be extended in a straight-forward manner for statistical and
perfect zero-knowledge.
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We call (G,P ,V) a succinct argument system if the running time of V is poly(λ, |x|, log |w|).
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Chapter 3: Constructions
In this chapter, we present the basic construction of our new argument system
for NP that is complete and sound. We defer the zero-knowledge version of our
protocol to Chapter 6.
Recall that the CMT protocol, and interactive proof protocols as defined in
Definition 1, only allow the prover P to convince the verifier V that f(x) = 1 for a
fixed f and a common input x. It does not allow auxiliary input w to f , limiting
the supported class of computation to P. To extend the interactive proof protocols
to prove statements in NP, we propose a new scheme for verifiable polynomial dele-
gation, which allows the prover P to commit a polynomial defined by w efficiently,
and later open it to a random evaluation point, as required by the CMT protocol.
3.1 Verifiable Polynomial Delegation
In the last step of the CMT protocol, the verifier Vcmt evaluates a polynomial
Ṽd on a random point rd. Since the number of terms in Ṽd is equal to the number
of input gates of C, this makes the verifier’s work linear not only in the size of the
input x but also the length of the witness w. We propose a verifiable polynomial
delegation (VPD) scheme to address this problem. We give the formal definition of
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a VPD scheme here.
Definition 3. Let F be a finite field, F a family of `-variate polynomials over F,
and d a variable-degree parameter. (KeyGen,Commit,Evaluate,Ver) constitute an
extractable VPD scheme for F if:
• Perfect completeness. For any polynomial f ∈ F it holds that
Pr

(pp, vp)← KeyGen(1λ, `, d);
com← Commit(f, pp);
(y, π)← Evaluate(f, t, pp);
:




• Soundness. For any ppt adversary Adv the following probability is negligible:
Pr

(pp, vp)← KeyGen(1λ, `, d);
(f ∗, t∗, y∗, π∗)← Adv(1λ, pp);
com← Commit(f ∗, pp);
:
Ver(com, t∗, y∗, π∗, vp) = 1
∧
y∗ 6= f ∗(t∗)
 .
• Extractability. For any ppt adversary Adv there exists a polynomial-time algo-
rithm E with access to Adv′s random tape such that for all benign auxiliary inputs
z ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) the following probability is negligible:
Pr

(pp, vp)← KeyGen(1λ, `, d);
com∗ ← Adv(1λ, pp, z);
f ′ ← E(1λ, pp, z);
:
CheckCom(com∗, vp) = 1
∧
com∗ 6= Commit(f ′, pp)
 .
where CheckCom checks if a commitment is well-formed.
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There are several works in the literature on verifiable polynomial delega-
tion [19,42,56,69]. Our construction extends the scheme of Papamanthou et al. [69]
(which itself extends prior work [56] to the multivariate case) to achieve a “knowl-
edge” property, i.e., to ensure that if the server can successfully prove that y is the
correct output relative to com for some input t, then the server in fact knows a
polynomial f of the correct degree for which f(t) = y. Thus, our construction can
be viewed as a special-purpose SNARK for polynomial evaluation.
As our starting point we use the selectively secure VPD scheme of Papaman-
thou et al. [69]. Unfortunately, selective security means that the parameters used for
the VPD protocol are computed as a function of the specific point rd on which the
VPD will be executed. This is insufficient for our application since VPD’s param-
eters will be generated once during the preprocessing phase which happens before
the CMT protocol.
To overcome this limitation, we modify this scheme to require the prover to
provide additional “extractability” terms as part of the evaluation proof. Our mod-
ified VPD scheme is given in Construction 2. We define the variable degree of a
multivariate polynomial f be the maximum degree of f in any of its variables, and
use W`,d to denote the collection of all multisets of {1, . . . , `} for which the multi-
plicity of any element is at most d.
Construction 2 (Verifiable Polynomial Delegation). Let F be a prime-order





) is poly(λ). Con-
sider the following protocol for the family F of `-variate polynomials of variable-
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degree d over F.
1. KeyGen(1λ, `, d): Select uniform α, s1, . . . , s` ∈ F, run (p,G,GT , e, g)← BilGen(1λ)




i∈W si}W∈W`,d. The public parameters are pp =
((p,G,GT , e, g),P, gα), and the verifier parameters are vp = ((p,G,GT , e, g),
gs1 , · · · , gs` , gα). For every f ∈ F we denote by ppf ⊆ pp the minimal subset
of the public parameters pp required to invoke Commit and Evaluate on f .
2. Commit(f, ppf ): If f 6∈ F output null. Else, compute c1 = gf(si,...,s`) and c2 =
gα·f(si,...,s`), and output the commitment com = (c1, c2).
3. CheckCom(com, vp): Check whether com is well-formed, i.e., output 1 if e(c1, g
α) =
e(c2, g) and 0 otherwise.
4. Evaluate(f, t, ppf ): On input t = (t1, . . . , t`), compute y = f(t). Next, us-
ing Lemma 1 compute the polynomials qi(xi, . . . , x`) for i = 1, . . . , `, such that
f(x1, . . . , x`)−f(t1, . . . , t`) =
∑`
i=1 (xi − ti)·qi(xi, . . . , x`). Output y and the proof
π := {gqi(s1,...,s`), gαqi(s1,...,s`)}`i=1.
5. Ver(com, y, t, π, vp): Parse the proof π as (π1, π
′





si−ti , πi) and e(c1, g
α) = e(c2, g) and e(πi, g
α) = e(π′i, g) for 1 ≤ i ≤ `
output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, Construction 2 is an extractable VPD
scheme. For a variable-degree-d `-variate polynomial f ∈ F containing m monomi-





), Commit in time O(m), Evaluate
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in time O(`dm), Ver in time O(`) and CheckCom in time O(1). If d = 1, Evaluate
runs in time O(2`). The commitment produced by Commit consists of O(1) group
elements, and the proof produced by Evaluate consists of O(`) elements of G.
Proof. The completeness requirement immediately follows from the construction of
(KeyGen,Commit,Evaluate,Ver).
We now prove the extractability property. Let Adv be a ppt adversary that on
input (1λ, pp), where (pp, vp) is the output of KeyGen(1λ, `, d), outputs commitment
com∗ such that CheckCom(com∗, vp) accepts. This implies that e(c1, g
α) = e(c2, g)
where com∗
def
= (c1, c2). By Assumption 2, there exists ppt extractor E ′ for Adv
such that upon the same input as Adv, and with access to the same random tape,





i∈W si = c1, except with negligible
probability. Note that, the coefficients (a0, . . . , a|W`,d|) can be encoded as a variable-
degree-d, `-variate polynomial that has ai as its monomial coefficients. We now
build extractor E :
1. Upon input (1λ, pp), E runs E ′ on the same input.
2. E tries to parse the output of E ′ as a0, . . . , a|W`,d| ∈ F and aborts if this fails.
3. E outputs f ′, where f ′ ∈ F is the polynomial with coefficients a0, . . . , a|W`,d|.
Note that E is ppt as E ′ is ppt and it only performs polynomially many operations in
F. It remains to argue that f ′ is a valid pre-image of Commit except with negligible
probability. Observe that, if E does not abort, it follows from the construction of
Commit that Commit(f ′, pp) = com, where com is the output commitment of Adv.
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By assumption 2, the probability that the output E ′ is not a valid set of coefficients
is negligible which concludes the proof.
Next, we prove the soundness property. Let Adv be a ppt adversary that
wins the soundness game with non-negligible probability. For i = 1, . . . , ` we define
adversary Advi that receives the same input as Adv and executes the same code, but
outputs only (πi, π
′
i) ∈ π∗ (where π∗ is the proof output by Adv). Moreover, since Adv
is ppt, all these adversaries are also ppt. Thus, for i = 1, . . . , `, from Assumption 2
there exists ppt Ei (running on the same random tape as Advi) which on input






j∈W sj 6= πi, except with negligible probability. Note
that, the coefficients (a0,i, . . . , a|W`,d|,i) for i = 1, . . . , ` can always be encoded as
a variable-degree-d, `-variate polynomial which we denote by q′i(x) for undefined
variable x = (x1, . . . , x`).
We construct an adversary B that breaks Assumption 1. On input (1λ, p,G,GT ,
e, g, gs, gs
2
, . . . , gs
`·d
), B does the following:
Parameter generation. B implicitly sets s1 = s and for i = 1, . . . , ` he chooses
ri ∈ F uniformly at random and sets (also implicitly) si = s · ri. Then he chooses
uniformly at random a value α ∈ F. Next B needs to generate the terms in P =
{g
∏
i∈W si , gα·
∏
i∈W si}W∈W`,d . Since the exponent of each term is a product of at most
` · d factors where each factor is one of the values si = s · ri, it can be written as
a polynomial in s with degree at most ` · d. Therefore, B can compute these terms
from the values g, gs, gs
2
, . . . , gs
`·d
and α. Finally, B runs Adv on input (1λ, pp),
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where pp = (p,G,GT , e, g, gα,P).
Query evaluation. Upon receiving (f ∗, t∗, y∗, π∗) from Adv, B first runs Commit(f ∗, pp)
to receive com
def
= (c1, c2) and then runs Ver(com, t
∗, y∗, π∗, vp) where vp = (1λ, p,G,GT ,
e, g, gs, gs
2
, . . . , gs
`·d
, gα). If Ver rejects, B aborts, else he runs extractors E1, . . . , E`
(defined above) on the same input as Adv and receives polynomials q′1, . . . , q
′
`. If





j∈W sj 6= πi, B aborts.
Otherwise, let δ = y∗ − f ∗(t∗) and let Q(x) be the polynomial over F defined as
Q(x)
def
= f ∗(x) − f ∗(t∗) −∑`i=1(xi − ti)q′i(x) where t∗ def= (t1, . . . , t`). B picks τ ∈ F
uniformly at random. If gτ = g−s, he sets τ ← τ + 1. He then computes polynomial
Q′(x)
def
= Q(x)/(τ + x1) and finally outputs (τ, e(g, g)
δ−1·Q′(s1,...,s`)) as a challenge
tuple for Assumption 1.
Since s1 = s, s2 = r2 · s, . . . , s` = r` · s, we have Q′(s1, . . . , s`) = Q′′(s)
where Q′′ is an efficiently computable univariate polynomial of degree ` · d hence
e(g, g)−δ·Q
′(s1,...,s`) is computable from (1λ, p,G,GT , e, g, gs, gs
2
, . . . , gs
`·d
). B is clearly
ppt since all of Ei are ppt and he performs polynomially many operations in
F,G,GT . Next, we analyze the success probability of B. Recall that, by assumption
Adv succeeds in violating soundness with probability ε. We observe that, condi-
tioned on not aborting, B’s output is always a valid tuple for breaking Assump-
tion 1. Let us argue why this is true. Since verification succeeds, it holds that
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e(c1/g
y∗ , g) =
∏`
i=1 e(g



















By the definition of Q′ it follows that
e(g, g)δ = e(g, g)Q(s1,...,s`)
e(g, g)
δ
τ+s1 = e(g, g)
Q(s1,...,s`)




τ+s1 = e(g, g)δ
−1·Q′(s1,...,s`).
Thus, the final piece in order to conclude the proof is to bound the probability that
B aborts. Note that, conditioned on Adv winning, B will only abort if extraction
fails which can only happen with negligible probability neg(λ). This holds since,
if verification succeeds it must be that e(π′i, g) = e(πi, g
α) for i = 1, . . . , ` and in
this case, by Assumption 2, extraction for any of E1, . . . , E` fails with negligible
probability. Since ` is polynomial in λ it follows that the probability any of them
fails (which by a union bound is at most equal to the sum of each individual failure
probability) is also negligible.
Finally, let us argue that the polynomial division Q(x)/(τ + x1) is always
possible. Recall, that for polynomials defined over finite fields division is always
possible assuming that the dividend’s degree is at least as large as that of the
divisor’s. Moreover, the degree of the quotient is at most that of the dividend’s and
that of the remainder is strictly smaller than that of the divisor. Let us assume for
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contradiction that Q(x) is a constant polynomial. Since, e(g, g)δ = e(g, g)Q(s1,...,s`+1)
and e(g, g) is a generator or GT , it must be that Q(x)
def




(xi − ti)q′i(x)− f ∗(x) + f ∗(t∗)








From the above relation it follows that t∗ is a root of the polynomial f ′
def
= f ∗(x)−y∗,
i.e., f ′(t∗) = 0 which implies that f ∗(t1, . . . , t`) = y
∗. Thus, in this case, y∗ is the
correct evaluation of f ∗ on t∗, i.e., δ = 0 and Adv did not cheat. In all other cases,
the polynomial division is possible.
From the above analysis it follows that the probability that B succeeds is at
least (1−neg(λ))ε. By assumption, ε is the non-negligible probability that Adv wins
the soundness game, therefore B’s success probability is also non-negligible. This
contradicts Assumption 1 and our proof is complete.
Asymptotic analysis. The claims for the general polynomial case follow directly
from the analysis of [69]. For d = 1, i.e., for multi-linear polynomials, we prove the
tighter bound for the runtime of Evaluate below.
Recall that during Evaluate the prover computes polynomials qi(xi, . . . , x`) for
i = 1, . . . , `, such that f(x1, . . . , x`) =
∑`
i=1 (xi − ti) · qi(xi, . . . , x`) + f(t1, . . . , t`)
and proof π = {gqi(si,...,s`), gαqi(si,...,s`)}`i=1. We start by computing q1(x1, . . . , x`).
Since the degree of every variable is at most 1, the multi-linear polynomial f can be
written as f(x1, . . . , x`) = g(x2, . . . , x`) + x1 · h(x2, . . . , x`), where g(x2, . . . , x`) and
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h(x2, . . . , x`) are multi-linear polynomials of variables x2, . . . , x`. In this way, f can
be decomposed as
f(x1, . . . , x`) = g(x2, . . . , x`) + x1 · h(x2, . . . , x`)
= (g(x2, . . . , x`) + t1 · h(x2, . . . , x`)) + (x1 − t1)h(x2, . . . , x`)
= R1(x2, . . . , x`) + (x1 − t1)h(x2, . . . , x`) .
We set q1(x1, . . . , x`) = h(x2, . . . , x`) (which means q1 contains no monomial
with x1), and proceed to decompose the multi-linear polynomial R1(x2, . . . , x`) with
` − 1 variables in the same way as f to compute q2(x2, . . . , x`). Regarding the
complexity of this, note that both g(x2, . . . , x`) and h(x2, . . . , x`) contain at most
2`−1 monomials. Therefore, it takes 2`−1 additions and multiplications to compute
q1(x1, . . . , x`) and R1(x2, . . . , x`), and 2
`−1 exponentiations to generate gq1(s1,...,s`)
and gαq1(s1,...,s`) in the proof, respectively. The exact same reasoning applies for all
of q3, . . . , q`. At the last step after computing q`(x`), the remaining constant term
is equal to the answer f(t1, . . . , t`). In general, in the ith step, we are decompos-
ing Ri−1(xi, . . . , x`) with ` − i + 1 variables in the same way above to compute
qi(xi, . . . , x`) and Ri(xi+1, . . . , x`), and the complexity is O(2
`−i). Thus, the total
complexity of computing q1, . . . , q` is O(2
`−1) +O(2`−2) + . . . = O(2`). The polyno-
mial evaluation in order to get the answer takes the same time. Each pair πi, π
′
i is
computed with two exponentiations, thus the overall running time is O(2`).
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3.2 Improving the Expressiveness of the CMT Protocol
As presented in Theorem 2 and Remark 2, the prover complexity of the CMT
protocol is in particular efficient if the circuit can be represented as many parallel
copies of the same small sub-circuit. In this section, we show how to modify the CMT
protocol to achieve the same prover efficiency for circuits that consist of multiple
(different) sub-circuits.
Let C be a depth-d, size-n, layered arithmetic circuit consisting of B inde-
pendent (“parallel”) sub-circuits C1, · · · , CB, each of depth at most d′ and size at
most n′, where the outputs of C1, · · · , Cn are fed into an aggregation circuit D of
depth-d′′ and size n′′. In this section, we show how to modify the CMT protocol
so as to prove statements about the output of C in time which is linear in the
size of C. Our modified protocol proceeds as follows. We start by following the
standard CMT protocol for the d′′ layers of sub-circuit D. Next, for the remain-
ing d − d′′ = d′ layers, we modify things in a similar way to [78] and [79]. Let
Si now denote the maximum number of gates in layer i across C1, · · · , CB, and
let si = dlogSie. We let Vi again be a function mapping a gate at level i to its
value, but we now specify a gate g by a pair g1, g2, where g2 ∈ [B] indicates the
sub-circuit in which g lies and g1 ∈ [Si] is the index of g (at level i) within that sub-
circuit. The prover and verifier then run a CMT-like protocol, but using the equa-
tion Vi(g1, g2) =
∑
u1,v1∈{0,1}si+1 (addi+1(g1, u1, v1, g2) · (Vi+1(u1, g2) + Vi+1(v1, g2)) +
multi+1(g1, u1, v1, g2) · (Vi+1(u1, g2) · Vi+1(v1, g2))).
The equation above still recursively defines Vi in terms of Vi+1, but takes
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advantage of the fact that there is no interconnection between the different sub-
circuits. This has the effect of reducing the number of variables in addi+1 and
multi+1 from 2si+1 + si + 3dlogBe to 2si+1 + si + dlogBe. Next, we define the











˜addi+1(z1, u1, v1, g2) · (Ṽi+1(u1, g2)
+ Ṽi+1(v1, g2)) + ˜multi+1(z1, u1, v1, g2) · (Ṽi+1(u1, g2) · Ṽi+1(v1, g2))
)
.
The only difference between equation 3.1 and the equation used for data-
parallel circuits with same sub-circuits in [78,79] is that ˜addi+1 and ˜multi+1 take an
extra variable g2, which denotes that the gates and wiring patterns can be different
in each sub-circuit. We further observe that running the same algorithm for the
sumcheck protocol as in [78, 79] on equation 3.1 results in the same complexity on
the prover, which is O(BSi logSi+1). To see this, for the first 2si+1 rounds, there
are at most BSi monomials per round, as there are at most BSi gates in the i-th
layer of the circuit and the number of non-zero monomials in ˜addi+1 and ˜multi+1
is bounded by the number of gates. By Remark 1, this takes O(BSi) arithmetic
operations per round, so the complexity for these rounds is O(BSi logSi+1). For the
remaining rounds, by Remark 1, P ’s running time is O(2dlogBe−j) in round 2si+1 + j
(j = 1, . . . , dlogBe) and the complexity is O(B). Thus, the complexity is dominated
by the first part, i.e., O(BSi logSi+1).
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In this way, we extend the class of the circuit efficiently supported by the
CMT protocol in [78,79] without any overhead on the prover time.1 We present the
following result.
Theorem 4. Let C : Fn → F be a depth-d layered arithmetic circuit consisting
of B parallel sub-circuits C1, . . . , CB connected to an “aggregation” circuit D such
that |D| = O(|C|/ log |C|), and let S = maxj{width(Cj)}. Executing the CMT
protocol from Construction 1 using Equation 3.1 and the above described modifica-
tions to the sum-check protocol, yields an interactive proof for C with soundness
O(d · width(C)/|F|). Moreover, P’s running time is O(|C| logS) and the protocol
uses O(d log(width(C))) rounds of interaction. If ˜addi and ˜multi are computable
in time O(polylog(width(C))) for all the layers of C, then the running time of the
verifier V is O(n+ d · polylog(width(C))).
3.3 The Construction of Our Argument System
Finally, we present our new argument system with circuit-independent prepro-
cessing. Our construction combines the modified CMT protocol from Section 3.2
with the VPD scheme presented in Section 3.1. We refer to the prover and veri-
fier of the CMT protocol as (Pcmt,Vcmt), respectively, and to the algorithms of the
VPD scheme as (KeyGen,Commit,Evaluate,Ver). We construct an argument system
(G,P ,V) for the satisfiability of arithmetic circuits over finite fields, where the pre-
processing done by G depends on a bound on the size of the circuit, the size of its
1The complexity of the CMT protocol for circuits composed of identical sub-circuits has recently
been improved to O(BSi + Si logSi) in [82].
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input, and the field over which it is defined, but not the circuit itself.
Let V1+2cmt be the restriction of the CMT verifier from Construction 1 which
performs Steps 1 and 2 of Vcmt and outputs (rd, ad) without performing Step 3.
Construction 3 is a formal description of our argument system.
Construction 3. Let F be a prime-order field with |F| exponential in λ, and let n, t
be input size and circuit size parameters. For simplicity of exposition we assume
that n is a power of 2. Consider the algorithms G,P ,V described below.
Preprocessing phase. G(1λ, n, t) runs (pp, vp) ← KeyGen(1λ, n, 1). The proving
key pk is set to be pp and the verification key vk is set to be vp.
Evaluation phase. Let C : Fnx+nw → F be a depth-d layered arithmetic circuit
over F with at most t gates such that nx + nw ≤ n. Moreover, let x ∈ Fnx and
w ∈ Fnw be such that C(x;w) = 1. Assume that nw/nx = 2m − 1 for some m ∈ N.
Consider the following protocol between P and V.
1. P first commits to the multilinear extension Ṽd of the input layer of C(x;w).
That is, P runs c← Commit(Ṽd, pp) and sends c to V. Upon receving c, V runs
CheckCom(c, vp). If the output is reject, V rejects.
2. V computes the multilinear extension x̃ of the input x, generates a random
point r ∈ (Flog(nx) × 0log(nw)) and sends r to P. Upon receiving r, P executes
(a, π) ← Evaluate(Ṽd, r, pp) and sends (a, π) to V. Upon receiving (a, π), V exe-
cutes Ver(c, a, r, π, vp). In case Ver outputs 0 or a 6= x̃(r), V outputs 0.
3. V runs V1+2cmt and P runs Pcmt to verify C(x;w) = 1. If V1+2cmt rejects at any point,
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V outputs 0. Otherwise, let rd, ad be the final values returned by V1+2cmt . At this
point, V must verify that Ṽd(rd) = ad.
4. V sends rd to P. Upon receiving rd, P executes Evaluate(Ṽd, rd, pp) and obtains
(a′d, π
′) which he sends to V.
5. V upon receiving (a′d, π′) executes Ver(c, a′d, rd, π′, vp). In case Ver outputs 0 or
a′d 6= ad, V outputs 0. Otherwise, V outputs 1.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 5. If Construction 2 is an extractable VPD scheme, then Construction 3
is an argument system for arithmetic circuits, as defined by Definition 2. The run-
ning time of P is O(|C| log |C|). When used for a depth-d, layered circuit C con-
sisting of B parallel sub-circuits C1, . . . , CB (the sub-circuits can be the same or
different) whose outputs feed into a circuit D with |D| ≤ |C|/ log |C|, the running
time of P is O(|C| · log maxj{width(Cj)}) and the protocol has O(d log(width(C)))
rounds. If C has input length n and is log-space uniform then the running time of
V is O(n + d · poylog(|C|)). Finally, if d is polylog (|C|), the above construction is
a succinct argument.
Proof. The completeness requirement immediately follows from the construction of
(G,P ,V).
We now argue about the knowledge soundness property. Let Adv be an ad-
versary which outputs a circuit C with |C| ≤ t and nx + nw ≤ n, where nx (nw) is
the size of the input (auxiliary input) of C) and an input x ∈ Fnx and is able to
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make V accept for (C, x). We will construct a corresponding extractor E which is
able to produce a witness w ∈ Fnw such that C(x;w) = 1, except with negligible
probability.
We begin by observing that the prover parameters pk of the argument, that
are given as input to Adv, are equivalent to pp output by KeyGen(1λ, n, 1). There-
fore, since Adv convinces V which runs CheckCom as a sub-routine, it holds that
in Step 1 Adv outputs a c
def
= (c1, c2) for the input layer of the circuit C such that
CheckCom(c, vp) accepts.
Next, let Adv′ be a simplified version of Adv that runs the same code of
but halts right after Step 1, outputting only commitment c. Clearly, whenever
CheckCom(c, vp) accepts when interacting with Adv, it will also accept upon re-
ceiving the output of Adv′ since they produce the same output. Thus, from the
extractability property of our VPD scheme, it follows that there exists extractor E ′
that upon the same input as Adv′ outputs f ′ such that c = Commit(f ′, pp) except
with negligible probability. Note that Adv′ is ppt as Adv′ is ppt, therefore, by
extractability, E ′ is also ppt.
Now we are ready to define our main extractor E for Adv. Upon input (1λ, pk),
E operates as follows:
1. Run E ′(1λ, pk) and receive polynomial f ′. If f ′ is not a n-variate polynomial of
variable-degree 1, abort.
2. Output w = (f ′(nx), . . . , f
′(nw − 1)).
E is ppt as E ′ is ppt, and he performs only polynomially many operations in F.
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It remains to show that in case Adv convinces V , then it holds that C(x;w) = 1
where w is the output of E , except with negligible probability. Assume for contra-
diction that Adv convinces V and C(x;w) 6= 1 with some non-negligible probability
ε, where w is the output of E . We will build an adversary B that uses Adv, E in
order to break the soundness of the CMT protocol or of our VPD construction, as
follows:
1. B receives as input (pp, vp) generated from KeyGen(1λ, n, 1) from a challenger for
the VPD soundness game. He then runs Adv(1λ, pk = pp).
2. Let C, x be the circuit and input chosen by Adv and let d be the depth of C.
Moreover, let c be the commitment output by Adv (claimed to be a commitment
to the input layer of C).
3. B runs CheckCom(c, vp) and if it outputs reject he aborts. Else, he runs E(1λ, pk)
and receives witness w. If w 6∈ Fnw , B aborts. Else, he sets polynomial f : Fn → F
to be the multilinear extension of the array x||w (i.e. the multilinear extension
of the entire input to C).
4. B chooses r ∈ Flognx × 0lognw uniformly at random and forwards it to Adv. Upon
receiving a, π, he runs Ver(c, a, r, π, vp). If it outputs reject he aborts. Else, if
a 6= f(r), B outputs (f, r, a, π) as a challenge for VPD and terminates.
5. B initializes the interaction with Vcmt for circuit C and input x,w. For all layers
of C (from 0 to d) B simply forwards the messages of Vcmt to Adv and vice versa.
6. Let rd be the random point established by Vcmt for the d-th layer of C. B forwards
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rd to Adv and receives a
′
d, π
′. He then runs Ver(c, a′d, rd, π
′, vp). If it outputs reject
he aborts. Else, if a′d 6= f(rd), B outputs (f, rd, a′d, π′) as a challenge for VPD
and terminates.
7. B forwards a′d to Vcmt and terminates.
B is ppt since Adv, E are ppt and he performs polynomially many operations in
F,G,GT . Let us now argue about B’s success probability.
We define the following events:
• Bwins is the event that B succeeds in breaking the VPD or the CMT soundness.
• Baborts is the event that B aborts during his interaction with Adv.
• A is the event that Adv succeeds in convincing P to accept and C(w, x) 6= 1,
where w is the output of E .
• R is the event that during the interaction of B with Adv, a 6= f(r) or a′d 6= f(rd).
• E = A ∩ Bcaborts.
For an event Y , let Y c denote its complement. In general, by the law of total
probability we can write
Pr[Bwins] ≥ Pr[Bwins|E ∩R] Pr[E ∩R]
+ Pr[Bwins|E ∩Rc] Pr[E ∩Rc].
Next, we turn our attention to evaluating the two summands.
For Pr[Bwins|E ∩R] we argue as follows. Conditioning on E ∩R implies that:
(i) Adv successfully convinces V , (ii) C(w, x) 6= 1, (iii) B does not abort, and (iv)
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a 6= f(r) or a′d 6= f(rd). Then, the view provided to Adv by B is a perfect emulation
of the interaction with V and the view provided by B to Vcmt is a perfect emulation of
the execution of CMT for C(x,w), up to the point where B finds out that a 6= f(r)
(during Step (4) above), or that a′d 6= f(rd) (during Step (7) above). Without loss
of generality, we focus on the case where this occurs for a 6= f(r) and the exact
same reasoning follows for the other case. Simply observe that (f, r, a, π) is indeed
a valid challenge tuple for the VPD soundness game, since Ver(c, a, r, π, vp) accepts
and Commit(f, pp) = c, as B did not abort. It follows that, under these conditions,
B always succeeds in winning therefore Pr[Bwins|E ∩R] = 1.
Regarding Pr[Bwins|E ∩ Rc] we argue as follows. Conditioning on E ∩ Rc
implies that: (i) Adv successfully convinces V , (ii) C(w, x) 6= 1, (iii) B does not
abort, and (iv) a = f(r) and a′d = f(rd). Then, the view provided to Adv by B is
a perfect emulation of the interaction with V . Moreover, the view provided to Vcmt
is a perfect emulation of the CMT protocol. Therefore, in this case too, B always
succeeds as he falsely convinces Vcmt to accept for C(x,w). Hence, we have that
Pr[Bwins|E∩Rc] = 1 and replacing both probabilities in the above inequality we get
Pr[Bwins] ≥ 1 · Pr[E ∩R] + 1 · Pr[E ∩Rc]
= Pr[E] = Pr[A ∩Bcaborts]
where we used the fact that R,Rc are complementary events. Finally, by the defi-
nition of conditional probability, we get
Pr[Bwins] ≥ Pr[A ∩Bcaborts] = Pr[Bcaborts|A] · Pr[A].
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Conditioned on Adv winning, we have that all of CheckCom(c, pp), Ver(c, a, r, π, vp),
Ver(c, a′d, rd, π
′, vp) output accept since they are sub-routines of V . It follows, that
B may only abort if the extraction fails during Step (3) above. By the extractability
property of our VPD and the construction of E this can happen only with negligible
probability. Thus, we can write
Pr[Bwins] ≥ Pr[Bcaborts|A] · Pr[A] ≥ (1− neg(λ)) · ε
which is non-negligible since, by our assumption, ε is non-negligible in λ.
Under our original assumption about the soundness of our VPD and that of
CMT this should only happen with negligible probability. Thus, this contradicts our
claim that Adv convinces V and C(x,w) 6= 1 with non-negligible probability (where
w is the output of extractor E), which concludes the proof of knowledge soundness
of our argument system.
Asymptotic analysis. The input size of the circuit is |x|+ |w|, which is bounded
by the maximum width of the circuit width(C). Applying Construction 2 with
d = 1 and ` = log(width(C)), by Theorem 3, in Step 1, 2, 4 and 5 the running
time of P is O(width(C)) and the running time of V is O(log(width(C)) + |x|).
Combined with Step 3, by Theorem 2 for Construction 3, the running time of P is
O(|C| · log(width(C))), the running time of V is O(|x|+ d · polylog(|C|)), and P and
V interact for O(d log(width(C))) rounds.
In the analysis above, applying Remark 2 and Theorem 4 for Construction 1
to Step 3, the running time of P becomes O(|C| · logS) if C consists of parallel
sub-circuit.
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Comparison to SNARKs. As presented above, the preprocessing of our con-
struction only depends on an upper bound of the size of the input, but not on any
particular circuit. In this way our construction does not have function-dependent
preprocessing, as required by SNARKs.
In the evaluation phase, the CMT protocol only requires modular additions
and multiplications. The only place having modular exponentiations in our scheme
is in the VPD protocol, and the number of modular exponentiations is linear to the
size of the input, while it is linear to the size of the circuit in SNARKs. As the
modular exponentiation is the bottleneck of the schemes, this leads to significant
improvements on the prover time. In addition, the fast multi-scalar exponentiation
and fast Fourier transform (FFT) in SNARKs consumes high memory, while the
CMT protocol and VPD protocol in our construction are memory friendly.
Our construction does introduce overhead on the proof size and the verification
time. The proof size increases from O(1) to O(d log(width(C))) and the verification
time increases from O(|x|) to O(|x|+d·polylog(|C|)). However, they are still succinct
(polylogarithmic on the witness size) and reasonable concretely in practice, as we
will show in Section 4.6 and 5.3.
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Chapter 4: Applications: Verifiable Databases
All major cloud providers offer Database-as-a-Service solutions that allow com-
panies and individuals (clients) to alleviate storage costs and achieve resource elas-
ticity by delegating storage and maintenance of their data to a cloud server. A client
can then query and/or update its data using, e.g., standard SQL queries.
Outsourcing data in this way, however, introduces new security challenges: in
particular, the client may need to ensure the integrity of the results returned by
the server. Providing such a guarantee is important if the client does not trust the
server, or even if the client is concerned about the possibility of server errors or
external compromise.
Prior works on verifiable databases address exactly this problem, but have sig-
nificant drawbacks. Function-specific schemes (e.g., authenticated data structures)
target specific classes of computations and can be much more efficient than generic
solutions; however, they suffer from limited expressiveness, and in particular they
cannot handle a wide range of SQL queries. Generic solutions (e.g., SNARKs) can
be used to verify arbitrary computations, but impose an unacceptable overhead at
the server, and requires an expensive setup phase for every possible SQL query.
Our new argument system in Chapter 3 provides a solution for verifiable
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databases. It is an argument system for any computations in NP, which can be
used to validate arbitrary SQL queries in principle. Meanwhile, it does not require
a separate setup phase for every SQL query. In this chapter we use our new argu-
ment system to construct vSQL, a system for verifiable databases and SQL queries.
vSQL allows a client who owns a relational database to outsource it to an untrusted
server while storing only a small digest locally. Later, the client can issue arbitrary
SQL queries to the server, who returns the query’s result. (In the case of an update
query, the result is an updated digest.) The client can then verify the validity of the
result using our argument system with the server; if the result returned by the server
is incorrect, the client will reject with overwhelming probability. In addition, vSQL
benefits from several performance optimizations that improve both the server’s and
client’s concrete efficiency (see Section 4.5).
vSQL overcomes the drawbacks of existing works. It is highly expressive, sup-
porting any computation expressed as an arithmetic circuit (which in particular
means arbitrary SQL queries, including updates) efficiently. We empirically demon-
strate vSQL’s concrete performance and expressiveness using the TPC-H [9] bench-
mark, and find that the server-side computation (which is usually the limiting factor
in verifiable-computation schemes) is 5–120× better for vSQL than it is in highly op-
timized SNARK-based constructions [6] (that further require query-dependent pre-
processing), and comparable to or better than a state-of-the-art database-delegation
scheme [91] that only supports a limited subset of SQL.
In this chapter, we first give some additional background on SQL queries
in Section 4.1, and introduce additional related work on verifiable databases in
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Section 4.2. We present the definition and our construction of verifiable databases
in Section 4.3 and 4.4. We then describe additional optimizations of our argument
system tailored for SQL queries in Section 4.5, followed by experimental results in
Section 4.6.
4.1 SQL Queries
Structured Query Language (SQL) is a very popular programming language
designed for querying and managing relational database systems. It operates on
databases that consist of collections of two-dimensional matrices called tables. In
the following, we briefly present the general structure of such queries and provide
concrete examples for common types.
In SQL, a simple query begins with the keyword SELECT followed by a function
A(col1, . . .) and then the keyword FROM followed by a number of tables, where A is
T1:
row id employee id name age salary
1 2019 John 28 45,000
2 1905 Kate 31 55,000
3 1908 Lisa 44 70,000
4 2117 Leo 23 39,000
5 2003 Alice 29 34,000
T2:








defined over (a subset of) the columns of the specified tables. This sequence of
clauses and expressions dictates the output of the query. Following these, there is
a WHERE clause followed by a sequence of predicates connected by logical operators
(e.g, AND, OR, NOT) that restrict the rows used when computing the output. The
above is best illustrated by a series of examples. Consider a database consisting of
tables T1 and T2:
The first example we provide is a SQL range query which is used to select rows for
which particular values fall within a set of specified ranges. The conditions may be
defined over multiple columns, in which case we refer to it as a multi-dimensional
range query. For example, the query “SELECT ∗ FROM T1 WHERE age < 35 AND salary
> 40, 000” is a two-dimensional range query that returns the following table.
row id employee id name age salary
1 2019 John 28 45,000
2 1905 Kate 31 55,000
A FROM clause can be followed by JOIN sub-clauses that are used to com-
bine multiple tables based on common values in specific columns. An example
of such a JOIN query is “SELECT T1.name, T2.department FROM T1 JOIN T2 ON
T1.employee id = T2.employee id,” which returns:
The result of any SQL query is itself a table to which another SQL query
can be applied. In other words, a SQL query may be composed of several sub-
queries. SQL also provides queries for adding, updating, and deleting data from a






clause followed by a table identifier, a series of values, and (optionally) a sequence
of WHERE clauses. For example, the query “DELETE FROM T2 WHERE department =
Sales” deletes the first two rows from T2. Finally, there are queries that manipulate
the database structure, e.g, by adding new columns or creating a new table.
Note that a common theme of the examples presented above is that they
process each row of some table independently, performing a specific operation (e.g.,
comparing values from given columns with a specified range) on each row. This
structure can be leveraged to improve efficiency of our argument system, as noted
in Remark 2.
4.2 Related Work on Verifiable Databases
Most existing work on verifiable databases comes from authenticated data
structures [77]. It typically focuses on handling only a specific class of compu-
tations on the outsourced database, e.g., range queries [62, 67], joins [43, 87, 94],
pattern matching [40,68] and set operations [32,61,70,92]. The most relevant point
of comparison to our work is IntegriDB [91], which supports a subset of SQL. In Sec-
tion 4.6, we show that vSQL is significantly more expressive than IntegriDB while
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enjoying comparable efficiency.
4.3 Definitions of Verifiable Databases
In this section, we present our security definition for a verifiable database
system, viewed as a two-party protocol run between a client that owns a database
D which it wishes to outsource to a remote server. In a setup phase, the client
computes a short digest of D, which it stores locally, and uploads D to the server.
Subsequently, he issues queries about the data or requests to update the data, which
are processed by the server. Each query evaluation is executed by an interactive
protocol between the two parties, at the end of which the client either accepts the
returned output or rejects it. Informally, the required security property is that no
computationally bounded adversarial server can convince the client into accepting
a false result. This is defined formally in Definition 4. To simplify notation, we do
not distinguish between verification parameters (that are stored by the client and
should be succinct) and proof-computation parameters (stored by the server).
Definition 4. A verifiable database system for database class D and query class
Q = U ∪ S (where U denotes update queries and S denotes selection queries), is a
tuple of algorithms defined as follows:
1. Setup takes as input 1λ, a database D ∈ D and outputs a digest δ and public
parameters pp.
2. Evaluate is an interactive protocol run between two probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms C and S on common input a digest δ, a query Q ∈ Q, and public
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parameters pp. Moreover, S holds database D. If Q ∈ S, then at the end of the
protocol C either outputs a result y (and accepts) or rejects. If Q ∈ U , then at
the end of the protocol C outputs a new digest δ′ (and accepts), or rejects.
Denote by Q(D) the evaluation of query Q on database D. We require that Setup
and Evaluate have the following properties.
• Perfect completeness. For any λ, any D0 ∈ D, any t ≥ 0, and any queries
Q1, . . . , Qt ∈ Q and Q∗ ∈ S, we require that y = Q∗(Dt) in the following experi-
ment:
– Setup is invoked on the input (1λ, D0) and outputs (δ0, pp).
– For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, do: S and C run Evaluate on inputs (Qi, δi−1, Di−1, pp) and
(Qi, δi−1, pp), respectively. If Qi ∈ U , let δi denote the output of C and set
Di = Qi(Di−1); otherwise, set δi = δi−1 and Di = Di−1.
– S and C run Evaluate on inputs (Q∗, δt, Dt, pp) and (Q
∗, δt, pp), respectively.
Let y denote the output of C.
• Soundness. For any t and polynomial-time attacker S∗, the probability that S∗
succeeds in the following experiment is negligible:
1. S∗(1λ) outputs D0 ∈ D .
2. Setup(1λ, D0) outputs (δ0, pp).
3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, do: S∗ outputs Qi. Then S∗ and C run Evaluate on inputs
(Qi, δi−1, Di−1, pp) and (Qi, δi−1, pp), respectively. If C rejects, the experi-
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ment ends. If C accepts and Qi ∈ U , let δi denote the output of C and set
Di = Qi(Di−1); otherwise, set δi = δi−1 and Di = Di−1.
4. S∗ outputs Q∗ ∈ S. Then S∗ and C run Evaluate on inputs (Q∗, δt, Dt, pp)
and (Q∗, δt, pp), respectively. Let y denote the output of C. We say that S
∗
succeeds if C accepts with output y, but y 6= Q∗(Dt).
Supporting database size increases. For some constructions (including ours),
the size of the public parameters pp may depend on the database size. If the database
size increases (as a result of updates), it may be necessary to extend pp; there are
various ways this can be done. For instance, the database owner can choose an
upper bound for the database size, and generate a long-enough pp during the setup
phase. Alternatively, the owner may maintain some (succinct) trapdoor information
that allows it to extend pp as needed.
Efficiency considerations. One important aspect of a verifiable database sys-
tem is efficiency; a trivial approach is to transmit D for each query and have the
client evaluate it himself. Therefore, a basic efficiency requirement is that the com-
munication between client and server for query evaluation should be sublinear in
the database size |D|. Also important is the client’s computational cost for, which
should ideally be smaller than evaluating the query (so the client can benefit not
only from delegation of its storage but also from delegation of its computation).
A final efficiency metric is the computational overhead of the server, which should
ideally be asymptotically the same as the cost of evaluating the query.
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4.4 Our Construction of Verifiable Databases
In this section, we present our construction of a verifiable database system. Re-
call that we refer to the prover and verifier of the CMT protocol as (Pcmt,Vcmt), and
we refer to the algorithms of our polynomial-delegation protocol as (KeyGen,Commit,
Evaluate,Ver).
The only modification on our argument system presented in Construction 3
is that the client also wants to outsource the storage of her input, the database D,
to the server. To do so, initially, the client views its database D as an array of
|D| elements (where |D| is equal to number of rows times number of columns) and
computes the multilinear extension D̃. Note that the number of variables in D̃ is
logarithmic in the total size of D. Next, the client generates a commitment com
to D̃ using our polynomial-delegation protocol, stores com locally, and uploads D
to the untrusted server. We stress that this phase does not depend on any specific
queries the client may choose to issue later.
Construction 4. Let λ be a security parameter, let D be a database and let F be a
prime-order field with |F| exponential in λ.
Setup phase. On input 1λ and a database D ∈ D, the client picks a parameter N ≥
|D| such that N ∈ O(|D|), which denotes an upper bound on the size of databases (in
terms of values in the database) that can be supported, and sets n = dlogNe. Let D̃
denote the multilinear extension of D. The client runs KeyGen(1λ, n, 1) to compute
public parameters pp, and Commit(D̃, pp) to compute commitment com on D̃. It
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then sends (D, pp, com) to the server and stores (pp, com).
Evaluation phase. Let (x0, . . . , xN−1) be the current version of the database D
stored by the server and let com be the commitment stored by both client and server.
Given a query Q ∈ Q, let C be a depth-d circuit over F that evaluates Q on input D
and (possibly empty) auxiliary input B ∈ F|B|. Assume w.l.o.g. that |B| = (2m−1)·N
for some integer m. Partition the input of C into 2m arrays (B1, . . . , B2m) each
of size N with B1 corresponding to D and the rest corresponding to the auxiliary
input. Finally, let B̃1, . . . , B̃2m denote the corresponding multilinear extensions of
B1, . . . , B2m where B̃1 = D̃.
• If Q is a selection query, the two parties then interact as follows:
1. S computes the necessary auxiliary input B2, . . . , B2m, and runs Commit(B̃i, pp)
for 2 ≤ i ≤ 2m to obtain values com2, . . . , com2m, which it sends to C.
2. C runs Vcmt,1+2 and S runs Pcmt to evaluate C(B1, . . . , B2m). If Vcmt,1+2 rejects
at any point, C outputs 0. Otherwise, let rd, ad be the final values returned by
Vcmt,1+2. Let Ṽd be the multilinear extension of the input layer of C. At this
point, C must verify that Ṽd(rd) = ad, which is done as follows.
3. C sends to S values ρ(1), . . . , ρ(2
m) ∈ Fn−1 chosen uniformly at random.
4. S parses rd as rd := (κ1, . . . , κm+n) and defines r
′
d := (κm+1, . . . , κm+n). S
then sends to C the evaluations (v1, . . . , v2m) of polynomials B̃1(r
′
d), . . . , B̃2m(r
′
d)
along with corresponding proofs πi computed by Evaluate(B̃i, r
′
d, ρ
(i), pp), for all
1 ≤ i ≤ 2m.
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5. C runs Ver(comi, r
′
d, vi, πi, ρ
(i), pp) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m. If any execution outputs 0,
C outputs 0. Otherwise, C defines r′′d := (κ1, . . . , κm) and computes Ṽd(rd) by
combining values v1, . . . , v2m as per Equation 2.1. If Ṽd(rd) 6= ad, C outputs 0,
otherwise 1.
6. The output of S is set to C(B1, . . . , B2m).
• If Q is an update query, the two parties then interact as follows:
1. S computes the necessary auxiliary input B2, . . . , B2m, and runs Commit(B̃i, pp)
for 2 ≤ i ≤ 2m computing values com2, . . . , com2m. Moreover, it computes
the multilinear extension Ṽout of the output of C(B1, . . . , B2m) and runs
Commit(Ṽout, pp) to compute output commitment comout. Finally, it sends
comout, com2, . . . , com2m to C.
2. C chooses r0 ∈ Fn, (the output of C is the entire new database which by
assumption is at most N therefore its multilinear extension operates on n =
logN elements), and sends it to the server along with a uniform value ρout ∈
Fn−1.
3. S responds with a0 = Ṽout(r0) and corresponding proof πout computed with
Evaluate(Ṽout, r0, ρout, pp).
4. C runs Ver(comout, r0, a0, πout, ρout, pp) and rejects if it outputs 0.
Otherwise, C runs Vcmt,2 while S runs Pcmt,2 on common input r0, a0. If
Vcmt,2 rejects at any point, C outputs 0. Otherwise, let rd, ad be the final
values returned by Vcmt,2. Let Ṽd be the multilinear extension of the input
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layer of C. At this point, C must verify that Ṽd(rd) = ad. This is achieved
by having C and S perform steps 3–5 from above.
5. The output of S is set to C(B1, . . . , B2m) and comout. If C accepts, it sets
com← comout.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 6. If Construction 2 is an extractable, verifiable polynomial-delegation
protocol, then Construction 4 is a verifiable database system for SQL queries.
If Construction 4 is executed on a database D with |D| values, to evaluate a
query expressed as a non-deterministic, depth-d arithmetic circuit C with at most S
gates per layer, that consists of parallel copies of a circuit C ′ with at most S ′ gates
per layer, followed by a post-processing circuit C ′′ of size O(|C|/ log |C|), and with
auxiliary input B, then
1. The running time of Setup is O(|D|).
2. Evaluate requires O(d logS) rounds of interaction.
3. The running time of C is O(k + d · polylog(S) + d|B|/|D|e log(|D|)), where k is
the size of the result for selection queries and k is O(log |D′|) for updates (D′ is
the output size).
4. The running time of S is O(|C| · logS ′ + (|B|+ |D|) · polylog(|B|+ |D|)).
Proof. The correctness requirement immediately follows from the construction of
(Setup,C, S). We now proceed to analyze the complexities of Setup, Evaluate, C and
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S. First note that the multilinear extension for D, as computed by Setup, contains
N terms. Thus, using an optimization from [69, Appendix D], KeyGen,Commit
take time O(N) = O(|D|) which is the total running time for Setup. The number
of rounds of interaction during Evaluate follow directly by the execution of the
CMT protocol. The overall running time of C for a selection query results from
executing the first two steps of V from Construction 1 which has running time of
O(k + d · polylog(S)) from Theorem 2 (as the last step of V is omitted). This is
followed by a series of O(d|B|/|D|e) executions of Ver from Construction 2, each
for a polynomial of log |D| variables and variable-degree 1. This yields an overall
running time of O(d|B|/|D|e·log |D|) For updates, the only difference is that the first
step of V is replaced by an execution of Ver from Construction 2 for a polynomial
of log |D| variables and variable-degree 1, which is subsumed by O(polylog(S)).
The running time of S (again using the optimization from [69]) is the sum of the
running time of P in Construction 1 (O(|C| · logS ′) as per Remark 2) and a number
of Evaluate from Construction 2 for ` = log |D| and d = 1. Using an FFT for
polynomial division (as in [69]), the cost for Evaluate can be upper bounded by
O((|B|+ |D|) · polylog(|B|+ |D|)).
Finally, we prove the soundness property. Assume that there exists an adver-
sary Adv which is able to break the soundness of the verifiable database system.
We will use Adv in order to construct an adversary Adv′ which is capable of either
breaking the soundness property of our verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol or
the soundness of the CMT interactive protocol.
Indeed, let Adv be an adversary which is capable of breaking the security of
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Construction 3. We build Adv′ as follows.
1. On input security parameter 1λ Adv′ runs Adv(1λ) to receive database D0 and
picks large enough bound parameter N .
2. Adv′ plays the security game of the verifiable polynomial-delegation scheme (Def-
inition 3). He sends variable parameter n = dlogNe and degree parameter d = 1
and receives pp← KeyGen(1λ, n, 1) and sends pp to Adv.
3. Adv′ computes the multilinear extension D̃0 of D0 (parsed as an array of N
elements) and computes com0 ← Commit(D̃0, pp). He then sends (com0, pp) to
Adv. The latter responds with upper bound t.
4. Adv′ chooses i′ uniformly at random from [t]. Then, for all 1 ≤ i < i′, Adv′
performs the following.
(a) Adv′ receives query Qi and 2
m− 1 commitments comi2, . . . , comi2m related to
auxiliary inputs Bi.
i. Qi is a selection query (Qi ∈ S). In this case Adv sends Adv′ the
query’s output yi.
ii. Qi is an update query (Qi ∈ U). In this case Adv sends Adv′ a
commitment comiout corresponding to the query’s result (instead of the
query’s output).
(b) Adv′ emulates Adv’s interaction with C during the Evaluate protocol. If the
output of C is 0, Adv′ aborts. Otherwise, if Qi ∈ S Adv′ sets Di ← Di−1 and
comi ← comi−1. If Qi ∈ U Adv′ sets Di ← Qi(Di−1) and comi ← comiout.
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5. If Qi ∈ S and yi = Qi(Di−1) Adv′ aborts.
6. If Qi ∈ U and Commit(Qi(Di−1)) = comiout Adv′ aborts.
7. If Qi ∈ S and yi 6= Qi(Di−1) For all 2 ≤ j ≤ 2m Adv′ runs the extractor Ej
(see below for a description) that outputs the pre-image of comj As a result Adv
′
receives an output oj. Adv
′ attempts to parse oj as a variable-degree-1 n-variate
polynomial B̃j. If this step fails Adv
′ aborts. Otherwise, Adv′ proceeds as follows.
(a) Since (B̃2, . . . , B̃2m) are variable-degree-1 n-variate polynomials, B̃j is a valid
multilinear extension of an array of N elements Bj, for all 2 ≤ j ≤ 2m (as
per Section 2.2).
(b) Adv′ initializes the soundness game with Vcmt (as per Definition 1) on
Ci, (Di−1, B2, . . . , B2m , yi), where Ci is the depth−d circuit representation
of Qi.
(c) Adv′ emulates Adv’s interaction with C during the Evaluate protocol. At any
point where Adv requires a random point from C, Adv′ requests a random
point from Vcmt and forwards it to Adv.
(d) At the end of the execution of Evaluate for the round corresponding to the
input layer of Ci, let ad be the claimed evaluation of the multilinear extension
of the inputs on point rd, as provided by Adv.
(e) At this point, Adv requires from C randomized challenges ρ(1), . . . , ρ(2
m) to
produce the evaluations of the 2m multilinear extensions of the input chunks
of Ci on challenge point r
′
d. Adv
′ requests ρ(1) from the verifiable polynomial
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delegation challenger, generates ρ(2), . . . , r(2
m) uniformly at random himself
and sends them all to Adv. Adv responds with evaluations v1, · · · , v2m and
proofs π1, . . . , π2m .
(f) It holds that v1 6= D̃i−1(r′d). In this case Adv′ outputs (comi−1, r′d, v1, π1, ρ(1), pp)
as the challenge input to Ver and halts.
(g) It holds that v1 = D̃i−1(r
′
d). Adv
′ checks that B̃j(r
′
d) = vj, for all 2 ≤
j ≤ 2m. If any check fails, he aborts. Otherwise, he outputs ad as the final
evaluation to Vcmt, where ad is the claimed evaluation received by Adv′ for
the evaluation of the multilinear extension of the input of Ci on point rd
and halts.
8. If Qi ∈ U and Commit(Qi(Di−1)) 6= comiout For all 2 ≤ j ≤ 2m Adv′ runs the
extractor Ej that outputs a pre-image of comj (see below for a description), receiv-
ing output oj. Moreover, Adv
′ runs the extractor Eout that outputs a pre-image of
comout receiving output o
′. Adv′ attempts to parse each of oj as a variable-degree-
1 n-variate polynomial B̃j and likewise for o
′ and a variable-degree-1 n-variate
polynomial Ỹ . If this step fails Adv′ aborts. Otherwise, Adv′ proceeds as follows.
(a) Since (B̃2, . . . , B̃2m , Y ) are variable-degree-1 n-variate polynomials, B̃j is a
valid multilinear extension of an array of N elements Bj, for all 2 ≤ j ≤ 2m
(as per Section 2.2). Likewise, Ỹ is a valid multilinear extension of an array
Y of N elements.
(b) Adv′ initializes the soundness game with Vcmt (as per Definition 1) on
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Ci, (Di−1, B2, . . . , B2m , Y ), where Ci is the depth−d circuit representation
of Qi.
(c) Adv′ emulates Adv’s interaction with C during the Evaluate protocol. At any
point where Adv requires a random point from C, Adv′ requests a random
point from Vcmt and forwards it to Adv.
(d) During the execution of Evaluate for the round corresponding to the output
layer of Ci, Adv requires from C randomized challenge ρ
(out) to produce the
evaluation of the multilinear extension of the output of Ci on point r0. Adv
′
generates ρ(out) uniformly at random and sends it to Adv. Adv responds with
evaluation vout and proof πout.
(e) Adv′ checks that Ỹ i(q0) = v
i
out. If the check fails, he aborts. Otherwise he
continues emulating Adv’s interaction with C during the Evaluate protocol.
(f) Adv′ proceeds to run steps 7d-7g above.
Since Adv and the algorithms of the verifiable database scheme run in time polyno-
mial in λ, it follows that Adv′ also runs in time polynomial in λ. Let us now argue
about the success probability of Adv′.
We begin by defining the extractors Ej necessary for retrieving the commitment
pre-images. Let µ be the number of commitments output by Adv during round i′
(µ = 2m − 1 or 2m depending on the type of Qi), and Ti′ be the transcript that
consists of all the inputs received by Adv during the i′ − 1 first rounds.
Let Adv′′ denote the adversary that 1λ, pp and Ti′ as auxiliary input z1, and
interacts internally with Adv as follows.
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• Use z1 to recreate the state of Adv right until the beginning or round i′.
• Upon receiving com1, . . . , comµ in the beginning of round i′, output them.
• Receive point r′d, randomized challenges ρ(1), . . . , ρ(µ), and auxiliary input z2
that consists of all the messages exchanged during the CMT execution in round
i′.
• Use z2 to recreate the state of Adv until the end of the CMT execution in
round i′.
• Upon receiving evaluations v1, . . . , vµ and proofs π1, . . . , πµ from Adv, output
them.
Finally, let Adv′′j for j = 1, . . . , µ denote the adversary that receives the same input
as Adv′′ and runs the exact same code, but only outputs comj initially and vj, πj
finally.
By the knowledge soundness property of our verifiable polynomial delegation
protocol, for each Adv′′j there exists Ej that on input (1λ, pp, z1) outputs variable
-degree 1, n-variate polynomial B̃j such that, if Ver accepts, then Commit(B̃j, pp) =
comj and B̃j(r
′
d) = vj with all but negligible probability. Here, we need to make the
assumption that the auxiliary inputs z1, z2 comes from a benign distribution.
1
1We stress that, in our construction, z1, z2 consist of values that are chosen uniformly at random
from their respective domains (random evaluation points for the CMT execution and randomized
challenges for the verifiable polynomial delegation), therefore assuming that this distribution is
benign seems like a mild assumption.
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We denote by EAdv the event that Adv wins the soundness game of the verifiable
database system (as per Definition 4) and by EAdv′ the event that Adv
′ wins the
soundness game of the verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol (as per Definition 3)
or the soundness game of the interactive protocol (as per Definition 1). By definition,
EAdv takes place if and only if there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ t such that Qi ∈ S ∧ bi =
1 ∧ yi 6= Qi(Di−1). We denote by E1 the event that there exists 1 ≤ i′′ ≤ t such
that Qi′′ ∈ U ∧ bi′′ = 1 ∧ Commit(Qi′′(Di′′−1) 6= comi′′out, i.e., the event that Adv
produced an update query and an incorrect commitment for round i′′. Note that
Pr[EAdv] = Pr[EAdv∧E1]+Pr[EAdv∧Ec1) where Ec denotes the complement of event
E.
Regarding the probability that Adv′ wins we can write
Pr[EAdv′ ] ≥ Pr[EAdv′|EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′] Pr[EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′]





Pr[EAdv′ |EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′] Pr[EAdv ∧ E1])
+ Pr[EAdv′ |EAdv ∧ Ec1 ∧ i′ = i] Pr[EAdv ∧ Ec1]
)
where the last step follows from the fact that i′ is chosen uniformly at random.
We now lower-bound Pr[EAdv′|EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′] as follows. Conditioned on
EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′, Adv′ provides a perfect emulation of C to Adv during the first
i′′ − 1 rounds. Moreover, assuming Adv′ does not abort in round i′′, he provides a
perfect emulation for both Adv′ and Vcmt for round i′′ up to, and including, step 7d.
If v1 6= D̃i′′−1(r′d) then the tuple (comi−1, r′d, v1, π1, ρ(1)i, pp) is indeed a valid chal-
lenge for the soundness game of the verifiable polynomial protocol, therefore Adv′
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wins. Otherwise, v1 = D̃i′′−1(r
′
d), and it follows that ad is the correct evaluation of
the multilinear extension of the input layer of Ci, therefore Adv
′ wins. From the
above it follows that Pr[EAdv′|EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′] = 1 − Pr[Adv′ aborts in round
i′′|EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′]. Note that conditioned on EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′, Adv′ will only
abort if any of the checks in steps 8, 8e, 7g fail, i.e., the extraction of the pre-image
polynomials for output and auxiliary input fails. By the knowledge soundness prop-
erty of the verifiable delegation protocol (and since, conditioned on EAdv, Ver which
is a subroutine of C outputs 1 for all of them), each of them can fail with probability
neg(λ). Since there are only O(poly(λ)) many of them, by a simple union bound we
get that Pr[EAdv′|EAdv ∧ E1 ∧ i′ = i′′] ≥ 1− neg(λ)
We can lower-bound Pr[EAdv′ |EAdv ∧ Ec1 ∧ i′ = i] in a similar manner. Con-
ditioned on EAdv ∧ Ec1 ∧ i′ = i, Adv′ provides a perfect emulation for Adv for all
rounds before the ith, and for both Adv and Vcmt for round i up to, and including,
step 7d. With the same argument as above, under these conditions Adv′ always
wins the game unless he aborts at round i. This last probability is again negligible,
i.e., neg′(λ) (for some neg′ not necessarily equal to neg defined above) due to the
knowledge soundness property of the verifiable delegation protocol. By substituting


















Assuming Adv wins with non-negligible probability in λ, we get that Adv′ also wins
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with non-negligible probability in λ (since t is polynomial in λ) which concludes our
proof.
4.5 Optimizations for SQL Queries
In this section, we introduce additional optimizations to improve the efficiency
of our argument system for SQL queries. In particular, we leverage the ability of our
scheme to efficiently handle auxiliary inputs in order to: (i) achieve faster equality
testing (which is useful for selection queries), (ii) allow for input/output gates at
arbitrary layers of the circuit with minimal overhead, and (iii) verify the results of
set intersections using a smaller number of gates (which is useful for join queries).
Finally, we discuss how to support expressive SQL updates, and how simple updates
(that consist of assigning values to unused table cells) can be verified using one round
of interaction.
Most of the optimizations discussed below exploit various techniques for con-
structing efficient representations of computations commonly when answering SQL
queries. These techniques include modifying the queries’ circuit representations in
order to utilize auxiliary inputs, encoding some of the query computations directly
as polynomials, and utilizing interaction in order to reduce the circuit size. Since
these modifications are applied directly to the underlying circuit being computed,
security when using these optimizations follows readily from security of our protocol.
61
4.5.1 Optimizing Equality Testing
A very common subroutine used in both selection and join queries is testing
whether two values are equal, which can be reduced to testing whether their dif-
ference is 0. Here we show how we can efficiently perform such zero tests using
auxiliary input provided by the prover.
Optimized zero testing. Ideally, we would like a small arithmetic circuit that
takes as input a field element x and outputs x′ = 0 if x = 0 and x′ = 1 otherwise.
It is well known [36] that, by relying on Fermat’s little theorem, this can be done
by computing x′ = xp−1 (where p is the field size). This approach is relatively
expensive, however, since it requires a circuit of size and depth O(log p). Instead,
we will construct a non-deterministic circuit for this task that has two outputs x′, z
and satisfies the following: x = 0 iff there is an auxiliary input y such that x′ = 0
and z = 0; also, x 6= 0 iff there is an auxiliary input y such that x′ = 1 and z = 0.
Thus, the rest of the computation can use x′, and the client will additionally verify
that z = 0.
We can achieve the above by computing x′ = xy and z = x · (1 − xy). Note
that setting y = x−1 if x 6= 0 (and setting y arbitrarily otherwise) yields correct
values for x′ and z. Moreover, if x = 0 then x′ = z = 0 for any choice of y, and
if x 6= 0 then the only way to force z = 0 is to set x′ = 1. We note that the same
high-level idea has appeared before (e.g., [71,76]) in the context of SNARKs that are
defined based on constraint systems. In our case, the CMT protocol only supports
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Figure 4.1: Zero testing. If zi = 0 then the input to C2 is a 0/1 value indicating
whether xi is zero.
a slightly different technique.
Enforcing zero values. A trivial implementation of the above would require the
server to send all the x′, y values to the client, resulting in the client performing
work linear in the number of zero tests. Since zero testing may be done at least
once per database row, this will lead to large overheads.
Instead (cf. Figure 4.1), we split the computation into two parts: (i) a circuit
C1 that computes z = x(1− xy), and (ii) a circuit C2 that evaluates the SQL query
using the result of the zero test (i.e., x′ = xy). Without loss of generality, we assume
the result of the zero test is used at the input layer of C2, as shown in Figure 4.1.
The client and the server will run two separate interactive proof protocols for C1
and C2. First, the protocol for C2 is executed up to one layer before its input layer
(i.e., the client and server pause before proceeding to its input layer). After that,
the protocol for C1 is initiated. Note that the honest prover does not need to send
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any of the outputs of C1 to the verifier since the verifier knows all of them are
supposed to be 0. Moreover, in order to initiate the execution of this protocol, the
verifier needs to compute the multilinear extension of the outputs of C1 evaluated at
a random point. Since the multilinear extension of the 0-vector is the 0-polynomial,
this step is free. Once the interactive protocol for C1 finishes layer 1, the verifier
uses the same randomness for the next layer of both circuits (layer 2 of C1 and the
input layer of C2, which have the same values).
2 This reduces the claims in both
executions to a single evaluation of the multilinear extension of the joint input for
that layer. Finally, layer 3 (the input layer) of C1 is verified normally. In this way,
the prover’s overhead for zero testing is only linear in the size of C1, which only has
3 layers. The verifier’s overhead is only polylogarithmic in the size of C1.
In our experiments (where dlog pe = 254), the above zero testing and enforce-
ment method yield an 80× speedup for both prover and verifier compared to the
deterministic approach using Fermat’s little theorem.
Handling conjunctions and disjunctions. In multi-dimensional SQL selection
queries, AND or OR operators are applied on the results of multiple selection clauses
over different columns, and thus the number of zero tests required potentially grows
with the number of columns. But note that OR clauses can be trivially reduced
to a single zero test; e.g., testing x1 = 0 ∨ x2 = 0 reduces to testing x1x2 = 0.
We further observe that AND clauses can also be reduced to a single zero test if
the input values are known to be in a bounded range. For example, if it is known





p/2 < x1, x2 <
√
p/2 then we may reduce evaluating the conjunction
x1 = 0 ∧ x2 = 0 to evaluating whether x21 + x22 = 0. In particular, if all values in
question are 32 bits long and p is a 254-bit value, then we can test conjunctions
involving up to 2189 values using just a single zero test. Alternatively, we can handle
conjunctions using packing: e.g., if x1, x2 are 32-bit values (and |p| > 64) then
testing whether x1 = 0 ∧ x2 = 0 is equivalent to testing whether 232x1 + x2 = 0.
These approaches ensure the number of required auxiliary inputs (as well as the size
of the zero-test circuit) for a multi-dimensional selection query depends linearly on
the number of rows in the table and is almost independent of the number of columns
involved in the query.
4.5.2 Supporting Inputs/Outputs at Arbitrary Circuit Layers
So far, we have assumed that the circuit being computed takes all its inputs at
the same layer, and produces all its outputs at the same layer. This is without loss
of generality since one can always define a “relay” gate that simply passes its input
to the next layer. In practice however, such relay gates will contribute some cost to
the execution of the interactive-proof protocol [81]. For many natural SQL queries,
this might even result in a highly inefficient circuit where most gates are relay gates.
For example, consider an SQL query of the form SELECT ∗ FROM T WHERE coli = x.
A circuit for evaluating this query takes the entire table as input, but only values
from the ith column are involved in the selection process. All the other values, from
all other columns, are simply relayed between the various circuit layers.
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Avoiding relaying the inputs. We now describe a technique that avoids relay
gates by leveraging the property of the multilinear extension described in Section 2.2.
Concretely, consider a circuit C such that some internal layer k operates on 2M
values with m = dlogMe. Assume the second half (denoted by B) of the 2M values
are “fresh inputs” (these may either be from the database itself, or auxiliary input
from the prover), while the first half (denoted by A) come from layer k + 1. Before
running the CMT protocol for C, the verifier holds the commitment (either obtained
from the preprocessing or received from the server) to the multilinear extension, Ṽ Bk ,
of the fresh inputs to the kth layer. Next, during the execution of the CMT protocol,
the client receives the evaluation of the multilinear extension of the values at layer
k, i.e., Ṽk(r1, . . . , rm+1), at some random point (r1, . . . , rm+1) as before. As only the
first M wires (corresponding to A) are connected to layer k + 1, the client needs to
obtain the evaluation of the multilinear extension (denoted by Ṽ Ak ) of the first M
values, at a random point and use it to continue the CMT protocol for layer k + 1.
This is done as follows. By Equation 2.1 in Section 2.2, we have Ṽk(r1, . . . , rm+1) =
(1−r1)Ṽ Ak (r2, . . . , rm+1)+r1 ·Ṽ Bk (r2, . . . , rm+1). Since B are all input gates, the client
can request the evaluation of Ṽ Bk at point (r2, . . . , rm+1) along with a correspond-
ing proof (using the verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol). Next, the client
computes Ṽ Ak (r2, . . . , rm+1) =
(
Ṽk(r1, . . . , rm+1)− r1 · Ṽ Bk (r2, . . . , rm+1)
)
/(1 − r1),
obtaining an evaluation of Ṽ Ak at the random point (r2, . . . , rm+1). The client then
uses it to continue the execution of the CMT protocol for layer k + 1 as usual.
We note that similar optimizations can be performed in order to avoid relying
output gates as well.
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Generalizations. For both inputs and outputs, using Equation 2.1 allows us to
avoid relaying a number of input and the output gates. We notice that the number
of input (resp. output) gates does not have to be half of the total number of gates
in the layer, but can be any fraction 1/m′ such that m′ is a power of 2. Moreover,
while we described the solution assuming that the “fresh” inputs at some layer are
all in the second half of the inputs to that layer, this is not required. With small
modifications we can accommodate more complicated wiring patterns, e.g., the case
where odd wires are routed from the previous layer and even wires are fresh inputs
to the circuit.
4.5.3 Verifying Set Intersections
A join operation requires computing the intersection of two large sets of column
values (assuming for now there are no duplicates). The naive way to compute the
intersection of two N -element sets, where each element is represents using z bits,
requires a circuit that performs N2 equality tests on z-bit inputs. We describe here
several ways this can be improved.
A sorting-based O(zN log2N) solution. An asymptotic improvement can be
obtained by first sorting the 2N elements, and then comparing consecutive elements
in the sorted result. Sorting can be done using O(N log2N) comparator gadgets of
width z, resulting in a circuit of size O(zN log2N) overall. The concrete overhead
of this approach is high, as each comparator must be implemented by decomposing
the inputs to their bit-level representations.
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A routing-based O(zN + N logN) solution. Prior literature on SNARKs [16]
improves the above by relying on auxiliary input from the prover to replace sorting
networks with switching networks that can induce arbitrary permutations on N
elements. Using this approach, the server will simply specify the permutation that
sorts the elements; the client can verify that the elements are sorted in linear time.
Switching networks can be built using O(N logN) gadgets that swap their inputs if
an auxiliary bit is set to 1. The total complexity of this approach is O(zN+N logN).
An O(zN) interactive solution. In our setting, where we have interaction, we
can do better. We simply have the server provide the sorted list x′1, . . . , x
′
2N cor-
responding to the original items x1, . . . , x2N . The client can verify that the new
list is sorted in O(N) time, so all that remains is for the client to verify that it
is a permuted version of the original list. This can be done by having the server
commit to the new values (as part of the auxiliary input he computes) using our
verifiable polynomial-delegation scheme. The client then chooses and sends to the







i− r) = 0. Overall, this approach requires O(zN)
auxiliary inputs and gates.
Sorting 0 values. The concrete cost can be further reduced as follows. In case
many of the elements are 0, after the sorting step they will be pushed to the
front of the auxiliary-input array (assuming, for simplicity, that all values are non-
negative). Instead of providing one auxiliary input per element, it suffices for the
prover to tell the verifier the number of non-zero elements, and only provide aux-
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iliary inputs for those. For example, assume only the last 1/m of elements are
non-zero (where m is a power of 2), using Equation 2.1 in Section 2.2, the eval-
uation of the multilinear extension for all elements at point r = (r1, . . . , rlog(mn))
is Ṽ (r) = r1 . . . rlogmṼm(rlogm+1, . . . , rlogmn), where Ṽm is the multilinear extension
of the non-zero elements. Thus, the size of the auxiliary input and the number of
necessary comparisons only depend on the number of non-zero elements (as opposed
to the total number of elements).
In the context of SQL queries, the scenario above is very common. Consider
a query where a join clause is applied on the result of two range queries. It is
often the case that only a small portion of rows in the table fall within the bounds
imposed by the latter. Therefore, after evaluating the range selection, the values in
these rows will be propagated through the circuit, while the values in all other rows
will effectively be set to 0. The join query (and therefore the sorting) will then be
applied on this result which has the property that many of its elements are 0. Thus
the above optimization can significantly lower the join evaluation cost in this case.
Sorting multiple columns. Another challenge arises when the output of a join
query includes more than just the reference column, e.g., SELECT ∗ FROM T1,T2,
WHERE T1.coli = T2.colj. In this case, in order to compute the set intersection using
the above interactive method, the verifier must make sure that the prover permuted
all of the columns of T1 (resp., T2) with the same permutation used for coli (resp.,
colj).
We achieve this using the following packing technique. Assume for simplicity
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that each database row has two columns with values xi, yi respectively, and that
the elements are arranged as tuples (x1, y1), · · · , (xN , yN). Suppose the elements
xi, yi have length at most z bits, with z < blog pc/2. To sort both columns based
on the xi values, we ask the server to provide auxiliary inputs (a1, . . . , a2N) =
(xπ(1), yπ(1), · · · , xπ(N), yπ(N)), such that the {xπ(i)} are sorted and the {yπ(i)} are
permuted by the same permutation. The client then chooses and sends to the
server two random values r1, r2, and both parties run the interactive proof protocol
described above for the following three checks:
1.
∏N
i=1(xi − r1)(yi − r1)−
∏2N







i − r2) = 0, where bi = xi + yi2z and b′i = a2i−1 + a2i2z;
3. (a1, a3, . . . , a2N−1) are sorted.
The first check guarantees that ais are a permutation of xi, yis, which also implies
that ais have length at most z bits. Now as xi, yi, ais all have length at most z bits,
the second check guarantees that ∃π : a2i−1 = xπ(i) and a2i = yπ(i) (note that we
cannot omit the first check as there exist ais with more than z bits that can pass
the second check). This, together with the last check, guarantees xπ(i)s are sorted
and yπ(i)s are permuted by the same permutation.
The technique generalizes naturally to sort multiple columns based on a refer-
ence column. As long as the packing result does not overflow in Fp, we can pack all
the columns. Otherwise, we can duplicate the reference column, perform a separate
packing of subsets of columns, and sort them separately. In particular, assuming
z = 32 and p is 254 bits long, we can pack up to 7 columns in a single field element.
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Handling duplicate values. Finally, if there are duplicate values in the reference
columns, the result of a join query can no longer be described as a set intersection.
In this case, a pairwise comparison of the elements of the two columns, viewed
as multisets, provides the correct result but the cost is quadratic in the number
of database rows. Instead we can do the following. First, we extract the unique
values from each multiset (using a linear-size circuit as described in [78]). Then we
compute the intersection of the resulting sets with our previous technique for the
case of no duplicates. Following this, we apply again the same technique to intersect
this intersection with each of the original multisets. This returns two multisets such
that: (i) each of them contains exactly those elements that appear in both original
multisets, and (ii) every element appears in each multiset exactly the same amount
of times as it appeared in the the corresponding original multiset. Finally, the join
result can be computed with a pair-wise comparison of the elements of these two
multisets. Note that the cost for this final step is asymptotically optimal as it is
exactly the same as simply parsing the join’s output.
4.5.4 Supporting Expressive Updates
A common problem of existing dynamic authenticated data structures (e.g., [67,
91]) is that they support limited types of updates: element insertions and deletions.
Thus, they cannot handle general updates that can be expressed as SQL queries
themselves, e.g., the query UPDATE Employees; SET Salary = 45000; WHERE Age =
33.
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The main reason such update queries are hard to handle is that the client
must eventually compute the corresponding updated database commitment. With-
out access to the database, it must again rely on the untrusted server to provide
this new commitment. SNARK-based constructions can support expressive updates
by including the commitment computation in the circuit. However, this would con-
siderably increase the prover’s overhead.
Our approach avoids this cost by separating the computation of the update
from its verification. First, the server computes the updated database normally, and
commits to the multilinear extension of the result using our verifiable polynomial
delegation scheme. The client and server then verify that the update was performed
correctly by running the CMT protocol on the circuit that performs the update.
In order to initiate the CMT protocol, the client needs to compute the multilinear
extension of the updated database (which is here the circuit’s output) and evaluate
it on a random point. This would naively require transmitting the entire updated
database back to the client. Instead, we rely on the server to compute the evaluation
for the client, and verify this value using our verifiable polynomial-delegation scheme.
Once this is done, the remainder of the CMT evaluation proceeds normally.
4.5.5 Efficient Value Insertions
As explained above, our construction can handle any update query by having
the server evaluate the update-query circuit and then commit to the output as the
new digest. For simple updates such as adding/subtracting a constant from an
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element, we have a much simpler mechanism. By utilizing the closed form of the
multilinear extension, in order to add a constant v to the bth entry in the database,
the multilinear extension of the database is increased by Xb(x1, · · · , xn)v (as defined
in Equation 2.1). Therefore, the client only needs to multiply the commitment of
the database by gXb(x1,··· ,xn)v = pvb , where pb is the bth element of the public key P. In
practice, as the size of P is linear in the size of the database, the client can outsource
its storage to the server and obtain an authenticated value of pb using a Merkle hash
tree or digital signatures. Thus, simple updates of this form can be handled with
one round of interaction, and the running time for both parties is logarithmic in the
database size using a Merkle tree, or constant using a digital signature scheme. The
update above also captures inserting a new element/row to the database, which is
adding their values to previously unused cells.
4.6 Experimental Results
4.6.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented our constructions (including the circuit generator and CMT
protocol) in C++, and compiled it with g++ 4.8.4. We use the NTL library [7]
for number-theoretic operations, and SHA-256 from the OpenSS libraryL [8] to
instantiate a random oracle. For the bilinear pairing we use the ate-paring library [1]
on a 254-bit elliptic curve. The EMP toolkit [86] was used for the network I/O
between the server and the client.
Since the running time of our verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol is over-
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whelmingly dominated by the modular exponentiations, in what follows we estimate
the running time of this component of our system by simply performing the same
number of exponentiation operations (using the same setup as above).
Hardware and network. Our experiments were executed on two Amazon EC2
c4.8xlarge machines running Linux Ubuntu 14.04, with 60GB of RAM and Intel
Xeon E5-2666v3 CPUs with 36 virtual cores running at 2.9 GHz. For the WAN
experiments, we used machines hosted in two different regions, one in the US East
and the other in the US West. The average network delay was measured at 72ms
and the bandwidth was 9MB/s. For each data point, we collected 10 experimental
results and report their average.
Database setup. We evaluate performance using the TPC-H benchmark [9], which
contains 8 synthetic tables and 22 SQL queries and is widely used by the database
community for performance evaluation. We represented decimal numbers, dates, and
categorical strings in the tables as elements in the field used by our constructions. In
our experimental evaluations, we do not consider substring or wildcard queries, and
the corresponding columns were discarded. The TPC-H database contains tables of
various sizes. The two largest tables used in our experiments contained 6 million
rows and 13 columns and 0.8 million rows and 4 columns, respectively.
TPC-H queries. We tested five TPC-H queries: query #2, #5, #6, #15, and #19.
As a representative example, query #5 is shown in Figure 4.2. It gives an example
of multi-way join queries on different columns of different tables. sub-query in line 6
is a selection query on table region, and the query in lines 7–8 is a range query on
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1. SELECT n name, SUM(l extendedprice*(1-l discount))
2. AS revenue
3. FROM customer, orders, lineitem, supplier, nation, region
4. WHERE c custkey = o custkey AND l orderkey = o orderkey
5. AND l suppkey = s suppkey AND c nationkey = n nationkey
6. AND n regionkey = r regionkey AND r name = ’MIDDLE EAST’
7. AND o orderdate >= date ‘1997-01-01’
8. AND o orderdate < date ‘1997-01-01’+interval ’1’ year
9. GROUP BY n name
10. ORDER BY (revenue) DESC;
Figure 4.2: Query #5 of the TPC-H benchmark.
table order. Lines 4–6 consist of join queries among tables customer, order, lineitem,
supplier, nation, region. In line 1, the result is projected to three columns, two of
which are aggregated. Finally, in lines 9–10, the aggregated values are summed for
each unique value of n name, and sorted based on n name in descending order.
Query #2 is a nested query. The inner query consists of a 4-way join followed
by a MIN query, resulting in a single value. The outer query consists of selection
queries, where the result of the inner query is used as a constraint, followed by a 4-
way join and projections. Query #6 is a simple 3-dimensional range query followed
by an aggregation. Query #19 consists of range and selection queries on two tables,
followed by a single join query and an aggregation. Query #15 creates a new table
that is the result of a one-dimensional range query and a SUM query. All the other
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queries in TPC-H are variants of these five queries with different dimensions and
constraints.
Query representation and field sizes. For every TPC-H query we implemented
a circuit generator that takes as input the database size and outputs an arithmetic
circuit for evaluating the specified query on a database of that size, using the op-
timizations described in Section 4.5 (when possible). We implemented both the
CMT protocol (Construction 1) and the verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol
(Construction 2) using a prime-order field with a 254-bit prime.
4.6.2 Performance Comparison: Selection Queries
We compare the performance of our construction with prior work, including
IntegriDB [91], a special purpose system optimized for a class of SQL queries, and
libsnark [6], the state-of-the-art general-purpose SNARK implementation. Below,
we report the results on queries #2, #5, #6, and #19.
For IntegriDB, we downloaded the implementation from [4] and executed it on
our machine. For libsnark, we estimated the performance as follows. For each query,
we first produced its circuit representation the jSNARK compiler [5], hardcodeding
the TPC-H dataset in the circuit. This resulted in a circuit which takes as inputs
the values used in selection and range queries. We then constructed a SNARK using
libsnark for this circuit, and report its performance. We note that this approach of
hardcoding the database and the query into the circuit yields a preprocessing phase
whose results are only useful for that specific query and database. In particular, the
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results of the preprocessing phase cannot be reused for other queries or databases, or
even an updated version of the database. Although clearly unrealistic, this approach
gives a lower bound on the server time when using a SNARK-based approach.3 Even
with this more efficient approach, we were not able to generate SNARKs for circuits
containing more than 220 multiplication gates (see Table 4.7 for the circuit sizes
of the queries we used in our evaluation). Therefore, for experiments requiring
larger circuits, we estimated the cost assuming the prover time grows linearly in the
circuit size (this is, again, an underestimate since the prover time actually grows
quasilinearly in the circuit size).
Setup phase. The setup phases in both IntegriDB and vSQL are query independent
and thus need to be executed only once, after which any supported queries can
be handled. We run the setup phases of both IntegriDB and vSQL on all eight
TPC-H tables. The setup for vSQL took about 1,185 seconds. For IntegriDB, the
setup phase could not be completed on the entire TPC-H database due to excessive
memory consumption. Our estimate for the setup phase of IntegriDB was about
350,000 seconds. Our construction is about 295× faster than IntegriDB because
the complexity of our setup phase is linear in the number of columns compared to
quadratic in IntegriDB.
For libsnark, the setup time depends on the query. The fastest setup time,
for query #6, is estimated to take 36,000 seconds, which is an order-of-magnitude
3It is possible to use SNARKs that support arbitrary queries by constructing a SNARK for
a universal circuit [18] and supporting delegation of storage [29, 41]. However, these approaches
introduce additional overhead.
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IntegriDB SNARKs vSQL (ours)
Query Server Client Server∗ Client∗ Server Client Total (WAN) Total (NI)
#19 6,376s 232ms 196,000s 6ms 4,923s 148ms 4,989s 4,923s
#6 1,818s 74ms 19,000s 6ms 3,878s 112ms 3,896s 3,878s
#5 7 7 615,000s 110ms 5,172s 305ms 5,379s 5,172s
#2 7 7 58,000s 40ms 2,421s 427ms 2,633s 2,421s
Figure 4.3: Comparison of server and client times for evaluating queries using Inte-
griDB, a SNARK-based approach and our construction. (See text for details.) The
numbers in columns marked by * are estimated. 7 denotes an unsupported query.
.
slower than vSQL. Running setup for all four queries is estimated to require about
1.7 · 107 seconds (roughly 197 days).
Evaluation phase. The results of the evaluation phase are summarized in Ta-
ble 4.3. The numbers reported in the “Server” column reflect the computation
time required for the server to evaluate the SQL query and produce a valid proof;
those in the “Client” column reflect the time for the client to verify the proof.
For vSQL, in the “Total (WAN)” column we also report the total end-to-end time
which includes the overhead due to communication between the client and server
over a WAN network. For comparison, the total time for IntegriDB and SNARKs
(which are non-interactive) is essentially the same as the server time, since the client
time is negligible. Note, however, that vSQL can be made non-interactive in the
random oracle model, virtually eliminating the cost of interaction at the negligible
expense of a small number of SHA-256 computations. We report the performance of
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this non-interactive mode, including the SHA-256 computation time, under “Total
(NI).”
Evaluation phase: vSQL vs. IntegriDB. As shown in Table 4.3, IntegriDB
can only support queries #19 and #6, compared with vSQL which can support all
TPC-H queries. While being more expressive, the running times of vSQL’s client
and server are on the same order of magnitude as those of IntegriDB; in fact, for
query #19, vSQL’s server (resp., client) outperforms that of IntegriDB by about
23% (resp., 36%). We observe also that the cost of interaction for vSQL (even over
a WAN) is small, mainly because prover time is by far the dominating cost.
Evaluation phase: vSQL vs. SNARKs. Compared to libsnark, the server
time of our constructions is significantly faster (ranging from approximately 5×
for query #6 to approximately 120× for query #5). At a high level, the better
performance of vSQL is a consequence of two features. First, our construction is
mostly information-theoretic and the number of (relatively slow) cryptographic op-
erations it requires is linear in the input and output length, whereas SNARK-based
approaches require a number of cryptographic operations linear in the circuit size. In
addition, as described in Section 4.5, our construction leverages interaction and aux-
iliary input to reduce the size of a query’s circuit representation. Verification when
using a SNARK-based approach is faster than in vSQL since it requires only a num-
ber of cryptographic operations linear in the output length. In practice, however,
the difference is at most 0.5sec which we consider negligible for most applications.
We stress that all numbers reported for libsnark are underestimations since they
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assume the database and queries are fixed in advance. We expect our construction’s
improvement to be even more significant compared to more general SNARK-based
systems that support arbitrary queries and dynamic outsourced databases (see dis-
cussion below).
Communication. For libsnark-based systems, the additional communication re-
quired for the proof is always constant (e.g., 288 bytes). For IntegriDB and vSQL
the communication required in all experiments was under half a megabyte. We con-
sider this to be negligible in practice for modern networks and thus omit additional
details.
Comparison with other SNARK-based systems. SNARKs can be used for
verifiable computation in various ways other than the one we used for our compari-
son.
Exploiting Structured Computations via Bootstrapping. Geppetto [37] takes a com-
plex computation and splits it into smaller building blocks, each represented as a
“small” circuit. Each such circuit can then be pre-processed with a SNARK sepa-
rately. In the context of SQL queries, the natural way to split the computation is
by having one small circuit that operates on a single row, and then applying that
circuit iteratively to each row in the database. An additional SNARK is then needed
to aggregate and verify the outputs of all the smaller SNARKs into a single succinct
proof, in a “bootstrapping” step. In practice, Geppetto has the potential to sig-
nificantly reduce the preprocessing time and memory consumption since the same
small circuit is used throughout the query evaluation. However, the total prover
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time to execute the smaller SNARK on every row is similar to that of the single
large SNARK we used as our benchmark, as the total number of exponentiations is
linear in the total number of multiplication gates and breaking a large circuit into
multiple smaller ones does not reduce that. Our results already show that the prover
time in that case is up to 2 orders of magnitude slower than for vSQL. Additionally,
the bootstrapping phase requires approximately 30,000–100,000 gates per instance
of the smaller circuit [37, Section 7.3.1]. Applying this to a table with 6 million
rows (as in the TPC-H dataset) will thus introduce an additional overhead of 1.4–
4.8× 107s for the prover, based on our estimations with libsnark (which is itself an
underestimate as the bootstrapping phase operates over a larger and less efficient
elliptic curve).
Memory Delegation via Hash Functions. Pantry [29] can be used to outsource mem-
ory by implementing a Merkle hash tree on top of Pinocchio [71]. The consistency
of each memory read/write access must be proven by checking the corresponding
Merkle path as part of the SNARK that evaluates the query. This approach has
the benefit of allowing the verifiable evaluation of RAM programs on outsourced
memory (as opposed to expressing the computation directly as a circuit). For SQL
queries, assuming the existence of pre-built database indices (as is typically the case
with modern database management systems), there are programs that can evaluate
certain queries in time sublinear in the database size. (E.g., assuming the existence
of a search tree that stores the ordered element values at its connected leaves, a sim-
ple 1-D range query can be evaluated in time logarithmic in the database size and
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linear in the result.) Thus, for specific queries for which such indices can be built,
Pantry can in theory outperform vSQL. Regarding the specific queries we evaluated
here, we note that the number of memory accesses would still be very large even
with the help of pre-built indices. The simplest TPC-H query we tested is query
#6, which is a 3-dimensional range query followed by a summation. Assuming a
search tree is built for each dimension and each 1-D range query has a 1% selec-
tivity (which is well below the selectivity in our experiments), getting the result of
each dimension requires 60,000 memory accesses. In practice, the concrete cost of
proving the correctness of each memory access would be approximately 2.5s, using a
SNARK-friendly algebraic hash function [60] for 106 4-byte memory blocks. There-
fore, just verifying the memory accesses for query #6 would take around 450,000s
(5 days) in this case.
Finally, in contrast to vSQL, both approaches require a query-specific setup
phase that can only be avoided if one uses a universal circuit [18] or proof-bootstrapping [17],
but these techniques incur considerable additional overheads.
4.6.3 Performance Comparison: Update Queries
We further test the performance of vSQL on a CREATE query (query #15 in
TPC-H). As shown in Table 4.4, the communication required is only 86.4KB, even
though the newly created table is itself more than 1MB in size. IntegriDB cannot
directly support such expressive updates. The only solution for IntegriDB would be
for the client to download the entire new table, verify its correctness, and preprocess
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Server Client Total (WAN) Total (NI) Comm.
2,034.3s 66ms 2,089.4s 2,034.4s 86.4KB
Figure 4.4: Performance of our construction on TPC-H query #15, creating a new
table from table lineitem.
it from scratch.
Next we look at updates that can be supported by IntegriDB, in particular
inserting a new row. In this case, vSQL outperforms IntegriDB since the total
time for inserting a row into the lineitem table in TPC-H is only 5.2ms using vSQL
vs. 1.46s using IntegriDB. This is because the vSQL client only needs to verify
the corresponding elements of the public parameters using a Merkle-tree proof and
then perform one exponentiation per column. For IntegriDB, the required number
of exponentiations is quadratic in the number of columns and logarithmic in the
number of rows.
In order for a SNARK-based system to support updates, it must offer a way
to check the validity of a new database digest returned by the prover. The standard
way of doing this is by incorporating the digest computation in the circuit that is
evaluated, which introduces a huge cost in practice. More recent approaches can
achieve this via an external mechanism that is not part of the circuit of the SNARK
(e.g., [12, 41]). Note however, that at the very least the update circuit must be
evaluated and the SNARK proof must be computed by the prover. According to
our performance comparison in the previous section, this already takes more time
than vSQL.
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Figure 4.5: Performance of vSQL for three TPC-H queries as a function of the
number of rows in the largest table involved in the query.
4.6.4 Scalability of Our Construction
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our constructions as a function
of the database size. To that end, we run our construction on the largest three of
the previous queries and scale the number of rows in the largest participating table
from 6,000 to 6,000,000.
Server time. As shown in Figure 4.5, the server performance for query evaluation
scales almost linearly with the size of the largest table, matching the theoretical
analysis of Theorem 5.
Client time. Figure 4.5 shows that the client’s verification time grows logarithmi-
cally with the number of rows in the largest table participating in a query (note the
logarithmic scale of the horizontal axis). This again matches Theorem 5.
84
Query # of Inputs Time (sec) Time/Input (ms)
#15 12,002,430 1,389 0.1157
#2 17,840,340 2,065 0.1158
#6 24,004,860 2,741 0.1142
#5 31,397,075 3,612 0.1151
#19 32,406,075 3,726 0.1150
Figure 4.6: Prover time for our polynomial-delegation scheme. The number of inputs
includes both the database and the prover’s auxiliary inputs.
4.6.5 Microbenchmarks
In addition to evaluating vSQL’s end-to-end performance, we also report on
the performance of vSQL’s main components—namely, our implementations of the
CMT protocol and the polynomial-delegation scheme.
Performance of the polynomial-delegation scheme. Table 4.6 shows the
prover time the polynomial-delegation scheme (Construction 2). As can be seen,
the prover spends about 0.11ms per input, which is the same order of magnitude as
what is achieved with SNARK-based schemes. Preprocessing for our polynomial-
delegation scheme (which is the only part of our construction that requires prepro-
cessing) took only 1,185 seconds for 95,525,880 inputs (12.4µs per gate).
Performance of the CMT protocol. Table 4.7 shows the performance of our
implementation of the CMT protocol. As can be seen, the average time required
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Query # of Gates Time (sec) Time/Gate (µs)
#2 198,646,335 356 1.79
#15 367,495,719 646 1.76
#6 704,643,060 1,137 1.61
#19 801,374,196 1,198 1.49
#5 945,828,996 1,560 1.65
Figure 4.7: Prover time for our implementation of the CMT protocol.
per gate is about 1.7µs.
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Chapter 5: Applications: Verifiable RAM Programs
While circuits can model arbitrary programs, most real-world computations
are expressed in terms of random-access memory (RAM) machines. This is true both
in terms of most programmers’ mental model of computation, as well as in terms
of the execution of assembly code on general-purpose computers. However, since
most constructions of VC protocols, including our new protocol in Section 3, work
on computations expressed as arithmetic circuits, verification of a RAM program
P is usually done by verifying the correct evaluation of an arithmetic circuit CP
that validates the execution of the program P . As mentioned in related work in
Section 1.1, most VC protocols (e.g., SNARKs) require the circuit to be fixed ahead
of time, during a trusted preprocessing phase. Due to this, previous works for
verifying RAM programs can be roughly divided into two main categories.
1. Program-specific preprocessing. If the program P to be verified is known
ahead of time, it is possible to tailor the circuit CP so as to verify P as efficiently
as possible. While this tailoring is beneficial to the protocol’s overall performance,
it comes at the expense of usability since CP cannot be used to verify another
program P ′. Examples of this approach are Pantry [29] and Buffet [83].
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2. Universal preprocessing. In case the RAM program to be verified is not
known ahead of time, it is possible to construct a universal circuit CRAM which
is capable of verifying any RAM program that runs for at most T steps. Examples
of this approach include [16,18].
Both these approaches have significant drawbacks. In the first case, the verifier can-
not change the RAM program P being verified without re-running the (expensive)
preprocessing phase. This is a major drawback as the preprocessing cost can only
be amortized by running the same program on different inputs.
In the second case, although the preprocessing cost can be amortized over the
evaluation of different programs on different inputs, the universal preprocessing used
in this approach imposes large concrete overheads during the proving phase.
This results from the fact that CRAM must be able to emulate all possible
operations at every CPU step in order to handle arbitrary RAM programs. In
contrast, the program-specific approach benefits from the fact that P is known
when CP is chosen, and so the set of possible instructions at each step is potentially
much smaller.
Two notable exceptions to the above are the works of [13, 17], which do not
need a preprocessing phase tied to a specific circuit. However, the concrete cost
of these systems remains significantly higher than that of the preprocessing-based
solutions mentioned above. (See Section 5.3.2.)
In this chapter, we present a new verifiable RAM construction, vRAM, that
achieves the best of both categories. It has similar (or even better) performance
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than what is achievable with program-specific preprocessing, but without knowing
the program during the preprocessing phase. This is achieved by using our new
argument system on the circuit validating the execution of a RAM program as a
backend, which has faster prover time and does not require the circuit to be fixed
during the preprocessing phase.
Experimental evaluations show that vRAM improvse the prover’s running time
by 9–30× as compared to the state-of-the-art-implementation in the universal set-
ting [18]. On the other hand, compared to systems using program-specific prepro-
cessing [83], vRAM achieves very similar prover performance; in fact, in some cases
our prover is faster despite the fact that systems with program-specific preprocessing
can deploy program-specific optimizations during the preprocessing phase.
We also show that vRAM is much better in terms of memory consumption,
which is currently the main bottleneck for running large instances of verifiable com-
putation. vRAM achieves an improvement of 55–110× in terms of memory con-
sumption compared to [18], which allows us to prove computations involving more
than 2 million CPU cycles with 256GB memory (65× more than [18]). The im-
provements achieved by vRAM come at the cost of increased verifier’s running time
and proof size, however these still remain well within the capabilities of modern
machines.
In this chapter, we first give preliminaries on RAM programs and RAM to
circuit reductions in Section 5.1, and present our new reduction in Section 5.2. We
then show experimental results in Section 5.3.
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5.1 Preliminaries on RAM programs
5.1.1 A Canonical RAM Architecture
In this section we establish notation for a random-access machine supporting
some instruction-set architecture.
Hardware. We focus on RAM machine computations, where the machine is parametrized
by the number of registers K and the register width (word size) W . The CPU state
consists of a W -bit program counter (pc) and K general-purpose, W -bit registers
r1, . . . , rK . Each instruction operates over two operands (registers) and stores its
result in a third register, to which we shall refer as the destination register. The
machine’s memory is a randomly accessible array of 2W bytes. We also assume two
read-only unidirectional tapes containing W -bit words. The first tape is used for the
program input x, and the second tape may potentially be used for auxiliary input
aux.
Program execution. A program is a sequence of instructions, where each instruc-
tion has two operands (which are either register numbers or constants) and stores
its result in a third register called the destination register. A random-access ma-
chine starts executing a program with all registers, its memory, and the program
counter initialized to 0. At each step, the instruction pointed by the pc is executed.
By default, every instruction increments the pc by one (i.e., pointing to the next
instruction), but an instruction (e.g., jump) can also modify the pc directly to facil-
itate arbitrary control flow. The machine’s inputs are the above-mentioned tapes,
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S and S∗∗ t, pc, r1, . . . , rK , O, flag, auxiliary
1
I and I∗∗ line number, opcode, i, j (source registers), k (target register)
A a, t, O, b (denoting memory load or store)
Table 5.1: Values in a state and an instruction.
accessible via special read instructions, as well as the initial contents of its mem-
ory. The machine outputs either accept or reject. We say program P accepts input
(x, aux) if the machine running program P with the specified input terminates with
output accept.
Machine state and instruction encoding. We define the notion of machine
state as the values of the machine’s registers pc, r1, · · · , rK at any point during
the program execution. Let S1, · · · , ST be a list of the machines states during
the execution of some program P . We augment each state Si to also include i in it,
referring to i as Si’s step number as well as to include an additional field Oi, referring
to it as the instruction’s output field. An instruction I contains information about
what operation the machine should execute (e.g., addition, multiplication, etc.), the
two source registers ri, rj as well as the target register rk. For a specific program
(which is a sequence of instructions) P = P1, · · · , P`, we augment every instruction
Pi to include its location i (line number) within P . The detailed values in a state
and an instruction used in our implementation is shown in Table 5.1.
1Auxiliary includes data from the prover for efficient implementation purposes, i.e., bit-
decomposition of the values for computation modulo 232 and bits denoting whether an instruction
is jump, memory store or load.
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We take as our set of available instructions from those used by TinyRAM [16,
18]. This is an ideal starting point for our implementation as the universal circuit
for the TinyRAM CPU can be described by a relatively small arithmetic circuit.
Execution traces. The trace tr = (S1, I1, S2, I2, . . . , IT−1, ST ) of a program P on
inputs x, aux is a sequence of CPU states and instructions, where S1 is the initial
state and each Si is produced by executing instruction Ii−1 on Si−1. A trace tr is
valid for a program P on input x if there is an aux such that P (x, aux) has trace tr.
Similarly, a trace tr of a program P on input x is accepting if there exists aux such
that tr is valid and we say that P accepts input (x, aux).
A universal NP relation for RAM programs. The following NP relation
RAM`,n,T captures accepting RAM programs:
Definition 5. For `, n, T ∈ N, relation RAM`,n,T consists of tuples (P, x; aux) such
that: (i) P is a program with ≤ ` instructions, (ii) x is an input of ≤ n words, and
(iii) P (x, aux) accepts in ≤ T steps.
5.1.2 Previous Reductions from RAM to Circuit Satisfiability
Before describing our improvements, in this section we present previous approaches
for constructing a circuit that can verify the execution of RAM programs. More
specifically, given a time bound T , [18] constructs a circuit C such that for any
RAM program P , ∃w : C(P, x;w) = 1 if and only if ∃aux such that P (x; aux)
accepts. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted, we do not distinguish











































































Figure 5.1: Circuits for the reductions from RAM programs to circuits from Sec-
tion 5.1.2 (left) and Section 5.2 (right). Circuits Cfetch and Cperm receive additional
input from the verifier as described in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4, respectively.
program length and the input size.
The circuit C takes as input a program P and a witness w that contains a
trace tr = (S1, I1, S2, I2 · · · , IT−1, ST ) and aux. C then outputs 1 only if S1 is the
initial state, ST is an accepting state, and the following hold at every step i in tr:
1. Correct instruction execution. State Si+1 is obtained from Si after executing
instruction Ii.
2. Correct instruction fetches. Ii is the instruction in P pointed to by the
program counter (pc) in Si. If i = 1 we require that pc = 0.
3. Correct memory accesses. If Ii is a load instruction accessing address a then
the value loaded is v, where v is the last value written to address a by some
previous instruction (and v = 0 if Ii is the first load from a.)
In order to verify the above three conditions, the circuit C is constructed from three
sub-circuits Cexe, Cmem, and Croute (cf. Figure 5.1(left)), which we explain below.
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Ensuring correct instruction execution. To ensure (1), every triple Si, Ii, Si+1
is given as input to a circuit Cexe which performs the following two checks. (a)
Check that the value Oi in Si is correctly computed by executing Ii.
2 In case Ii is
a memory load instruction, Cexe optimistically assumes that the loaded value Oi is
correct (this will be tested separately when checking memory accesses). (b) Check
that Oi is equal to rj of Si+1 (or pci+1 in case of jump), all other registers of Si+1
are the same as Si, Si’s step number is indeed i and pci is equal to the line number
of Ii in P (as encoded in Ii).
Ensuring correct instruction fetches. To ensure (2), C must check that the
instruction Ii is fetched from the location in the program P pointed by pci in
state Si (i.e., that Ii is the pci-th instruction in P ). In [18], this is achieved by
storing P in memory and then loading instructions before they are executed. For-
mally, a booting sequence B1, . . . , B` is prepended to the trace tr, with Bi storing
the i-th instruction of P in memory at address i. This results in a new trace
tr = (B1, · · · , B`, S1, I1, S2, I2 · · · , IT−1, ST ) of length 2T + `. Each Ii ∈ tr is then
viewed as two operations: One is a load operation fetching an instruction from the
memory address pointed by its line number, and the other is Ii itself. In this way,
the correctness of instruction fetches is reduced to checking the consistency of the
memory stores and loads performed by Bs and Is, which we describe next.
Ensuring correct memory accesses. To ensure (3), Ben-Sasson et al. [18] include
in w an additional trace tr∗ = (A1, · · · , A2T+`), which is a permuted version of tr
2If Ii is a memory instruction, Oi is the loaded or stored value; if Ii is a jump instruction, Oi
is the jump destination.
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where: (a) all the states in which a memory access is performed are sorted by
the memory address a being accessed (with ties broken by their step number in
tr), and (2) non-memory instructions are pushed to the end of tr. Notice that Bi
and Ii are also sorted, using the addresses i and the line number respectively. For
two adjacent entries Ai, Ai+1 ∈ tr∗ with outputs Oi, Oi+1, step numbers ti, ti+1 and
accessing addresses ai, ai+1, respectively, the circuit Cmem checks the following:
3
• If ai = ai+1 then ti < ti+1. If Ai+1 is a load instruction, the loaded value Oi+1 is
the same as the value Oi stored or loaded by Ai.
• If ai 6= ai+1 then ai+1 > ai, and if Ai+1 is a load instruction then Oi+1 = 0.
Checking consistency between tr and tr∗. Finally, C must ensure that tr∗ is
a copy of tr that contains exactly the same states and instructions, just sorted by
their accessed addresses. Note that the fact that tr∗ is sorted correctly has already
been checked by Cmem. Hence, it remains to ensure that a state appears in tr
∗
if and only if it appears in tr. This can be done by checking that there exists a
permutation π such that π(tr∗) = tr. To that end, C contains a sub-circuit Croute
which implements a O(T log T ) switching network that routes every entry in tr to
its matching entry in tr∗. The control bits used for the switching network (which
specifies the permutation π) are provided by the prover and included in w.
Overall complexity. For a program of size ` running for T steps, the above
reduction yields a circuit C of size T · |Cexe| + (2T + `) · |Cmem| + |Croute|. Since
3In case Ai corresponds to Bj or Ij , the value Oi loaded is the encoding of the instruction, i.e.
the concatenation of the machine operation code and the source and destination registers.
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Cexe, Cmem are fixed for a given architecture (i.e., they are independent of T, `),
and Croute can be implemented using O((T + `) · log(T + `)) gates, we have |C| =
O((T + `) · log(T + `)).
5.2 Our New RAM to Circuit Reduction
In this section, we present a ”tigher” reduction than the one of [18] presented in
Section 5.1.2, resulting in a more efficient argument for RAM programs. We rely on
our new argument system as a backend, which is both interactive and has a circuit-
independent preprocessing phase. More specifically, having a circuit-independent
preprocessing phase allows us to produce a concretely smaller circuit where at each
step the prover only proves the correct execution of the instruction that is actually
executed by the RAM program on its specific inputs, as opposed to proving the
correctness of a circuit evaluating all possible instructions. Next, the interactivity
property allows us to replace the routing network used in [18] for checking trace
consistency with an efficient interactive protocol for randomized polynomial identity
testing. This reduces the prover’s complexity from O((T + `) log(T + `)) to O(T + `)
as well as improves the prover’s concrete efficiency.
Our final circuit construction is shown in Figure 5.1(right). As in Section 5.1.2,
we must check correctness of (1) instruction execution, (2) instruction fetches, and
(3) memory accesses. Next we describe our implementation of these checks.
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5.2.1 Ensuring Correct Instruction Execution
Let tr = (S1, I1, S2, I2 · · · , IT−1, ST ). Recall that in the reduction described in Sec-
tion 5.1.2, the correct execution of tr’s instructions is checked via a universal Cexe
which performs two sets of tests on every triple Si, Ii, Si+1 ∈ tr. The first test (a)
checks the correctness of Oi (i.e., that performing Ii on Si results in Oi) while the
second test (b) checks that the values from Si are consistently propagated to Si+1
(including correct pci update and ordering of steps). Notice that while the second
test is relatively simple and identical for all triples, the majority of Cexe’s gates
are actually required for performing the first test. This is since this part of Cexe is
often implemented by a composition of smaller circuits each of which can check the
execution of a specific instruction, together with a multiplexer that specifies which
instruction should be checked at this step. In order to optimize the size of Cexe,
while maintaining the succinct representation of the result circuit C, we split Cexe
into two sub-circuits which perform these two checks independently. For the second
check we will the same circuit for all triples, whereas for the first one we we will use
a circuit that can only verify the logic of the particular instruction Ii. Below, we
describe in detail how these circuits are implemented.
Ensuring correct propagation of values. We define a circuit Ctime that takes as
input a triple Si, Ii, Si+1, and verifies that the value of the destination register in Si+1
is equal to Oi, all other registers in Si+1 remain unchanged, and pci+1 was updated
appropriately. Similar to Section 5.1.2, Ctime also checks that Si’s step number is
indeed i and that pci is equal to the alleged location of Ii in P (as encoded in Ii by
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the prover). However, unlike Section 5.1.2, we stress that Ctime does not verify that
Oi is the correct output after executing Ii.
Verifying instruction execution. Let J be the number of instruction types
supported by the RAM architecture. We include in the witness w an additional
trace tr∗∗ that is the result of sorting the pairs (Si, Ii) ∈ tr by the instruction type




i ) ∈ tr∗∗ and checks
that S∗∗i is a valid state for the instruction I
∗∗
i of type j (i.e., Oi is correctly computed
by executing I∗∗i on S
∗∗
i ). In this way, Cval,j is specialized to a specific instruction
type. Moreover, since tr∗∗ is sorted by instruction type, the copies of Cval,j will also
appear in C sorted by j. In this way, C can be succinctly described by (k1, . . . , kJ),
where kj (for j = 1, . . . , J) denotes the number of times instruction type j appears
in trace tr when program P is executed on input x (where
∑
j kj = T ).
5.2.2 Verifying Instruction Fetches
As described above, [18] ensures program consistency by first storing the program to
memory during the machine’s booting phase. Next, each instruction is sequentially
loaded from memory for execution. These operations are treated the same as regular
memory stores and loads, and are checked by T +` copies of Cmem. Here, we explain
how the correctness of these operations can be checked more efficiently assuming
instructions in the program are fixed and known to the verifier (i.e., if we assume
that P does not contain self-modifying code, similar to [16]).
Unlike the reduction of Section 5.1.2, note that the trace tr does not include a
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boot sequence. Instead, we observe that for each triple Si, Ii, Si+1, the circuit Ctime
already checks that pci is equal to the line number of Ii in P (as encoded in Ii by
the prover). All that remains is to verify that Ii is the instruction in P with the
same line number. Equivalently, let {P1, · · · , P`} be the set of instructions in P
where each Pi is augmented to also contain its line number within P (as defined
in Section 5.1.2). Then we only need to check that the sequence {I1, · · · , IT−1}
is a multiset of {P1, · · · , P`} (the multiplicity of some Pi may be 0 to account for
non-executed instructions). To that end, we add a circuit Cfetch that validates this
multiset relation and leverages the interactive property of our argument scheme from
Section 3. The circuit takes the sequence I1, · · · , IT−1 from tr and a random value r
(provided by the verifier) as input. Cfetch outputs the evaluation of its characteristic
polynomial at point r, i.e.,
∏T−1
i=1 (Ii − r). The verifier also receives from the prover





i=1 (Ii− r) and test whether it corresponds to the value output
by the circuit. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability the verifier accepts
if the two polynomials are not the same (i.e., {I1, · · · , IT−1} is not a multiset of
{P1, · · · , P`}) is negligible. We stress that this is only secure if we ensure that the
prover commits to the entire witness (including I1, · · · , IT−1) before seeing r, as is
the case in our construction in Section 3. In this way, we have replaced T + ` copies
of Cmem with a smaller circuit Cfetch evaluating the characteristic polynomial at a
random value which leads to concrete efficiency improvement.
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5.2.3 Ensuring Memory Accesses
Similar to Section 5.1.2, in order to verify memory accesses (ensuring (3)) we
include in w a trace tr∗ = (A1, · · · , AT ) sorted by the memory address being accessed
(again with ties broken by step number and non-memory instructions located at
the end of tr∗). Since the correctness of instruction fetches is already ensured (as
described above), we only sort the states Si in tr, and the length of tr
∗ now becomes
T . For every two adjacent entries Ai, Ai+1 ∈ tr∗ with outputs Oi, Oi+1, step numbers
ti, ti+1 and accessing addresses ai, ai+1, respectively, the circuit Cmem checks the same
two conditions as in Section 5.1.2. Finally, note that the number of instruction that
actually perform memory operations may be smaller than T , but we still include T
copies of Cmem in C to account for the worst case. In practice however, it is almost
certain that not every cycle will perform a memory access. E.g., even for a program
that consists of a single for loop that simply loads a memory location per repetition,
the total percentage of memory accesses is 25% (one instruction for the memory
load, plus three for counter increase, loop bound check, and jump). Motivated by
this, we exploit the circuit-independent pre-processing of our argument to modify
C so that it only contains αT copies of Cmem where α is the percentage of general
memory accesses over the total steps.
In order to achieve this, we split the witness to two separate parts. The first
contains tr and tr∗∗ sorted by time and instruction type, and the second contains
tr∗. Recall that after the optimization above, tr∗ only contains AT+`, · · · , A2T+`,
which is a permutation of S1, · · · , ST sorted by accessed memory addresses. Then,
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by our design, if Ii is not a memory load/store instruction, we set the accessed
memory address of Si as 0 and all the values in Si as 0s before sorting. In this
way, the first (1 − α)T states in AT+`, · · · , A2T+` are all zeros (assuming the real
memory address starts from 1) and there is no need to check anything for these
states, as they are not memory operations. Because of this layout, now the prover
only includes AT+`+αT , · · · , A2T+` in tr∗, and tells the verifier the number of non-
memory operations. With these information, it is sufficient to validate the new tr∗ is
a permutation of non-zero states in tr using CMT on circuit C ′, and the technique is
described in Section 4.5.2 for handling circuits that receive inputs at different levels.
With this optimization, we manage to reduce the number of Cmem further from T
to αT , which is a significant improvement in practice. However, the verifier now
needs to run two VPD instances (once for each part of the witness).
5.2.4 Checking Consistency
Finally, it remains to check that tr∗ and tr∗∗ are indeed permutations of tr.
Previous works [15, 16, 18] achieve this task by using routing networks, yielding
a circuit of size O((T + `) log(T + `), for a T -step RAM program of size `, and
correspondingly increasing the prover’s asymptotic running time from linear to
quasilinear. Using routing networks to achieve this would yield a circuit of size
O((T + `) log(T + `), for a T -step RAM program of size `, which would corre-
spondingly increase the prover’s asymptotic running time from linear to quasilinear.
Following the approach of Section 4.5.3, we leverage the interactive nature of our
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argument in order to avoid the use of routing networks, replacing them with a simple
interactive protocol that is similar to the one used above for verifying instruction
fetches. The result is that our prover’s running time is only O(T + `), i.e., asymp-
totically the same as simply evaluating the program.
More specifically, assume the prover holds lists x1, . . . , xm and x
′
1, . . . , x
′
m and
wants to convince the verifier that they are a permutation of each other. Consider
a circuit Cperm that takes x1, . . . , xm and x
′
1, . . . , x
′
m (provided by the prover) and a





i − r). If the two lists are permutations of each other the output is always
zero, otherwise by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma it is zero with negligible probability.4
Finally, evaluating this polynomial requires O(m) gates. For our argument, we
use two executions of this interactive protocol, one for the pair tr, tr∗ and one for
tr, tr∗∗, in a way that ensures that C outputs zero only if Cperm outputs zero both
times. From the above analysis, each of these circuits consists of O(T + `) gates.
We stress that it is crucial to have the prover commit to the two lists ahead of
time, in particular before seeing r, for security purposes. This is enforced by our
argument as P commits to the entire witness w in the first step of the protocol (cf.
Construction 3, Evaluation Phase, Step 1).
4As a state (e.g., A in tr∗) contains multiple values such as O and t and we want to ensure they
are permuted together, we pack the values before the check (e.g., for W -bit values (a, b, c), we set
x = a × 22W + b × 2W + c). If the result of a single pack overflows the field, we pack the values
multiple times with respect to the first value. In our implementation, we use a 254-bit prime field,
which allows packing of 7 32-bit numbers. We also use the same technique to ensure that S∗∗i and
I∗∗i in tr
∗∗ are permuted together.
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Finally, we apply our new argument system presented in Construction 3 on
the circuit presented above as a backend. This leads to a VC protocol for arbitrary
RAM programs. We are now ready to state the following result:
Theorem 7. Let ` be a program length parameter, T be a time bound and let n be an
input bound. Assuming that Construction 2 is an extractable verifiable polynomial
delegation protocol, then combining the results of Section 5.2 with Construction 3 we
obtain an argument system for the relation RAM`,n,T (as per Definition 5). More-
over, as the sizes of Ctime, Cval and Cmem are constants which are independent of
n, T, `, the running time of P is O(n+T + `) and that of V is O(n+ `+poylog(T )).
This yields a succinct argument with polylog (n+ `+ T ) rounds of interaction.
The theorem directly follows Theorem 5, and we omit the proof here.
5.3 Experimental Results
Software and hardware. We implemented our constructions (including the RAM
reduction, circuit generator, CMT protocol, and VPD protocol) in C++. We use
the GMP library [3] for field arithmetic and OpenSSL’s [8] SHA-256 implementation
for hashing. For the bilinear pairing we use the ate-paring library [1] on a 254-bit
elliptic curve.
We run our experiments on an Amazon EC2 m4.2xlarge machine having 32
GB of RAM and an Intel Xeon E5-2686v4 CPU with eight 2.3 GHz virtual cores.
Our implementations are not parallelized and only use a single CPU core.
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5.3.1 Comparison with vnTinyRAM and Buffet
In this section, we compare the performance of our system to existing sys-
tems for verifiable RAM. We compare to Buffet [83], a verifiable RAM system with
program-specific prepossessing (where the parameters generated by the trusted pre-
processing can only be used to verify one specific program on different inputs) and
vnTinyRAM [18], a universal verifiable RAM system (where the parameters gener-
ated by the trusted preprocessing can be used to verify any program up to some
bound on the number of steps). We also measure the performance of our system
against naive unverified execution of the RAM program. Finally, in Section 5.3.2
we also discuss comparisons to other verifiable RAM systems.
Benchmark. As a benchmark, we evaluate the RAM programs from [83] (see
Table 5.2). Following that work, we benchmark our system using programs of three
types.
1. Circuit friendly. The function computed by these programs has a very efficient
circuit representation. We use matrix multiplication as an example.
2. Fixed memory access and instruction patterns. These programs do not
exploit the full generality of RAM machines, i.e., their memory-access patterns
and control flow do not depend on the program’s inputs. This allows for a
tighter RAM-to-circuit reduction since it can be determined ahead of time which
instruction will be executed at each time step. Thus, the produced circuit only
needs to handle a specific instruction per cycle. We use pointer chasing and
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Benchmark Input Size # of Cycles Native
1: Matrix Mult. n=215 96M 42ms
2: Pointer Chasing n = 16634 50K 22µs
3: Merge Sort n = 512 65K 28µs
4: KMP Search n = 2900, k = 256 30K 13µs
5: Sparse Mat-Vec Mult. n = 1150, k = 2300 27K 12µs
Table 5.2: Benchmarks in our experiments. We report the input size, the number
of CPU cycles and the native running time on verifier for the instances we used in
Table 5.3 and 5.4.
merge sort as examples of such programs.
3. Input-dependent memory access and instruction patterns. Such RAM
programs use the full generality of RAM machines since they have input-dependent
control flow and memory-access patterns. In particular, the circuit generated by
the RAM reduction must be able to handle multiple possible instructions at every
step. We use KMP string matching [58] and CSR sparse matrix-vector multipli-
cation [47] as examples of such programs.
Buffet evaluation methods. Buffet’s front-end takes a RAM program and out-
puts a circuit that verifies its execution and its back-end uses a circuit-based VC
system based on Pinocchio [71]. We evaluate Buffet using the released code [2].
vnTinyRAM evaluation methods. We evaluate vnTinyRAM [18] using the
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code at [6]. As the code that takes a TinyRAM program and outputs the traces
for vnTinyRAM is not available, we are unable to produce vnTinyRAM traces cor-
responding to the execution of any benchmark RAM program. Instead, we esti-
mate the cost of vnTinyRAM by running the prover on traces of appropriate length
resulting from execution random machine instructions. Since the performance of
vnTinyRAM only depends on the total number of CPU steps and not on the in-
struction being executed at each step, this estimate is accurate.5
Using a different back-end for vnTinyRAM and buffet. Both Buffet and
vnTinyRAM can be re-factored to use the more recent construction of [53] as their
back-end. This would result in an approximate improvement of 30% in their setup,
prover time and public key size as well as 50% improvement in their proof and
verification key sizes. This would also improve verification time by 3×, as per the
benchmarks of [6].
vRAM evaluation methods. For vRAM, we implemented our own TinyRAM
simulator to output the program traces used by our prover and verifier backend.
We then adapted the assembly code for the programs in the Buffet benchmark, and
ran them in our TinyRAM simulator to obtain execution traces, which we provided
to prover-verifier backend. In order to measure the cost of our system vs. naive
unverified execution, we estimate the execution time of random instructions on a
5A version of vnTinyRAM that removes unnecessary instructions in each step after running the
particular program to be verified was released by Wahby et al. [83]. However, since the prover in
this program-specific version is unable to handle arbitrary RAM programs, it is not appropriate
for our comparison.
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single-threaded 2.3 GHz CPU core.
Experimental results. The results of the comparison are summarized in Ta-
bles 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 as well as in Figure 5.2. We executed each program on
the largest input size reported in [83]. Table 5.2 summarizes their input size, num-
ber of CPU cycles and the native running time if executed on the verifier locally.
As vnTinyRAM cannot handle such large parameters, we estimate its cost by ex-
trapolation, assuming linear growth. This yields a conservative estimate since the
overhead of vnTinyRAM’s prover grows quasilinearly (rather than linearly) with
the number of RAM instructions. We report setup time, prover and verifier time,
proof size and the size of the circuit verifying the RAM program. In Figure 5.2,
we show the prover time and memory consumption of the three systems versus the
number of CPU steps. In vRAM, these are mainly determined by the number of
CPU steps executed by the benchmark, rather then the specific choice of instruc-
tions executed in these steps. Consequently, we show the performance of pointer
chasing as a representative example, with other programs behaving similarly. Since
Buffet optimizes the circuit generated based on a particular benchmark program,
we report two cases: one is pointer chasing, which is a fixed-RAM program, and the
other is string search, which is a data dependent RAM program.
Comparison with vnTinyRAM. Both our system and vnTinyRAM can verify
the execution of arbitrary programs with a single setup. As shown in Table 5.3, 5.4
and Figure 5.2 (left), for all benchmarks except matrix multiplication, our system
achieves an approximate 8× improvement in setup time and 9× improvement in
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Setup Time (min) Prover Time (min)






20.0 150∗ 11.2 17.3
#3 16.1 200∗ 9.6 21.21
#4 22.9 90∗ 12.6 9.2
#5 20.8 82∗ 11.8 10.2
Table 5.3: Comparison of the performance of vRAM versus Buffet and vnTinyRAM
(Setup time and prover time. ∗ denotes simulation due to memory exhaustion).
prover time compared to vnTinyRAM. Note that vnTinyRAM is unable to exploit
the fact that matrix multiplication is circuit-friendly, leading to large circuit size,
setup, prover and verifier times. Since our system uses a preprocessing phase that
only depends on the input size and is otherwise agnostic to the program represen-
tation, for circuit-friendly benchmarks we are able to directly use the program’s
circuit representation and thereby obtain an improvement of more than 4 orders of
magnitude for setup time and 5 orders of magnitude for proving time compared to
vnTinyRAM.6
6Note that in order to support all the benchmarks in Table 5.3, vnTinyRAM only needs to
execute a single preprocessing phase which is as large as the largest instance, i.e. matrix multi-
plication. However, for fair comparison, we report a separate setup time for the 4 RAM-friendly
programs and compare the performance of our system to this number.
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|C| (Millions of gates) Verification Time (ms)
TinyRAM Buffet vRAM (mult/total) TinyRAM Buffet vRAM
#1 240000∗ 9.9 9.9 19.8 422∗ 401 26
#2 125∗ 8.6 38.5 150.8 56∗ 69 93
#3 164∗ 7.9 36.2 148.3 9∗ 8 91
#4 75∗ 10.5 18.2 72.4 15∗ 20 84
#5 68∗ 9.4 18.1 74.3 20∗ 15 85
Table 5.4: Comparison of the performance of vRAM versus Buffet and vnTinyRAM
(Number of gates and verification time. ∗ denotes simulation due to memory ex-
haustion).
The speedup obtained by vRAM is due to (1) the better RAM-to-circuit re-
duction from Section 5.2; and (2) the faster argument system from Section 3. To
isolate the effect of (1), in Table 5.4 we report the number of gates in the circuits
produced by our reduction. Note that unlike vnTinyRAM and Buffet, in vRAM
all types of gates (numbers reported in the last column) contribute to the prover
time, instead of multiplication gates only.7 Thus, to facilitate the comparison be-
tween vnTinyRAM’s circuit reduction and our circuit reduction, we also report the
number of multiplication gates in the table. As shown in Table 5.4, the number of
7Both vnTinyRAM and Buffet use the notion of quadratic constraints with each constraint
verifying that the product of the outputs of two unbounded fan-in gates equals to the output of a
third unbounded fan-in add gate.
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Figure 5.2: Prover time (left) and memory consumption (right) of our construction
vs vnTinyRAM and Buffet for various number of CPU steps.
multiplication gates in our system is 3.3–4.5× less than in vnTinyRAM. Regarding
(2), the performance of our argument system is demonstrated in more detail in Sec-
tion 5.3.4, where we show that the per-gate cost of our system is lower than that of
QAP-based systems.
Comparison with Buffet. The main advantage of our system compared to Buffet
is that it can support arbitrary programs with a single setup. As shown in Table 5.3,
the setup time for our system is 38.7 minutes for any program that runs for up to
65K CPU steps. Although the setup time of Buffet for the indicated programs is
lower, an independent setup would have to be run for each different program to be
verified (and the set of programs being verified must be known at the time setup is
run). Moreover, we note that Buffet’s setup time would likely be larger than ours if
used for a program running for 65K CPU steps (which none of the benchmarks do).
Overall, the prover time of our system is comparable to that of Buffet. On
one hand, for programs with fixed memory access and instruction patterns (such as
pointer chasing and merge sort) Buffet can perform numerous optimizations, since
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the instruction to be executed in each CPU step is pre-determined. This allows
Buffet to highly customize the resulting circuit. Nonetheless, our system is still only
around 2× slower than Buffet while avoiding program-dependent preprocessing. On
the other hand, for programs with input-dependent memory and instruction patterns
(such as KMP string search and sparse matrix-vector multiplication), our system
actually outperforms Buffet, despite the fact that the latter can optimize the circuit
during preprocessing. Moreover, as mentioned in [83, Section 4.3], if a program has
deep nesting of data dependent loops or complex conditions (e.g., a state machine),
the compiler of Buffet may have to incur a significantly higher overhead, since the
amount of applicable optimizations will be limited. However, the performance of
our construction is not adversely affected by such programs therefore our speedup
compared to Buffet can be higher.
Finally, we note that when the program is circuit-friendly, e.g., matrix multi-
plication, Buffet can also represent the computation using a circuit. In this case, the
circuit is exactly the same in both systems, and the prover time of our system is 22×
faster than Buffet, since our argument system outperforms Buffet’s Pinocchio-based
argument [71].
Memory consumption. Another advantage of our system is that it uses much
less memory in order to prove the same statement. As shown in Figure 5.2 (right),
the memory consumption of our system is 55–110× less than vnTinyRAM, yielding
a two orders of magnitude improvement. The memory consumption is also 4− 8×
less than Buffet. In particular, on a desktop machine with 32GB of RAM, we can
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#1 #2 #3 #4 #5
Proof Size (KB) 4 256 255 236 235
Memory Usage (GB) 3.6 7.6 7.7 3.8 3.8
Table 5.5: Proof size and memory usage of vRAM.
execute 218 CPU steps, while vnTinyRAM can only reach 212 steps, and Buffet can
reach 215 − 216 steps. We also report the memory consumption for the benchmarks
we run in Table 5.5. The improvement is largely due to our reliance on the CMT
protocol which imposes a minimal memory overhead for the non-input part of the
circuit. In fact, although the circuit size is much larger than the input size, the
memory usage of our VPD protocol and the CMT protocol are on the same order.
In addition, in the VPD protocol, the memory is mainly used for storing the public
key, thus the usage is roughly the same in the setup and the evaluate phase of VPD.
Verification time and proof size. We next compare the verification time and
communication cost of our system with vnTinyRAM and Buffet, both of which out-
perform our system. In particular, the verification time is 9–56ms for vnTinyRAM
and 8–35ms for Buffet (except matrix multiplication). Also, vnTinyRAM and Buf-
fet inherit a proof size of 288 Bytes from QAP-based SNARKS. For comparison,
the verification time and the overall communication cost for our construction varies
on different sizes of circuits. As shown in Table 5.4 and 5.5, the verification time
is 84–93ms and the communication is 235–256KB for different programs. However,
we believe that these are very modest quantities for any modern machine.
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Proving 2 million instructions. To demonstrate the ability of our construction
to handle the task of verifying programs that run for large amounts of CPU steps,
we also ran our system on an Amazon EC2 m4.16xlarge machine featuring 256GB of
RAM and an Intel Xeon E5-2676v3 CPU with 64 virtual cores running at 2.4GHz.
Using this machine, we executed our system for programs consisting of 221 instruc-
tions. The reported prover’s time is 51000s, the memory consumption grows to 252
GB and the total number of gates in the circuit is 4.8 billion. While these numbers
are concretely large, we stress that, to the best of our knowledge, this is by far the
largest reported successfully performed instance of verifiable RAM computation.
In particular, this instance is about 65× larger than the largest instance reported
in [18] (which was achieved by using a 256GB solid state drive as additional memory
space). Finally, the reported verification time was less than 105ms and the total
communication cost was 336.5KB.
5.3.2 Comparison to Other RAM-based VC systems
In this section, we briefly discuss the performance of our system compared to
other RAM-based VC systems.
Pantry and SNARKs for C. Pantry [29] and SNARKs for C [16] are two VC
schemes that predate Buffet and vnTinyRAM, with their performance subsumed by
those systems (see [83, Figure 10] and [18, Figure 3]).
Exploiting data parallel structure via bootstrapping. Geppetto [37] is a VC
system that takes a large circuit, splits it into sub-circuits, and preprocesses each
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sub-circuit with a SNARK separately. An additional SNARK is then applied to ag-
gregate and verify the outputs of all sub-circuits in a ”bootstrapping” step. Though
verifiable RAM is not explicitly considered in [37], the system can be potentially
applied to circuits checking the correctness of a RAM program, such as ones in Sec-
tions 5.1.2 and 5.2. Due to the data parallel structure of these circuits, Geppetto can
reduce the setup time asymptotically (e.g., only one setup for the sub-circuit Cmem,
Ctime etc.). However, it introduces a big concrete overhead for both setup and prover
time because of the bootstrapping phase. For example, it requires ∼ 30, 000-100, 000
gates to bootstrap one small sub-circuit of just 500 gates [37, Section 7.3.1].
Constant or no preprocessing. Two alternative approaches for RAM-based VC
are suggested in [13, 17] by Ben-Sasson et al. The first uses composition of elliptic
curves to recursively apply a SNARK in a sequence of T fixed-size circuits, each
of which validates the state of a single previous CPU step, executes the next CPU
step, and outputs the new state. In this way, the resulting setup time is constant.
The second constructs a RAM-based VC without any preprocessing by using PCPs.
Both these systems incur a very large concrete overhead on the prover. It takes
35.5 seconds/cycle for the first system [17, Figure 1], which is about 3000× slower
than ours. For the second one, it takes 0.33 seconds/cycle using 64 threads in
parallel [13, Figure 1], which roughly corresponds to 21.1 seconds/cycle using single
thread [13, Section 2]. This is compared to our single threaded implementation
which achieves 0.015 seconds/cycle. We leave the task of achieving a speedup for
our system via parallelization as future work.
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Figure 5.3: Prover time for evaluating memcpy (left), RC4 (right) using vRAM
with (green) and without (blue) the optimizations of Section 5.3.3. For memcpy
we vary the size of the copied memory block and for RC4 we vary the number of
pseudorandom bytes generated.
5.3.3 Just-in-Time Architecture
Next, we use the architecture-independent preprocessing property of our scheme
to improve performance for specific tasks. Common just-in-time compilation meth-
ods are used to optimize the executed code for a specific architecture. The circuit
independent preprocessing feature of our construction allows us to take this ap-
proach further and modify the machine’s architecture in order to better fit a specific
program after executing it, when the program’s exact behavior on its inputs is
known. We illustrate this using two benchmarks from [16,18]. We stress that since
our protocol has architecture-independent preprocessing we are able to change the
architecture without rerunning the preprocessing phase. In particular, the follow-
ing results were achieved with a single preprocessing execution. In all cases, the
verifier’s runtime remained below 150ms.
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Improving performance by adding instructions. Figure 5.3(left) shows prover’s
time for evaluating a program which copies consecutive blocks of memory from one
location to another (e.g., memcpy). We achieve a 3.6× improvement by introducing
a memory instruction which (1) copies a byte from memory address A to memory
address B and (2) increments A and B by 1 for the next loop iteration. This reduces
the number of gates in the obtained circuit, thus yielding lower prover time. In this
case, we did not modify any of the machine’s other parameters (e.g., number of
registers and register size).
Improving performance by changing register sizes. Next, Figure 5.3(right)
shows prover’s time for evaluating a RC4 pseudorandom generator on a highly spe-
cialized architecture. More specifically, we modified the machine to contain 3 8-bit
registers, a 32-bit address register for memory accesses and a 32-bit program counter.
Each RC4 round was implemented using 16 instructions operating over the 8-bit
registers. Notice the 2.4× speedup compared to the non-optimized version, which
again results from the overall reduction of necessary gates in order to generate one
pseudorandom byte.
5.3.4 Microbenchmarks
Finally, we report here the individual performance of our construction’s main
building blocks.
Verifiable polynomial delegation. Table 5.6 shows the prover time of our imple-
mentation of the VPD from Section 3.1. The prover time is about 12µs per input
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Benchmark VPD CMT Buffet vnTinyRAM
Time/Input Time/Gate Time/Gate Time/Gate
#2 11.32 5.42 77.50 72.20
#3 13.17 6.36 68.34 72.15
#4 13.23 6.18 74.97 72.33
#5 12.90 5.77 72.10 72.37
Table 5.6: Per gate (input) prover time for our VPD and CMT, Buffet and
vnTinyRAM for the last 4 RAM programs in the benchmark (same order and size
as in Table 5.3 and 5.4). Time reported in µs.
gate, which is about 8× faster than that of [88]. This is due to (i) our improved
VPD construction (amounting to around 2-4×) and (ii) due to the fact that 85%
of the inputs used in our RAM reduction are field elements that encode single bit
values (due to bit decomposition, register indices and flags), which leads to faster
exponentiation times for the VPD prover.
CMT protocol. Next, we evaluate the performance of our CMT protocol. As
can be seen in Table 5.6, the average time required per gate for the CMT prover
is about 6µs, which is about 4× slower than the 1.7µs number reported in [88].
This is because we implemented our new CMT protocol supporting circuits with
different copies of sub-circuits in Section 3.2, while the CMT protocol for regular
circuits is used in [88]. Both the per-input time for the VPD protocol and the per-
gate time for the CMT protocol are much faster than the per-gate time for Buffet
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and vnTinyRAM.
Circuit generator. Finally, we report the number of gates required by our re-
duction to verify a TinyRAM cycle. We measure this by dividing the total number
of gates of the circuits produced by the experimental evaluation of Section 5.3.1
over the number of TinyRAM steps. For our tested programs this circuit contained
about 2500 gates, 600 of which are multiplications (for comparison, vnTinyRAM
takes roughly 2000 multiplication gates, as reported in [18]. Notice that the work
of [18] only needs to report the number of multiplication gates while we must report
on the total number of gates.
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Chapter 6: Zero Knowledge
Our argument scheme presented in Section 3 lacks one crucial property: it
is not zero-knowledge. Moreover, while state-of-the-art SNARKs from quadratic-
arithmetic programs can be made zero-knowledge by simply randomizing proof ele-
ments, this approach is not directly compatible with our argument scheme.
In this chapter, we show a zero-knowledge version of our argument scheme.
At a high level, in order to obtain a zero-knowledge property we replace both of
the underlying components, the VPD and the CMT protocols, with zero-knowledge
variants. For the CMT component, this can be achieved by running the entire proto-
col inside homomorphic commitments (as first observed in a a more general context
by Cramer and Damg̊ard [38]). For the VPD part, we devise a new construction
that we call zk-VPD which is used to allow the prover to produce a proof about the
correctness of a commitment to the correct evaluation of a polynomial (rather than
proving correctness of the evaluation itself).
Asymptotically, our protocol has the same performance as that in Section 3
and has a preprocessing phase that only depends on an upper bound on the size
of the input, but not on the specific circuit to be evaluated. In practice, we would
expect it to have a slightly larger overhead for both parties (due to the increased
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number of cryptographic operations).
In this chapter, we first go through building blocks we use to achieve zero-
knowledge in Section 6.1, and present the zero-knowledge variants of the VPD pro-
tocol and CMT protocol in Section 6.2 and 6.3. We then present the construction
of our new zero-knowledge argument system in Section 6.4.
6.1 Building Blocks
Linearly homomorphic commitment scheme. We assume the existence of a
commitment scheme Comm = (Setup,Com,Open) that has Zq (for prime q) as its
message space. This could be instantiated by the Pedersen commitment scheme [73],
for example. We assume:
• Setup(1λ) outputs public commitment parameters cp.
• Com(cp,m, r) on input a message m ∈ Zq and randomness r outputs a com-
mitment com.
• Open(cp, com,m, r) accepts iff Com(cp,m, r) = com.
We also require that there exists an efficient algorithm Evaluate(cp, com1, . . . , comn, x1, . . . , xn)
that on input n valid commitments (for some randomness values ri) for m1, . . . ,mn




accepts, where r′ is computed as a function of (r1, . . . , rn, x1, . . . , xn). For Pedersen
commitments, this can be easily achieved by having Evaluate(cp, com1, . . . , comn,










Zero-knowledge argument for commitment-preimage equality. We assume
the existence of a zero-knowledge argument ZKeq for proving that two commitments
produced with Comm have the same pre-image. Somewhat informally, we write
ZKeq(m, r1, r2; com1, com2) → 1/0 to denote the interaction between a prover that
holds cp,m, r1, r2, com1, com2 such that Open(cp, comi,m, ri) accepts for i = 1, 2, and
a verifier that holds cp, com1, com2 will eventually accept if he believes they have
the same preimage and he will reject otherwise. For completeness, we require that
the verifier accepts with probability 1 for a valid statement. For soundness, we
require that for any probabilistic polynomial-time (cheating) prover algorithm, the
verifier will accept a false statement with probability negligible in λ. Zero-knowledge
dictates that the verifier learns nothing about m1,m2. For the Pedersen commitment
scheme, such a protocol can be instantiated by first using a sigma-protocol (e.g., the
one from [25]) and then using standard techniques to make it full zero-knowledge
(e.g., [44]).
Zero-knowledge argument for product of preimages. We assume the exis-
tence of a zero-knowledge argument ZKprod for proving that for three commitments
com1, com2, com3 produced with Comm it holds that the preimage of the last is the
product (in F) of the preimages of the first two. We write ZKeq(m1,m2, r1, r2, r3;
com1, com2, com3) → 1/0 to denote the interaction between a prover that holds
cp,m1,m2, r1, r2, r3, com1, com2, com3 such that Open(cp, comi,mi, ri) accepts for i =
1, 2, and Open(cp, com3,m1 ·m2, r3) accepts, and a verifier that holds cp, com1, com2,
com3. For completeness, we require that the verifier accepts with probability 1 for
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a valid statement. For soundness, we require that for any probabilistic polynomial-
time (cheating) prover algorithm, the verifier will accept a false statement with
probability negligible in λ. Zero-knowledge dictates that the verifier learns nothing
about m1,m2. For the Pedersen commitment scheme, this can again be instantiated
via a standard combination of [25,44].
Exractability. Finally, we want the commitment scheme to be extractable in the
manner described in [21] for the case of collision-resistant functions, i.e., it should
not be possible to output a valid commitment without knowing a corresponding
pre-image. Somewhat informally, this is captured by the existence of an adversary-
specific extractor that (given access to the adversary’s code, random tape and auxil-
iary input) can output a pre-image for any commitment value the adversary produces
with all but negligible probability. For the Pedersen commitment scheme this can
be achieved, under Assumption 2, via the following modifications. (1) Parameters
cp also include value gβ for β ∈ F chosen uniformly at random. (2) Commitments
consist of a pair of values from com, com′ ∈ G such that com′ = comβ. (3) Upon
receiving such a commitment com, com′, the receiving party must check the relation
e(com, gβ) = e(com, g) and abort if the check fails. To ease notation, in the following
when describing a commitment value we will only refer to com and we will omit the
above validity check from the description of our protocols.
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6.2 Zero-Knowledge Polynomial Commitment
In this section we present our zero knowledge polynomial delegation scheme.
At a high level, the main idea is to modify the polynomial delegation scheme of [88]
to output a commitment to the evaluation instead of the evaluation itself. That is,
instead of having Evaluate output the value y of the polynomial f when evaluated
on the input x together with a suitable proof π, the zero-knowledge polynomial
delegation commitment scheme outputs a statistically hiding and computationally
binding commitment comy to the value of y (in addition to the proof π). This hides
the value of y but still supports verifying that comy is indeed a commitment to f(x).
We first present our definition of a zero-knowledge polynomial delegation
scheme.
Definition 6. Let F be a finite field, F be a family of `-variate polynomials over
F, and d be a variable-degree parameter. (KeyGen,Commit,Evaluate,CheckCom,Ver)
constitute a zero-knowledge verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol for F if:





(pp, vp)← KeyGen(1λ, `, d)
comf ← CommitPoly(f, rf , pp)
(comy, π)← CommitValue(f, t, f(t), rf , ry, pp)
:
CheckCom(comf , vp) = 1 ∧
Ver(comf , t, comy, π, vp) = 1

• Binding. For any ppt adversary Adv and benign auxilary inputs z1, z2 the fol-
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lowing probability is negligible:
Pr

(pp, vp)← KeyGen(1λ, `, d)
(π∗, com∗f , com
∗
y, state)← Adv(1λ, z1, pp)
(f∗, t∗, y∗, r∗f , r
∗
y)← Adv(1λ, z2, state, pp)
:
CheckCom(com∗f , vp) = 1 ∧
Ver(com∗f , t
∗, com∗y, π∗, vp) = 1 ∧
com∗f = CommitPoly(f
∗, r∗f , pp) ∧
(com∗y, π) = CommitValue(f∗, t∗, y∗, r∗f , r
∗
y , pp)
∧ f∗(t∗) 6= y∗

.
• Zero Knowledge. For security parameter λ, polynomial f , adversary Adv, and






1. (pp, vp)← KeyGen(1λ, `, d)
2. Generate rf uniformly at random
3. comf ← CommitPoly(f, rf , pp)
4. k ← Adv(1λ, comf , vp)
5. For i = 1, . . . , k repeat:
(a) Generate ri uniformly at random
(b) ti ← Adv(1λ, comf , comy1 . . . , comyi−1 , π1, . . . , πi−1, vp)
(c) (comyi , πi)← CommitValue(f, ti, f(ti), rf , ri, pp)





1. (comf , pp, vp, σ)← Sim(1λ, `, d)
2. k ← Adv(1λ, comf , vp)
3. For i = 1, . . . , k repeat:
(a) ti ← Adv(1λ, comf , comy1 . . . , comyi−1 , π1, . . . , πi−1, vp)
(b) (comyi , πi, σ)← Sim(ti, σ, pp)
4. b← Adv(1λ, comf , (comy1 . . . , comyk , π1, . . . , πk), vp)
5. Output b
We require that for any ppt adversary Adv and all f ∈ F, there exists a simulator
Sim such that the following is negligible
∣∣Pr [RealAdv,f (1λ) = 1]− Pr [IdealAdv,Sim(1λ) = 1]∣∣ .
Finally, we say that (KeyGen,Commit,Evaluate,CheckCom,Ver) are an extractable
zero-knowledge verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol for F if (KeyGen,Commit,
Evaluate,CheckCom,Ver) satisfy the following extraction requirements instead of the
above defined soundness requirement.
• Polynomial extractability. For any ppt adversary Adv there exists a polynomial-
time algorithm E with access to Adv′s random tape such that for all benign auxil-
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iary inputs z ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) the following probability is negligible:
Pr

(pp, vp)← KeyGen(1λ, `, d);
com∗f ← Adv(1λ, pp, z);
(f, rf )← E(1λ, pp, z)
:
CheckCom(com∗, vp) = 1 ∧
com∗f 6= CommitPoly(f, rf , pp)
 .
• Evaluation extractability. For any ppt adversary Adv there exists a polynomial-
time algorithm E with access to Adv′s random tape such that for all benign auxil-
iary inputs z ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) the following probability is negligible:
Pr

(pp, vp)← KeyGen(1λ, `, d)
(t∗, π∗, com∗f , com
∗
y)← Adv(1λ, pp, z)
(f, rf , y, ry)← E(1λ, pp, z)
:
CheckCom(com∗f , vp) = 1 ∧
Ver(com∗f , t
∗, com∗y, π
∗, vp) = 1 ∧
(f(t∗) 6= y ∨ com∗f 6= CommitPoly(f, rf , pp) ∨
(π∗, com∗y) 6= CommitValue(f, t∗, y, rf , ry, pp))

.
Our construction of zero-knowledge verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol
is as following:
Construction 5 (Zero-knowledge Verifiable Polynomial-Delegation Pro-
tocol). Let F be a prime-order finite field, ` be a variable parameter, and d be a





) is polynomial in λ. Consider the fol-
lowing protocol for the family F containing `-variate polynomials of variable-degree d
over F.
1. KeyGen(1λ, `, d): Select α, β, s1, . . . , s`, s`+1 ∈ F uniformly at random, run bp←




i∈W si}W∈W`,d. The public parameters
are set to be pp = (bp,P, gα, gβ, gs`+1 , gαs`+1 , gβs`+1) and the verifier parameters
are set to be vp = (bp, gs1 , · · · , gs` , gs`+1 , gα, gβ).
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2. CommitPoly(f, rf , pp): If f 6∈ F output null. Else, compute c1 = gf(si,...,s`)+rf s`+1
and c2 = g
α·(f(si,...,s`)+rf s`+1), and output the commitment comf = (c1, c2).
3. CheckCom(comf , vp): On input a commitment comf = (comf,1, comf,2), check
whether it is well-formed, i.e., output 1 if e(comf,1, g
α) = e(comf,2, g) and output
0 otherwise.
4. CommitValue(f, t, y, rf , ry, pp): Choose r1, . . . , r` ∈ F uniformly at random. Next,
using Lemma 1 compute polynomials qi such that
f(x1, . . . , x`) + rfx`+1 − (y + ryx`+1) =
∑̀
i=1




Set comy ← (gy+rys`+1 , gβy+βrys`+1). For i = 1, . . . , `, compute comi ← CommitPoly(





put comy and the proof π := (com1, . . . , com`+1).
5. Ver(comf , t, comy, π, vp): Parse the proof π as (com1, . . . , com`+1). For i =
1, . . . , ` + 1 run CheckCom(comi, pp). If any of them outputs 0, output 0. Oth-
erwise, parse comf as (comf,1, comf,2) and comy as (comy,1, comy,2) and for i =
1, . . . , ` + 1 parse comi as (comi,1, comi,2). If e(comy,1, g
β)
?
= e(comy,2, g) and
e(comf,1/comy,1, g)
?
= e(gs`+1 , com`+1,1)
∏`
i=1 e(g
si−ti , comi) output 1, otherwise
output 0.
Next, consider the following theorem.
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Theorem 8. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, Construction 5 is a zero-knowledge ex-
tractable verifiable polynomial-delegation protocol. Moreover, for a variable-degree-d






), CommitPoly in time O(m), CommitValue in time O(`dm), Ver
in time O(`) and CheckCom in time O(1). If d = 1, CommitValue can be made to
run in time O(2`). The commitment produced by CommitPoly consists of O(1) group
elements, and the proof produced by CommitPoly consists of O(`) elements of G.
Proof. Completeness follows by close inspection of the algorithms. Next, we prove
the rest of the properties of Definition 6.
Polynomial extractability. Let Adv be a ppt adversary that on input (1λ, pp),
where (pp, vp) is the output of KeyGen(1λ, `, d), outputs commitment com∗f such
that CheckCom(com∗f , vp) accepts. This implies that e(comf,1, g
α) = e(comf,2, g).
By Assumption 2, there exists ppt extractor E for Adv such that upon the same






i∈W sigbs`+1 = comf,1, except with negligible probability.
Note that, the coefficients (a0, . . . , a|W`,d|, b) can always be encoded as an (` + 1)-
variate polynomial that consist of the sum of two polynomials: an `-variate one with
degree-variable d that is defined over variables x1, . . . , x` and has values ai as its
monomial coefficients, and the univariate, degree-1 polynomial bx`+1.
Binding. Next, we prove the binding property. Let Adv be a ppt adversary that
wins the binding game with non-negligible probability. For i = 1, . . . , ` + 1 we
define adversary Advi that receives the same input as Adv and executes the same
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code, but outputs only comi ∈ π∗ (where π∗ is the proof output by Adv). Moreover,
since Adv is ppt, all these adversaries are also ppt. Thus, for i = 1, . . . , ` +
1, from Assumption 2 there exists ppt Ei (running on the same random tape as
Advi) which on input (1
λ, pp) outputs a0,i, . . . , a|W`,d|,i, bi ∈ F such that the following
holds: If e(comi,1, g





j∈W sj · gbis`+1 6= comi,1,
except with negligible probability. By the same reasoning as above, the coefficients
(a0,i, . . . , a|W`,d|,ibi) for each i = 1, . . . , ` can always be encoded as an (`+ 1)-variate
q′i that can be expressed as the sum of an `-variate polynomial with variable-degree d
that is defined over variables x1, . . . , x` and a univariate degree-1 polynomial defined
over x`+1.
We now proceed to build an adversary B that breaks Assumption 1 for pa-
rameter (`+ 1) · d. Upon input (1λ, bp, gs, gs2 , . . . , gs(`+1)·d), B proceeds as follows:
Parameter Generation. B implicitly sets s1 = s and for i = 2, . . . , ` + 1 he chooses
ρi ∈ F uniformly at random and sets (also implicitly) si = s · ρi. Then he chooses
uniformly at random values α, β ∈ F. Next B needs to generate the terms in
P = {g
∏
i∈W si , gα·
∏
i∈W si}W∈W`,d . Since the exponent of each term is a product
of at most ` · d factors where each factor is one of the values si = s · ri (for i =
1, . . . , `), it can be written as a polynomial in s with degree at most ` ·d. Therefore,
B can compute these terms from the values g, gs, gs2 , . . . , gs`·d and α. Then, he
computes gs`+1 , gαs`+1 , gβs`+1 . Finally, B runs Adv on input (1λ, pp), where pp =
(bp,P, gα, gβ, gs`+1 , gαs`+1 , gβs`+1).







Adv, B first checks whether CommitPoly(f ∗, r∗f , pp) = com∗f and CommitValue(f ∗, t∗,
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r∗y, pp) = com
∗




π∗, vp) where vp = (bp, gs1 , . . . , gs
`+1
, gα, gβ). If Ver rejects B aborts, else he runs
extractors E1, . . . , E`+1 (defined above) on the same input as Adv and receives poly-
nomials q′1, . . . , q
′
`+1.










f ∗(t∗). Note that by setting s1 = s, s2 = ρ2 · s, . . . , s`+1 = ρ`+1 · s, we implicitly set
variables x2, . . . , x`+1 to ρ2 ·x1, . . . , x` = ρ`+1 ·x1. Thus, K(x) can be interpreted as
an (efficiently computable) univariate polynomial of degree at most (` + 1) · d over
variable x1, which we refer to as K
′(x1).
B then proceeds as follows. He chooses τ ∈ F uniformly at random. If gτ =
g−s, he aborts. Else, he computes univariate polynomial Q of degree at most (`+1)·d
and value R ∈ F such that K ′(x1) = (x1 + τ)Q(x1) + R. We then distinguish two
cases. (1) If R = δ then B factorizes the polynomial K ′ and let Y ⊂ F be the set
of its roots (|Y | ≤ (` + 1) · d). For each y ∈ Y , B tests whether gy = gs. If so, he
outputs (τ, e(g, g)
1
y+τ ) as a challenge tuple for Assumption 1 and halts. If all these
checks fail, he aborts. (2) Else, (if R 6= δ) he outputs (τ, e(g, g)Q(s1)·(δ−R)−1) as a
challenge tuple for Assumption 1 and halts. Recall that, (as explained above) the
expression in the exponent is a (`+ 1) ·d degree polynomial thus the challenge value
is computable in polynomial time from (1λ, p,G,GT , e, g, gs, gs
2
, . . . , gs
(`+1)·d
).
B is clearly ppt since all of Ei are ppt and he performs polynomially many
operations in F,G,GT . Next, we analyze the success probability of B. Recall that, by
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assumption Adv succeeds in breaking the binding property of the scheme with non-
negligible probability ε. We observe that, conditioned on not aborting, B perfectly
emulates the binding game to A and moreover B’s output is always a valid tuple for
breaking Assumption 1. Let us argue why this is true.
Since verification succeeded, it holds that





and since extraction succeeded this can be replaced with
e(g, g)f









































e(g, g)δ = e(g, g)K(s1,...,s`+1)
e(g, g)δ = e(g, g)K
′(s1) = e(g, g)(x1+tau)Q(s1)+R
In order for the last substitution to be possible, it must the case that K ′(x1),
and correspondingly K ′(x) is non-constant polynomial (i.e., with degree > 0). Re-
call, that for polynomials defined over finite fields division is always possible assum-
ing that the dividend’s degree is at least as large as that of the divisor’s. Moreover,
the degree of the quotient is at most that of the dividend’s and that of the remainder
is strictly smaller than that of the divisor (i.e., R is a constant in this case).
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Let us assume thatK ′(x) is a constant polynomial. Since, e(g, g)δ = e(g, g)K(s1,...,s`+1)
and e(g, g) is a generator or GT , it must be that K ′(x)
def
= δ therefore we can write
f ∗(x1, . . . , x`)− δ − f ∗(x1, . . . , x`) =
x`+1q
′
`+1(x1, . . . , x`+1) + (ry − rf )x`+1 +
∑̀
i=1
(xi − ti)q′i(x1, . . . , x`+1)
f ∗(x1, . . . , x`)− y∗ =
x`+1q
′
`+1(x1, . . . , x`+1) + (ry − rf )x`+1 +
∑̀
i=1
(xi − ti)q′i(x1, . . . , x`+1)
f ∗(x1, . . . , x`)− (ry − rf )x`+1 − y∗ =
x`+1q
′
`+1(x1, . . . , x`+1) +
∑̀
i=1
(xi − ti)q′i(x1, . . . , x`+1).
Now let f ′ be the `+1 variable polynomial defined as f ′(x1, . . . , x`+1)
def
= f ∗(x1, . . . , x`)−
(ry− rf )x`+1 and let t′ ∈ F`+1 defined as t′ = (t∗1, . . . , t∗` , 0). From the above relation
it follows that f ′(x1, . . . , x`+1)− y∗ =
∑`+1
i=1(xi − t′i)q′i(x1, . . . , x`+1), therefore t′ is a
root of the polynomial f ′′
def
= f ′(x1, . . . , x`+1)−y∗, i.e., f ′′(t′) = 0 which implies that
f ′(t1, . . . , t`+1)− y∗ = 0
f ∗(t1, . . . , t`)− (ry − rf ) · 0− y∗ = 0
f ∗(t1, . . . , t`) = y
∗
which implies that y∗ is the correct evaluation of f ∗ on t∗, i.e., δ = 0. If that
is the case, B has already aborted, therefore conditioned on not aborting this will
never happen.
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In all other cases, the polynomial division is possible therefore we can write
e(g, g)δ = e(g, g)(s1+τ)Q(s1)+R
e(g, g)
δ






s1+τ = e(g, g)Q(s1).
If δ = R (case (1) above), then it follows that e(g, g)0 = e(g, g)Q(s1), i.e., s1 = s is root
of Q. Therefore, s = y for some y ∈ Y (and therefore |Y | > 0). Since factorization
can be done in deterministic polynomial time B always succeeds in computing this
y and e(g, g)
1
y+τ = e(g, g)
1
s+τ thus B succeeds in breaking Assumption 1 in this case.
If δ 6= R (case (2) above), from the above it holds that
e(g, g)
δ−R
s1+τ = e(g, g)Q(s1)
e(g, g)
1
s1+τ = e(g, g)Q(s1)·(δ−R)
−1
therefore, in this case too, B succeeds in breaking Assumption 1 in this case.
Since the two cases are complementary, B always succeeds, conditioned on not
aborting. Thus, it remains to bound the probability of aborting. B can only abort
in three cases. If extraction fails, if y∗ = f ∗(t∗), or if τ = −y. The former can only
happen with negligible probability. This holds since, if verification succeeds it must
be that e(comi,2, g) = e(comi,1, g
α) for i = 1, . . . , `+ 1 and by Assumption 2, extrac-
tion for any of E1, . . . , E`+1 fails with negligible probability. Since ` is polynomial
in λ it follows that the probability any of them fails (which by a union bound is at
most equal to the sum of each individual failure probability) is also negligible. The
second happens by assumption with probability at most 1 − ε (as Adv wins with
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probability at least ε), whereas the third happens with negligible probability O(2−λ)
as τ is chosen uniformly at random from F. By a union bound, the abort probability
is at most (1− ε) + neg(λ). Thus the success probability of B is ε− neg(λ) which is
non-negligible as we assumed that ε is non-negligible. Since B succeeds in breaking
Assumption 1 this contradicts our original assumption and our proof is complete.
Evaluation extractability. This follows almost directly from soundness and poly-
nomial extractability. In particular, let Adv be an ppt adversary that plays the
evaluation extractability game. Let Advf , Advy be two adversaries that on input
the same input as Adv, run Adv’s code internally but only output com∗f , com
∗
y re-
spectively and then halt. Clearly, both adversaries are ppt. Moreover, whenever




∗, vp) output 1, it follows that: (1) by
polynomial extractability there exist extractor Ef with access to the code and ran-
dom tape of Advf that with all but negligible probability outputs f, rf such that
CommitPoly(f, rf , pp) = com
∗
f , and (2) by Assumption 2, since Ver accepted (and
recall that as a sub-routine, Ver checks that e(comy,1, g
β) = e(comy,2, g)) there exists
ppt extractor with access to the code and random tape of Advy that with all but
negligible probability, outputs y, ry ∈ F such that gy+rys`+1 = comy,1.
It remains to show that the event E = {f(t∗) 6= y, where f is the output of
Ef and y is the output of Ey} occurs with negligible probability. For contradiction,
assume Pr[E] = ε, for some non-negligible ε. Then we can build adversary Adv′ that
breaks the binding property of our scheme, as follows.




2. Adv′ runs Ef , Ey on the same input as Adv to receive f, rf , y, ry.
3. Adv′ outputs (f, t∗, y, π∗, com∗f , com
∗
y, rf , ry) as a challenge for the soundness game.
Adv′ is clearly ppt as Adv, Ef , Ey are all ppt. Note that whenever E occurs, Adv′
wins. Assuming that Pr[E] = ε, it follows that Adv′ breaks the binding property,
for which we proved above that it can only happen with negligible probability. This
concludes our proof.
Zero knowledge. We build our simulator Sim that operates as follows.
1. On input (1λ, `, d), run KeyGen(1λ, `, d) and receive pp, vp. Set σ = α, β, s1, . . . , s`+1.
Choose rf ∈ F uniformly at random and set comf = (grf , gα·rf ). Send vp, comf
to A.
2. Receive k from A.
3. For i = 1, . . . , k repeat:
(a) Receive ti from A.
(b) Choose r1i, . . . , r`i, ryi ∈ F uniformly at random.
(c) Compute comyi = (g
ryis`+1 , gβryis`+1), comji = (g
rjis`+1 , gαrjis`+1) for j =






(d) Output (comyi, πi = (com1i, . . . , com`+1i), σ).
Sim is clearly ppt as all the above steps can be computed in time polynomial
in λ. Next, note that since rf and r1i, . . . , r`i, for all i, are chosen uniformly at
random, it follows that comf , com1i, . . . , com`i are indistinguishable from uniformly
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chosen elements from G. Moreover, this holds both in the real and the ideal game
execution since in the former the discrete logs of these elements are computed as
the sum of a polynomial evaluation in F and an element of F chosen uniformly at
random. Finally, note that in both games, for any i, fixing comf , com1i, . . . , com`i
also fixes a unique element com`+1i ∈ G. From the above, it follows that for any (even
unbounded) adversary A and all f ∈ F, it holds that the view from the execution of
RealAdv,f (1
λ) and IdealAdv,Sim(1
λ) is indistinguishable, thus Construction 5 is perfect
zero-knowledge.
6.3 Zero-Knowledge CMT Protocol
We start with a zero-knowledge sum-check protocol, which is a major building
block in the CMT protocol.
6.3.1 A Sum-Check Protocol over Homomorphic Commitments
As shown in Section 2.3.1, the messages exchanged during the sum check
protocol reveal the coefficients of g1, · · · , g`, thus leaking additional information
about the values of g, beyond H. This is problematic since we would like to use
the sum-check protocol as part of a zero-knowledge argument system of NP, where
leaking additional evaluations of g might leak information about the prover’s witness.
To that end, we execute the sum-check protocol over an additively homomorphic
commitment scheme. In particular, we consider the Pedersen commitment scheme,
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modified as described in Section 6.1. The modified protocol starts by having P
commit to the coefficients of g and by providing a commitment com0 to the value
H. Next, at round i, instead of having P send to V the coefficients of gi, we modify
the sum-check protocol and have P send commitments to these coefficients to V .
Since Pedersen commitments are linearly homomorphic, V can locally compute a
commitment com∗ to gi(0)+gi(1) and then check (using the ZKeq protocol) that com∗
commits to the same value as comi−1, thus verifying that indeed gi−1(ri−1) = gi(0)+
gi(1). In case this verification succeeds, V sends a uniformly random challenge ri to
P , and both P and V use the homomorphic properties of the Pedersen commitment
scheme in order to obtain a commitment comi to the evaluation of gi on ri. P and
V repeat the above, using comi and ri in round i+ 1.
Formally, we present our construction below.
Construction 6 (Sum-check Protocol Over Homomorphic Commitment
Schemes). Let F be a prime-order finite field, and let λ be a security parameter.
In addition, let Comm be a linearly homomorphic commitment scheme as described
in Section 6.1, cp ← Setup(1λ), and let g(b1, · · · , b`) be an `-variate total-degree-d
polynomial over F which is represented using m coefficients a0, · · · , am. Consider the
following protocol between P and V for convincing V that t0 =
∑
b1∈{0,1} · · ·
∑
b`∈{0,1}
g(b1, · · · , b`) is a valid opening to some commitment com0. That is, that he knows
ρ0 such that com0 = Com(cp, t0, ρ0).
1. For all i = 1, · · · , ` perform the following.
(a) Define gi(x) =
∑
bi+1,··· ,b`∈{0,1} g(r1, · · · , ri−1, x, bi+1, · · · , b`) and let a0, · · · , am
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be the coefficients of gi.
(b) For every 0 ≤ j ≤ m P computes comaj ← Com(cp, aj, ρaj) where ρaj ∈ F is
selected uniformly at random and sends (coma0 , · · · , comam) to V.
(c) V computes com∗i−1 ← coma0 ·
∏m
k=0 comak which is a commitment to gi(0) +
gi(1).
(d) V and P perform ZKeq(cp, ti−1, ρi−1, ρa0 +
∑m
j=0 ρaj ; comi−1, com
∗
i−1).
(e) V generates a random value ri and sends it to P.
(f) Both V and P compute comi ← Evaluate(cp, coma0 , · · · , comam , 1, ri, · · · , rmi ).





2. V computes com∗` ← Com(cp, g(r1, · · · , r`), ρ`+1) and sends com∗` and ρ`+1 to P.
3. Both V and P perform ZKeq(cp, g(r1, · · · , r`), ρ`, ρ`+1; com`, com∗`).
We now state the following theorem (we are only interested in proving “regu-
lar” soundness and not knowledge soundness).
Theorem 9. For any `-variate, total-degree-d polynomial g : F` → F with m non-
zero coefficients, assuming Comm is a linearly homomorphic commitment scheme,
as described in Section 6.1, and ZKeq is a zero-knowledge non-interactive argument
for testing equality of commitments for Comm, Construction 6 is an interactive
argument with soundness d · `/|F| for the following language L(cp, com0, g; ρ0) : com0 ← Com
cp, ∑
b1,··· ,b`∈{0,1}
g(b1, · · · , b`), ρ0
 and cp← Setup(1λ)

where λ is the security parameter.
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Proof Sketch. The completeness property immediately follows from Construc-
tion 6. We now proceed to argue about the soundness property.
Soundness. Let g(b1, · · · , b`) be an `-variate total-degree-d polynomial over a fi-
nite field F. We begin by observing that the commitment com0 and all coefficient
commitments comaj ,i for i = 1, . . . , `, j = 1, . . . ,m are extractable. That is, for each
of them there exists a polynomial-time extractor that receives the same input as
the adversary Adv and outputs with all but negligible probability a valid pre-image
from F, whenever Adv succeeds in convincing V . This follows under Assumption 2
using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 8 (recall that, as explained in
Section 6.1, we implicitly assume that whenever V receives a commitment he checks
whether it is well-formed and rejects otherwise).
Next, we distinguish between the following two complementary cases.
1. There exists 0 ≤ i ≤ ` such that the extracted pre-images for comi, com∗i
are not equal. In this case, this directly contradicts the soundness of the ZKeq
protocol executed in Steps 1d and 3 of Construction 6. This means that Adv can
be used to construct a black box adversary Adv′ which breaks the soundness of
the ZKeq protocol.
2. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ ` it holds that the extracted pre-images for comi, com∗i
are equal. In this case let t∗0 be the extracted pre-image of com0, and let h
∗
i
be the extracted pre-image of comi for all i = 0, · · · , ` − 1. Also, let g∗i be the
polynomial defined by coefficients a0, · · · , am which are the pre-images extracted
from the commitments coma0 , · · · , comam sent by P in Step 1b of Construction 6
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during the (i + 1)th round. Notice that since comi and com
∗
i have the same




i (0) + g
∗
i (1). Due




i )i=1,··· ,`) is a valid transcript for a (possibly)
cheating prover P∗ controlled by Adv trying to convince a verifier V that indeed
t0 =
∑
b1∈{0,1} · · ·
∑
b`∈{0,1} g(b1, · · · , b`).
Thus, if t0 6=
∑
b1∈{0,1},...,b`{0,1} g(b1 . . . , b`) then Adv can be used in a black-box
manner in order to break the soundness property of the sum-check interactive
proof protocol.
Moreover, we prove the following lemma that will be helpful for us while
proving the zero-knowledge property of our argument.
Lemma 2. For every verifier V∗ and for every `-variate, total-degree-d polynomial
g : F` → F with m non-zero coefficients, there exists a simulator Sim such that Sim
is capable of simulating from cp, com0,m and t0 (without using g) the partial view
of V∗ defined by cp, com0 as well as the messages obtained during only Step 1 of
Construction 6.1
Proof Sketch. We build simulator Sim which simulates the view of V during Step 1
of Construction 6 as follows. First, Sim receives as input commitment parameters
cp, commitment com0, an upper bound m on the number of coefficients of g, as
well as the value t0 =
∑
b1,··· ,b`∈{0,1} g(b1, · · · , b`). Sim proceeds to simulate Step 1 of
Construction 6 as follows.
1Notice that the partial view does not include the coefficients a1, · · · , am of g.
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1. For i = 1, . . . , `:
(a) Sim chooses coefficients a0, . . . am−1 chosen uniformly at random from F and
sets am such that ti−1 = a0 + am +
∑m−1
j=0 aj. Let gi(x) be the polynomial
denoted by coefficients a0, . . . , am and notice that ti−1 = gi(0) + gi(1).
(b) For every 0 ≤ j ≤ m, Sim computes comaj ← Com(cp, aj, ρaj) where ρaj ∈ F
is selected uniformly at random, and sends (coma0 , · · · , comam) to V∗.
(c) Sim computes com∗i−1 ← coma0 ·
∏m
k=0 comak .
(d) Let Simeq be the simulator guaranteed from the zero knowledge property of
ZKeq. Sim runs simulator Simeq on inputs (cp, com∗i−1, comi−1) in order to
simulate V∗’s view during the execution of ZKeq the ith round.
(e) Upon receiving ri from V∗, Sim computes comi ← Evaluate(cp, coma0 , · · · , comam





The produced transcript is indistinguishable from the one V∗ gets while interacting
with P since: (i) the coefficients a0, . . . , am for each round i satisfy the same rela-
tion with respect to ti−1 in both cases, (ii) Comm is statistically hiding, i.e., each
commitment is indistinguishable from a commitment to a random value, and (iii)
the output of Simeq for round i is indistinguishable from the messages received by
V∗ while running ZKeq on the same values. In the following, we consider a slightly
modified simulator Sim that outputs as secret state the values (t`, ρ`) to be used
when building a larger simulator that runs Sim as a black box.
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6.3.2 A CMT Protocol over Homomorphic Commitments
Similarly to the case of the standard sum-check protocol, the messages ex-
changed during the CMT execution leak information about the intermediate values
of the circuit C and thus potentially about the circuit’s input (which in our case
will include the prover’s witness). Thus, similarly to Section 6.3.1, we execute the
CMT protocol over homomorphic commitments and use the commitment’s hiding
property to conceal from V information regarding the circuit’s internal wires.
The modified protocol proceed as follows. First, P sends to V commitments
comx1 , . . . , comxn to the n inputs of C and a commitment com0 to 1 (the claimed
output of the circuit when evaluated on x). Next, at round-i, both P and V use
the first step of the sum-check protocol over homomorphic commitments, resulting





i is uniformly generated by V . Let q1, q2 be the last 2si elements
of r′i. P then computes t1 = Ṽi(q1), t2 = Ṽi(q2), t3 = t1 · t2 and commits to
t1, t2, t3 resulting in comt1 , comt2 , comt3 . V then verifies (using the ZKprod protocol)
that indeed comt3 is a commitment to the multiplication of t1 and t2 and uses the
homomorphic properties of the commitment scheme and the ZKeq protocol in order
to check that the value com′i provided earlier by P is indeed a commitment to the
evaluation of Ṽi−1(r
′
i). Both V and P then use the homomorphic properties of the
commitment scheme and the ZKeq protocol in order for V to obtain a commitment
comi to a value ai = Ṽi(γ(r
′′
i )), where r
′′
i is generated by V , and proceed to the next
round of the protocol using ai and random point ri = γ(r
′′
i ). Finally P reveals x and
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r0 to V who then checks their consistency with the initial commitments, evaluates
the polynomial Ṽx on the last random point established rd and both parties use
ZKeq to establish that a commitment to this evaluation has the same pre-image as
comd. We stress that this entire last step (which clearly would violate any notion
of zero-knowledge) will not be a step of our final construction; it will instead by
replaced with appropriate evocations of zk-VPD.
Formally, consider the protocol presented below.
Construction 7 (CMT Protocol Over Homomorphic Commitment Schemes).
Let F be a prime-order finite field, and let λ be a security parameter, Comm be
a linearly homomorphic commitment scheme as described in Section 6.1, and let
cp ← Setup(1λ). In addition, let C : Fn → F be a depth-d layered arithmetic cir-
cuit and let x ∈ Fn be inputs of C such that C(x) = 1. Consider the following
protocol between P and V for convincing V that x is a valid opening to a series of
commitments comxi ← Com(cp, xi, ρxi), where xi ∈ F is the i-th element of input x.
1. Both parties set a0 = 1 and r0 = 0. P generates ρ0 uniformly at random,
computes com0 ← Comm(cp, a0, ρ0) and sends it to V.
2. For all i = 1, · · · , d perform the following.
(a) V and P execute Step 1 of Construction 6 on input ai−1, polynomial Ṽi−1
(as per Equation 2.1), and randomness ρi−1 for P and comi−1, ri−1 for V.
As a result, V obtains a commitment com′i = Com(t, ρi) (where t and ρi are
known to P and not to V) where P claims that t = Ṽi−1(r′i) with r′i having
been selected uniformly at random by V.
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(b) Let (q1, q2) be the last 2si elements of r
′
i. P computes t1 = Ṽi(q1), t2 = Ṽi(q2),
and t3 = t1 · t2. P then computes commitments comt1 ← Com(cp, t1, ρt1),
comt2 ← Com(cp, t2, ρt2), and comt3 ← Com(cp, t3, ρt3) which he sends to V.
(c) V and P perform ZKprod(cp, t1, t2, t3, ρt1 , ρt2 , ρt3 ; comt1 , comt2 , comt3).
(d) Using Equation 2.1 V can express Ṽi−1(r′i) as a linear function of r′i, Ṽi(q1),
Ṽi(q2), Ṽi(q1) · Ṽi(q2). Thus, using Evaluate, V can obtain a new commitment
com∗i to the evaluation of Ṽi−1(r
′
i) and let ρ
∗
i be the corresponding random-
ness.
(e) V and P perform ZKeq(cp, Ṽi−1(r′i), ρi, ρ∗i ; com′i, com∗i ).
(f) Let γ : F → Fsi be the line defined by γ(0) = q1 and γ(1) = q2 and let
h(x) be the degree-si polynomial such that h(x) = Ṽi(γ(x)) and h0, . . . , hsi
be its coefficients. For j = 0, . . . , si, P computes commitments comhj ←
Com(cp, hj, ρhj) and sends them to V.
(g) V computes comh(0) ← comh0 and comh(1) ←
∏si
j=0 comhj which are commit-
ments to h(0) and h(1) respectively.
(h) V and P perform ZKeq(cp, t1, ρt1 , ρh0 ; comt1 , comh(0)) and ZKeq(cp, t2, ρt2 ,∑si
j=0 ρhj ; comt2 , comh(1)).
(i) V chooses r′′i ∈ F uniformly at random, sets ri ← γ(r′′i ) and sets comi ←
Evaluate(cp, comh0 , · · · , comhsi , 1, r′′i , · · · , r′′si).




3. P sends to V the input x and randomness ρ0 and ρxi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. V verifies
that comxi = Com(cp, xi, ρxi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and that com0 = Com(cp, 1, ρ0).
4. Let Ṽx be the multilinear extension of the polynomial Vx satisfying Vx(i) = xi for
all i = 1, · · · , n. The verifier computes com∗x ← Com(cp, Ṽx(rd), ρ∗d) where ρ∗d is
chosen uniformly at random.
5. V and P perform ZKeq(cp, Ṽx(rd), ρd, ρx; com∗x, comd). V accepts if the protocol
accepts and rejects otherwise.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 10. Let C : Fn → Fk be a depth-d layered arithmetic circuit over a fi-
nite field F. Assuming Comm is an linearly homomorphic commitment scheme as
described in Section 6.1, ZKeq is a zero-knowledge argument for testing equality of
committed values, and ZKprod is a zero-knowledge argument for testing the product
relation between three commitments in Comm, the CMT protocol presented in Con-




(cp, C, comx1 , . . . , comxn); (x1, · · · , xn, ρx1 , . . . , ρxn)
)
:
C(x1, · · · , xn) = 1 ∧
n∧
i=1
comxi = Com(cp, xi, ρxi)
}
where cp ← Setup(1λ), λ is the security parameter, n is the input size of C, and S
is the maximal number of gates per circuit layer in C.
Proof Sketch. The completeness property immediately follows from Construc-
tion 7. We now proceed to argue about the soundness property.
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Soundness. Soundness follows by a similar argument as in Theorem 9. Indeed, let
P∗ be an cheating prover which convinces V (with non-negligible probability) of a
claim “1 = C(x)” for some x and C, such that 1 6= C(x). Using Assumption 2, for
each commitment that V receives from P∗, there exists a polynomial-time extractor
with access to P∗’s code and random tape that outputs (with all but negligible
probability) a corresponding commitment pre-image.
Next, we define the following events.
1. Event A takes place if the extracted pre-image for comd is not equal to Ṽx(rd) or
there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ d such that the extracted pre-images for com′i, com∗i during
Step 2e, or the extracted pre-images for comt1 , comh(0) or comt2 , comh(1) during
Step 2h are not equal.
2. Event B takes place if there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ d such that the extracted pre-image
for comt3 is not equal to the product of the extracted pre-images for comt1 , comt2
during Step 2c
3. Event Ci (for 0 ≤ i ≤ d) takes place if Ṽi(ri) = ai (where Ṽi is as defined in
Equation 2.1) when evaluating C on the extracted pre-image of comx and ai is
the extracted pre-image of comi.
Note that assuming C(x) 6= 1 is equivalent to assuming Ṽ0(r0) 6= a0 i.e., that ¬C0
occurred. Next, we study the following (exhaustive) cases.
• Event A occurs. We argue about this case in exactly the same manner as in the
proof of Theorem 9. That is, this directly contradicts the soundness of the ZKeq
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protocol executed in Steps 5, 2e, or 2h of Construction 6 since P∗ can be used
in a black box manner to construct an adversary Adv which breaks the soundness
of the ZKeq protocol.
• Event B occurs. Again, this directly contradicts the soundness of the ZKprod
protocol executed in Step 2c of Construction 6 since P∗ can thus be used in a
black box manner to construct an adversary Adv which breaks the soundness of
the ZKprod protocol.
• There exist 1 ≤ i ≤ d such that ¬Ci−1 occurs and events A, B do not. We
will now prove that this case contradicts the soundness property of Construction 6.
Note that since V computes Ṽx(rd) def= Ṽd(rd) himself and since event A did not
occur, Cd must occur. Therefore in this case it holds ¬A∧¬B ∧¬Ci ∧¬C0 ∧Cd.
Therefore, there must exist i′ such that ¬Ci′−1 ∧ Ci′ .
Let a∗i′−1 be the extracted pre-image of comi′−1, a
∗
i′ be the extracted pre-image
of comi′ . Since ¬Ci′−1 ∧ Ci′ holds we obtain that a∗i′ = Ṽi′(ri) and that a∗i′−1 6=
Ṽi′−1(ri′−1). Next, since a
∗
i′ = Ṽi′(ri) from Steps 2f-2h we obtain that (except with
negligible probability) it holds that the extracted pre-images of comt1 , comt2 are
indeed equal to Ṽi′(q1), Ṽi′(q2) (where (q1, q2) are the last 2si elements of r
′
i).
We now claim that P∗ can be used in black-box manner to construct an adver-
sary Adv that succeeds in falsely proving that a∗i′−1 is equal to Ṽi′−1(ri′−1), thus
contradicting the soundness of Construction 6. Indeed, let Vsum−check be a verifier
for Construction 7 using the coefficients of Ṽi′−1. Adv then performs (using the
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code of P∗) Step 1 of Construction 6. Since the verifier V for Construction 7
did not reject while interacting with P∗ (and in particular, did not reject during
Step 2a with i = i′), Vsum−check will not reject as well. Notice that, at this point
in Construction 6, it is the case that com` is a commitment to Ṽi′−1(r
′
i) and so is
com′i′ (defined in Step 2a of Construction 7 with i = i
′).
Next, Vsum−check and Adv proceed by performing Steps 2 and 3 of Construc-
tion 6. We now argue that Vsum−check will not reject during Step 3 of Construc-
tion 6. Indeed, since the extracted pre-images t1, t2 of comt1 , comt2 are equal to
Ṽi′(q1), Ṽi′(q2) and since V did not reject during Step 2c and 2d of Construction 7
with i = i′, we obtain that V successfully performed a step which is equivalent to
Step 2 of Construction 6. Thus, V holds a commitment com∗i′ to Ṽi′−1(r′i) (using
the notation of Construction 7) and Vsum−check holds a commitment com∗` to the
same value Ṽi′−1(r
′
i). At this point, ass explained above we also have that that the
pre-images of com` and com
′
i′ are both equal to Ṽi′−1(r
′
i) as well. Since event A
did not occur, it holds that the pre-images of com′i′ and com
∗
i′ also have the same
pre-image. By transitivity, we obtain that com∗` is a commitment to the same
value as com`, thus Vsum−check will not reject during Step 3 of Construction 6.
Therefore, we have violated the soundness of Construction 6 by allowing Adv to
falsely prove that a∗i′−1 = Ṽi′−1(ri′−1).
Moreover, we prove the following lemma that will be helpful for us while
proving the zero-knowledge property of our argument.
Lemma 3. For every verifier V∗ and for every depth-d layered circuit C : Fn → Fk
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over a finite field F there exists a simulator Sim such that Sim is capable of simulating
the view of V∗ in steps 1 and 2 of Construction 7 from C, without access to x.
Proof Sketch. We build simulator Sim that simulates the view of V during Steps 1
and 2 of Construction 7. The simulator gets as input commitment parameters cp
and a circuit C and proceeds as follows.
1. Sim sets a0 = 1 and r0 = 0, and computes comx ← Com(cp, 0, ρx) for some ρx
generated at random. Sim then sends comx to V∗.
2. Sim generates ρ0 uniformly at random, computes com0 ← Com(cp, a0, ρ0) and
sends it to V .
3. Sim proceeds to simulate Step 2 of Construction 7 as follows. For all i = 1, · · · , d
Sim performs the following.
(a) Let Simsum−check be the simulator from the proof of Lemma 2. Sim runs
Simsum−check on input (cp, comi−1, si−1, ai−1), in order to simulate V∗’s view
during the execution of Step 2a. In addition to the final message com′i sent
to V∗, Simsum−check also outputs a secret state (ai, ρi) which is not forwarded
to V∗. Notice that ai is the simulated value of Ṽi−1(r′i) where r′i was chosen
by V∗.
(b) Let (q1, q2) be the last 2si elements of r
′
i. Sim chooses simulated values
t1, t2 ∈ F for Ṽi(q1) and Ṽi(q2) such that ai (which is the simulated value
Ṽi−1(r
′





(c) Sim then computes comtj ← Com(cp, tj, ρtj) for j = 1, 2, 3, where t3 = t1 · t2
and ρt1 , ρt2 , ρt3 are chosen uniformly at random from F, and forwards them
to V∗.
(d) Let Simprod be the simulator guaranteed from the zero knowledge property of
ZKprod. Sim runs simulator Simprod on input cp, comt1 , comt2 , comt3 in order
to simulate V∗’s view during the execution of Step 2c of Construction 7).
(e) Sim performs Step 2d of Construction 7 using the values r′i, t1, t2, t3. This
results in a commitment com∗i to the value of Ṽi−1(r
′
i).




i in order to simulate V∗’s
view during the execution of Step 2e of Construction 7).
(g) Sim computes comh(0) as a fresh commitment to t1. For j = 1, . . . , si − 1,
Sim chooses values hj ∈ F uniformly at random. Moreover, he chooses hsi
such that
∑si
j=1 hj + t1 = t2 and for j = 1, . . . , si he computes comhj ←
Com(cp, hj, ρhj). Sim then sends comh0 , . . . , comhsi to V∗.
(h) Sim computes comh(1) ← comh(0) ·
∏si
j=1 comhj .
(i) Sim runs simulator Simeq on input cp, comt1 , comh(0) and on input cp, comt2 , comh(1)
in order to simulate V∗’s view during the execution of Step 2h of Construc-
tion 7).
(j) Finally, Sim sets ri ← γ(r′′i ) (where r′′i was sent by V∗ in Step 2j of Con-
struction 7) and ai ← H(r′′i ) (where H is the degree-si polynomial that
has as coefficients t1 = h0, h1, . . . , hsi) and ρi ←
∑si
j=0 r
′′jρhj . Finally, Sim
computes comi ← Comm(ai, ρi).
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We claim that the view of V∗ while interacting with Sim (for Steps 1,2 of Con-
struction 6) is indistinguishable from the view he gets while interacting with the
honest prover P since: (i) All triplets ai and t1, t2 (for each round i) chosen by
Sim satisfy Equation 2.1, (ii) All values hj (for each round i) satisfy the condition
h0 = t1 and
∑si
j=1 hj + t1 = t2, (iii) by assumption, the messages received by V∗ by
Simeq, Simprod, Simsum−check (forwarded via Sim) are indistinguishable form the ones
received while running ZKeq,ZKprod and Construction 6 with the honest prover,
and (iv) (ii) Comm is statistically hiding.
Other approaches to make CMT zero-knowledge. Chiesa et al. [34] showed
how a large class of algebraic protocols (including sum-check and CMT) can be made
zero-knowledge using only information theoretic techniques. While this is a very at-
tractive property, it is not clear how to make their approach compatible with a VPD
protocol from Section 3.1. Next, in a concurrent and independent work, Wahby et
al. [84] presented an efficient zero-knowledge argument for sufficiently “parallel” cir-
cuits that utilizes the CMT protocol and uses the same general approach for making
it zero-knowledge as the one used in this work (i.e., running the CMT protocol over
homomorphic commitments). Unlike our construction which has a trusted prepro-
cessing phase and relies on non-standard knowledge-of-exponent assumptions, the
construction of [84] does not require any preprocessing and its security is based solely
on the DDH assumption. However, while our construction achieves communication
size and verification time that are polylogarithmic in the size of the witness w for




|w|) which might be prohibitive for some applications.
6.4 Zero-Knowledge with Function Independent Preprocess-
ing
In this section we construct our zero knowledge proof system with function
independent preprocessing. We run the CMT protocol over homomorphic commit-
ments, as described in 6.3, and by replacing the VPD construction of Section 3 with
our zk-VPD construction from Section 6.2. Formally, consider the following protocol
and theorem.
Construction 8 (Zero-knowledge Delegation Protocol). Let λ be a security
parameter and let F be a prime order field such that |F| is exponential in λ. In
additional, let n be an input size parameter and let t be a circuit size parameter. In
the following, for simplicity of exposition we assume that n is a power of 2. Consider
the algorithms G,P ,V described below.
• Preprocessing phase. The parameter generator G on input 1n, 1t, 1λ runs
(pp, vp) ← KeyGen(1λ, n, 1). The proving key pk is set to be pp and the verifi-
cation key vk is set to be vp.
• Evaluation phase. Let C : Fnx+nw → F be a depth-d layered arithmetic circuit
over F such that |C| ≤ t and nx + nw ≤ n. In addition, let x ∈ Fnx and w ∈ Fnw
such that C(x;w) = 1. Assume that nw/nx = 2
m − 1 for some m ∈ N. Consider
the following protocol between P and V.
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1. Let Ṽd be the multilinear extension of the input layer of C evaluated on (x;w).
P commits to the values of Ṽd by executing comṼd ← CommitPoly(Ṽd, ρṼd , pp)
where ρṼd is generated uniformly at random. P then sends comṼd to V.
2. V runs CheckCom(comṼd , vp). In case CheckCom rejects, V rejects as well.
3. V and P execute Steps 1 and 2 of Construction 7. In case Construction 7
rejects, so does V. Otherwise, at the end of Step 2 of Construction 7 V holds
a commitment comd of an evaluation of Ṽd at a random point rd chosen by V
while P holds the randomness ρd used to generate comd.
4. P executes (com∗d, π)← CommitValue(Ṽd, rd, Ṽd(rd), ρṼd , ρṼd(rd), pp) where ρṼd(rd)
is generated uniformly at random and sends (com∗d, π) to V.
5. Upon receiving (com∗d, π), V executes Ver(com∗d, rd, comṼd , π, vp). In case Ver
rejects, so does V.
6. P and V perform ZKeq(cp, Ṽd(rd), ρd, ρṼd(rd); com∗d, comd). (Note that cp is a
subset of vp.) In case ZKeq rejects so does V.
7. V computes the multilinear extension x̃ of the input x, generates a random
point rx ∈ (Flognx × 0lognw) and sends r to P.
8. Upon receiving rx, P executes (com∗x, πx) ← CommitValue(Ṽd, rx, rṼd , ρrx , pp)
where ρrx is generated uniformly at random and sends (com
∗
x, πx) to V. Next,
V executes Ver(com∗x, rx, comṼd , πx, vp). In case Ver rejects, so does V.
9. V computes comx ← Com(vp, x̃(r′x), ρ′x) where ρ′x is generated uniformly at ran-
dom and r′x is defined to be the first log nx elements of rx. V sends ρ′x to
P.
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10. Both P and V perform ZKeq(cp, Ṽd(rx), ρrx , ρ′x; comx, com∗x). In case ZKeq
rejects so does V.
Theorem 11. For any circuit size parameter t, input size n and finite field F,
Construction 8 is a zero-knowledge argument system for the relation
R = {(C, x;w) : C ∈ CF ∧ |C| ≤ t ∧ inp(C) ≤ n ∧ C(x;w) = 1}.
Moreover, for every (C, x;w) ∈ R the running time of P is O(|C| · log(width(C)))
and if C is log-space uniform then the running time of V is O(|x|+ d · poylog(|C|)).
Finally P and V interact O(d log(width(C))) rounds where d is the depth of C. In
case d is polylog (|C|), the above construction is a succinct argument.
Proof Sketch. The completeness property immediately follows from Construc-
tion 8. We now proceed to argue about the knowledge soundness property.
Knowledge soundness. Let Adv be a reduced version of P∗ that aborts right after
outputting comṼd . By the polynomial extractability property of Construction 5,
there exists extractor E ′ that upon the same input as P∗ and the same random
tape, outputs a n-variable degree-variable 1, polynomial f and randomness ρf such
that CommitPoly(f, ρf , pp) = comṼd with all but negligible probability. We are now
ready to build our extractor E as follows:
1. Run E ′(1λ, pp) and receive polynomial f and randomness ρf . If f is not a n-
variable degree-variable 1, polynomial f , abort.
2. Output w = (f(nx), . . . , f(nw − 1)).
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We now argue that assuming P∗ successfully convinced a verifier V , it is indeed the
case that C(x,w) = 1.
First, notice that com∗x (produced via CommitValue) and comx are of the same
format, i.e., regular Pedersen commitments under the same cp parameters (as de-
scribed in Section 6.1). Thus, by the soundness property of the ZKeq protocol we
obtain that comx and com
∗
x are commitments to the same pre-image. Next, let Evpd,x
be the extractor for P∗ (limited to Steps 1 and 8 of Construction 8) guaranteed by
the evaluation extractability of property of Construction 5, as per Definition 6. Since
P∗ convinces V we obtain that Evpd,x on the same inputs as P∗ outputs f(rx) as the
pre-image of com∗x (with high probability).
We now argue that (f(0), · · · , f(nx − 1)) = x. Indeed, notice that f is an
n-variate variable-degree-1 polynomial and it is thus a multilinear extension. In ad-
dition, by construction of x̃ (Step 7 of Construction 8) it holds that (x̃(0), · · · , x̃(nx−
1)) = x. Next, since comx and com
∗
x are commitments to the same value, we obtain
that x̃(r′x) = f(rx). Thus, by the properties of multilnear extensions we obtain that
with high probability it holds that (f(0), · · · , f(nx−1)) = (x̃(0), · · · , x̃(nx−1)) = x.
We now proceed to argue that C(x,w) = 1. Let x′ = (x,w). We now show how
to construct a prover P∗cmt which will convince a verifier Vcmt from Construction 7
that C(x′) = 1. Using the soundness property of Construction 7 we shall obtain
that C(x,w) = C(x′) = 1 with high probability. Indeed, let x′ = (x′1, · · · , x′n), P∗cmt
starts by computing comx′i ← Com(cp, x′i, ρx′i ) where ρx′i is generated uniformly at
random and cp was given to P∗ by the parameter generator G. P∗cmt then sends
comx′1 , · · · , comx′n to Vcmt and proceeds as follows.
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1. P∗cmt sets a0 = 1, r0 = 0, generates ρ0 uniformly at random, computes com0 ←
Comm(cp, a0, ρ0) and sends it to Vcmt. P∗cmt then emulates G and runs P ∗ until
Step 3 of Construction 8, discarding messages sent to Vcmt.
2. Using P (restricted to Step 3 of Construction 8), P∗cmt now interacts with Vcmt
during Step 2 of Construction 7 by forwarding messages between Vcmt and P . At
the end of this step P∗cmt and Vcmt hold a commitment comd and a random point
rd chosen by V∗cmt.
3. P∗cmt then sends x′ and the randomness ρx′1 , · · · , ρx′n to Vcmt.
4. P∗cmt then runs P ∗ until Step 6 of Construction 8 again discarding messages sent
to Vcmt.
5. Using P (restricted to Step 6 of Construction 8), P∗cmt now interacts with Vcmt
during Step 5 of Construction 7 by forwarding messages between Vcmt and P .
We now proceed to argue that since P convinces V it is the case that P∗cmt convinces
Vcmt. Indeed, first notice that since Step 2 of Construction 8 involve running running
Steps 1 and 2 of Construction 7 and since V did not reject we have that V∗cmt will not
reject as well. Next, since the commitments comx′1 , · · · , comx′n to Vcmt sent by P∗cmt
to Vcmt are honestly computed commitments to the values of x′ using the randomness
ρx′1 , · · · , ρx′n , we obtain that V∗cmt will not reject during Step 3 of Construction 7. It
remains to show that V∗cmt will not reject during Step 5 of Construction 7.
Indeed, notice that f is the unique multilinear extension of x′ = (x,w). Thus
we have that the polynomial Ṽx defined in Step 4 of Construction 7 actually equals
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f . Let Evpd,d be the extractor for P∗ (limited to Steps 1 and 4 of Construction 8)
guaranteed by the evaluation extractability of property of Construction 5, as per
Definition 6. Since P convinces V we have that with high probability Evpd,d on the
same inputs as P∗ outputs f(rd) as the pre-image of com∗d. Next, by uniqueness
property of multilinear extensions, we have that the multilinear extension Ṽx′ of
x′ computed in Step 2 of Construction 7 equals f . This implies that commitment
com∗x′ computed in Step 4 of Construction 7 (executed on input x
′) is also to a
commitment to Ṽx′(rd) = f(rd). Overall, since comd is produced the same way in
Construction 7 and Construction 8, we obtain that the ZKeq protocol is executed
on commitments to the same values. Thus, if P convinces V we obtain that Vcmt
will also be convinced by P∗cmt.
Zero knowledge. Let Simvpd be the simulator from Theorem 8 and Simcmt be the
simulator from Lemma 3. Consider the simulator Sim which is defined as follows.
1. On input (1λ, C, x), Sim runs Simvpd on input (1
`, n, 1) where n is the input size
of C and receives commitment comṼd , parameters pp, vp, and state σ. Note that
pp contains commitment parameters cp for the Pedersen commitment scheme, as
defined in Section 6.1. Sim sends vp to V∗.
2. Sim runs Simcmt on input (cp, C), in order to simulate V∗’s view during the
execution of Step 3 of Construction 8. Let comd be the corresponding output
forwarded to V∗ and rd be the last random point chosen by V∗.
3. In order to simulate V∗’s view during Step 4 of Construction 8, Sim runs Simvpd
on input (rd, σ, pp) and receives commitment com
∗
d, proof π, and new state σ.
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Sim then forwards (com∗d, π) to V∗.
4. Sim runs simulator Simeq on input comd, com
∗
d in order to simulate V∗’s view
during the execution of Step 6 of Construction 8.
5. Upon receiving rx from V∗, Sim simulates V∗’s view during Step 8 of Construc-
tion 8. To that end, Sim runs Simvpd on input (rx, σ, pp) and receives commitment
com∗x, proof πx, and new state σ. Sim then forwards (com
∗
x, πx) to V∗.
6. Upon receiving ρ′x from V∗, Sim computes comx ← Comm(vp, x̃(rx), ρ′x). Next, Sim
runs simulator Simeq on input comx, com
∗
x in order to simulate V∗’s view during
the execution of Step 10 of Construction 8.
We claim that the view of V∗ while interacting with Sim is indistinguishable from
the view he gets while interacting with the honest prover P since: (i) Comm is
statistically hiding, (ii) the messages received by V∗ by Simeq (forwarded via Sim) are
indistinguishable from the ones received while running ZKeq with the honest prover,
(iii) the messages received by V∗ by Simcmt (forwarded via Sim) are indistinguishable
from the ones received while running Construction 7 with the honest prover, and (iv)
the messages received by V∗ by Simvpd (forwarded via Sim) are indistinguishable from
the ones received while running Construction 5 with the honest prover. Note that




x are independent of each other
(modulo the common commitment parameters cp) in both the real and the ideal
execution. In particular, the messages exchanged during Step 3 of Construction 5
do not depend on the value of comx (comṼd in the real execution).
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Asymptotic complexity. Firstly, we note that Pedersen commitments, as well
as protocols ZKeq, ZKprod, require a constant number of exponentiations and field
operations (when instantiated as explained in Section 6.1). Then, the analysis of
the asymptotic complexity of our argument follows in a straight forward manner
from: (i) the analysis of CMT in Theorem 2, (ii) the analysis of the standard VPD
in Theorem 3, (iii) the fact that the zk-VPD protocol of Section 6.2 has the same
asymptotic behavior as the plain VPD in Section 3.1.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we introduce a new construction of an argument system. Our
construction combines techniques developed in the literature of interactive proofs
with an extractable verifiable polynomial delegation scheme, supporting proving
relations in NP. Compared to the most commonly used existing techniques, i.e.
SNARKs, our construction only requires a setup phase that is independent of the
relation, and can be used later to prove any relation without a separate setup. In
addition, we significantly improve the prover efficiency, by reducing the number of
expensive cryptographic operations on the prover side from proportional to the size
of the circuit representing the relation to the size of the input (and the witness).
We apply our new construction to build a verifiable database system that
supports validating arbitrary SQL queries. The prover time is improved by up to
2 orders of magnitude compared to SNARK-based solutions and is comparable to
those customized systems that support only a subset of SQL queries (e.g., Inte-
griDB). We also use our new argument systems to build a verifiable RAM program
and show that it improves the prover time by 1-2 orders of magnitude and the mem-
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ory consumption by 120× compared to prior work, and scales to prove a program
with 2 million CPU instructions, beating the 32K instructions achieved by the best
existing result.
Finally, we present a variant of our argument system that achieves an addi-
tional zero-knowledge property.
7.2 Future Directions
Efficient zero-knowledge argument without trusted setup. Though our new
argument system removes the function-dependent setup phase, it still requires a
trusted party to perform the key generation with a trapdoor, and the soundness
and zero-knowledge will be broken if the trapdoor is leaked.
Many recent work [11, 14, 26, 30, 84] try to remove this trusted setup phase.
However, they either produce a proof that is not succinct (square root of the size of
the witness [11,26,84]), or require a linear verification time [11,26,30]. A remaining
open problem is to construct an efficient and succinct argument system without
trusted setup.
Privacy-preserving smart contracts. One key application of zero-knowledge
proof is to construct privacy-preserving smart contracts. Smart contract systems
on blockchain and crypto-currencies enforce the correct execution of digital con-
tracts among many parties without a trusted third party. However, existing smart
contracts have no privacy guarantee. All information of the contracts, such as the
amount of money and the sender and the receiver of the transactions, are exposed
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on the blockchain.
Kosba et. al. [59] proposed a system, Hawk, for privacy-preserving smart
contracts using zero-knowledge proof. Instead of posting the contract in the clear
on the blockchain, a contract manager would instead post a zero-knowledge proof
that the contract is correctly executed. In this way, all parties of the blockchain can
validate the contract without learning any of its information. However, zk-SNARK
is used to construct the zero-knowledge proof in [59], which requires a trusted setup
phase for every different contract. Because of this, a trusted party needs to be
present to generate the parameters of zero-knowledge proof for every contract in
Hawk, which deviates from the original goal of decentralization in blockchain.
A future direction is to apply our new zero-knowledge proof system to address
this issue. With our new protocol, the public parameters are only generated once by
a trusted authority, and can be used to generate proofs of difference smart contracts
later. How to reduce the proof size and verification time of our protocol, and how
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